[ G.R. No. 58445. April 27, 1989 ] 254 Phil. 846
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 58445. April 27, 1989 ]
ZAIDA G. RARO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES), RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees’ compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of “presumption of compensability” and “aggravation” found in the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees’ compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of “proof of increased risk.” There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees’ Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission’s affirming the GSIS decision.
The following issues are raised in this petition:
“1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
“2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease." (p. 17, Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable.
The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely –
“Occupational Diseases
Nature of Employment
xxx xxx
xxx xxx
- Cancer of stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses
Woodworkers, wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
- Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain.
Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers.”
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation)
The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission’s allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines “sickness” as follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Title, unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
“(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational disease and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).”
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:
“SECTION 1.
xxx xxx .xxx
“(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.” (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing - that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G. R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
To understand why the “presumption of compensability” together with the host of decisions interpreting the “arising out of and in the course of employment.” provision the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen’s compensation law and the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen’s Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of “presumption of compensability” and “aggravation” and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees’ Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., G. R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:
“We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner’s attack against he constitutionality of the new law on employee’s compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.
“The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker’s constitutional rights.”
xxx xxx xxx
“The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
“On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
“The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
“Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. x x x.”
“The petitioner’s challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
“The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen’ s compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen’s compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it.” (at pp. 4, 5, and 6).
The non-adversarial nature of employees’ compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee; this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.
Employees’ compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are and in amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the Iaw to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund which the tens of million of workers and their Families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the acturial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees’ Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees’ Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees’ Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)] Nemaria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur. Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., dissents in a separate opinion.