[ G.R. No. 70825. March 11, 1991 ] 272 Phil. 639
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 70825. March 11, 1991 ]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, PETITIONERS, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[*] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66710 affirming in all respects the decision[**] of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV, dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of Lot 6783, Cad 239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran, Albay. The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable. The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits “A” and “C”) and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal building (Exhibit “B”) having been complied with, and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies. Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file an opposition to the application. Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. On the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation. Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez filed a motion to dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her tenants. On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following findings of facts: On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila:
“INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS
“Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al 28 del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en Decreto de 28 de Octubre de 1869. . . . . . “Feb. 24. - Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectareas y 16 centiareas de terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053. Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . . Luna.” (Exhibit “L”)
The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913 in Civil Case No. 422 entitled “Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante” (Exhibit “K”). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in the name of “Los Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante” (Exhibits “P”, “Q” and “R”), was so declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits “I”, “S” and “T”). In CAR Case No. 523, Sotera Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court of Agrarian Relations in Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit “J”) On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the amount of P8,500.00 (Exhibit “E”). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume the responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in CAR Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11, 1970 (Exhibit “F”). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit “G”) and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit “H”). Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit “M”) and a technical description thereof (Exhibit “N”) indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and carabaos. Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellat Court which affirmed the lower court’s decision in all respects. The appellate court considered Exhibit “L” as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that Espartinez’ possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for registration was filed. The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed errors of law in: (a) granting the application or confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court’s decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and disposable and despite private respondent’s failure to adduce in evidence certain required documents. A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit “L” as a possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court itself describes it, “a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October 28, 1869.” (Rollo, p. 29). The “excerpt of an entry” is the Spanish text quoted above. From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit “L” is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made. Granting that there was indeed an “adjudication” or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands v. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit “L” not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez’ predecessors-in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545). The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit “M”, which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit “L”, is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396). In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the land under Exhibit “L” and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tracing plan at all notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission (See: Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners’ repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention. Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523, were not land registration cases and, therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed upon. Espartinez’ reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land. The law states:
“SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.”
Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit “L” from which Espartinez claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in the Heirs of Amunategui case must be given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable v. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands v. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands v. Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain. SO ORDERED. Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), see dissenting opinion. Regalado, J., pro hac vice.