[ G.R. No. 96131. September 06, 1991 ] 278 Phil. 434
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 96131. September 06, 1991 ]
CORAZON C. GONZAGA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are two (2) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated 10 September 1990 and 30 October 1990, respectively, rendered in Criminal Case No. 14404, entitled “People vs. Corazon C. Gonzaga” (For: Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code). The resolution dated 10 September 1990 granted the prosecution’s motion to suspend accused-petitioner, pendente lite, from her position as school principal of Malabon Municipal High School, Malabon, Metro Manila. The resolution dated 30 October 1990 denied accused-petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the 10 September 1990 resolution. Petitioner alleges in her present petition[1] that a complaint for malversation of public funds was filed against her, in her capacity as School Principal of the Malabon Municipal High School, Malabon, Metro Manila. The complaint was filed before the Ombudsman by the Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of Malabon, based on the audit report of the Commission on Audit, wherein petitioner as an accountable officer is alleged to have incurred a shortage of P15,188.37; that an information[2] dated 2 March 1990 was thereafter filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for the crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code;[3] that before she could be arraigned, accused-petitioner filed with respondent court a motion for re-investigation, which motion was denied by said court in its resolution dated 2 July 1990;[4] that on 17 August 1990, accused-petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged; and that on the same date, the prosecution filed a motion seeking to suspend, pendente lite, the accused as school principal of the above-named school,[5] on the basis of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 (“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”), as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.[6] The resolution dated 10 September 1990 granted the prosecution’s motion to suspend the accused, pendente lite, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, accused CORAZON GONZAGA is hereby suspended pendente lite from her position as Principal of the Malabon National High School, Malabon, Metro Manila and from such other public positions that she maybe holding, effective immediately upon notice hereof. “Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Intramuros, Manila for implementation thereof and to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof."[7] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was, as afore-stated, denied by the respondent court in its resolution dated 30 October 1990, dispositive part of which reads: “Considering the mandatory character of Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the various decisions of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the same, accused Gonzaga’s Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dated September 10, 1990 suspending her pendente lite is denied."[8]
In the present petition, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension imposed on her as school principal of Malabon Municipal High School by the afore-stated resolutions of the respondent court. We find merit in the petition. It will be noted that in the questioned resolutions, respondent court imposed on petitioner an indefinite period of suspension, pendente lite, from her mentioned office, on the basis of Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, earlier quoted. Petitioner at the outset contends that Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, is unconstitutional as the suspension provided thereunder partakes of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. We do not accept the contention because: firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory.[9] What the Constitution rejects is a preventive suspension of indefinite duration as it raises, at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of the laws; in other words, preventive suspension is justifiable for as long as its continuance is for a reasonable length of time;[10] secondly, preventive suspension is not a penalty;[11] a person under preventive suspension, especially in a criminal action, remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence as his culpability must still be established;[12] thirdly, the rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity, and that to declare a law unconstitutional, the basis for such a declaration must be clearly established.[13] The issue in this case, as we see it, is not whether Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 is valid or not, but rather whether the same is constitutionally applied in relation to the surrounding circumstances.[14] It is worthy to note that even prior to the cases of Deloso (1988) and Doromal (1989), to be discussed shortly, pronouncements had already been made by the Court in the cases of Garcia (1962) and Layno (1985)[15] to the effect that a preventive suspension lasting for an unreasonable length of time violates the Constitution. In the more recent cases of Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, and Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan,[16] suspension under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 was held as limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, in consonance with Section 42 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (otherwise known as the “Civil Service Decree”).[17] We see no cogent reason why the same rule should not apply to herein petitioner. In fact, the recommendation of the Solicitor General (counsel for public respondent) is that, inasmuch as the suspension mentioned under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is understood as limited to a maximum duration of ninety (90) days, the order of suspension imposed on petitioner, having been rendered on 10 September 1990, should now be lifted, as suspension has already exceeded the maximum period of ninety (90) days. All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. In fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined.[18] What the Constitution abhors is an indefinite preventive suspension as it violates the due process and equal protection clauses,[19] and the right of public officers and employees to security of tenure.[20] Henceforth, considering that the persons who can be charged under Rep. Act 3019, as amended, include elective and appointive officers and employees, and further taking into account the rulings in the Deloso and Doromal cases, the ninety (90)-day maximum period for suspension under Section 13 of the said Act shall apply to all those who are validly charged under the said Act, whether elective or appointive officer or employee as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019.[21] To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act. 2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807;[22] and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee,[23] the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan, dated 10 September 1990 and 30 October 1990, are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner may re-assume the position of school principal of the Malabon Municipal High School, Malabon Metro Manila without prejudice to the continuation of trial on the merits of the pending case against her in the Sandiganbayan, unless there are other supervening legal grounds which would prevent such re-assumption of office. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., on leave.