G.R. No. L-34836

LINDA TARUC, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII, AND GEN. TAGUMPAY A. NANADIEGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE AFP, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N

[ G.R. No. L-34836. November 29, 1988 ] 250 Phil. 65

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. L-34836. November 29, 1988 ]

LINDA TARUC, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII, AND GEN. TAGUMPAY A. NANADIEGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE AFP, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment and setting aside of respondent Judge’s resolution dated February 3, 1972 denying petitioner’s motion to quash dated January 25, 1972 insofar as it questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act; and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent judge from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. Q-1623 with respect to herein petitioner. Republic Act No. 1700 was approved on June 20, 1957. On November 13, 1971, herein petitioner was charged by Col. Tagumpay A. Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (Rollo, p. 14), with 45 others, designated only as John Does, with viola­tion of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700, which penalizes persons who, after the approval of the Act, are found, after trial, “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts” to have joined the Communist Party of the Philip­pines (CCP) or to have maintained their membership therein. Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, a preliminary investigation was thereupon held by respondent Judge to whose sala the criminal complaint was assigned. On January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion to quash (Rollo, p. 19) on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional and therefore the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a crime, and consequently the court did not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged. The following day, January 26, 1972, respondent judge issued an order for the arrest of petitioner and of three others after finding them prima facie guilty of the charge. No bail was fixed for petitioner (Rollo, p. 65). Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was issued on the same date (Rollo, p. 29), but petitioner could not be located and to date remains it large (Rollo, p. 99). On February 2, 1972, counsel for petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of arrest and in the alternative that she be released on bail (Rollo, p. 22). Meantime, respondent judge issued his questioned order of February 3, 1972 (Rollo, p. 21), which reads as follows:

“The motion to dismiss filed for and in behalf of respondent Carlos Jacinto dated February 1, 1972 which only repeats arguments adduced in the motion to dismiss filed by Senator Jose W. Diokno for and in behalf of respondents Teresito Sison, Angelo de los Reyes, by Atty. Crisostomo Ibarra filed for and in behalf of respondent Victor Felipe, by Atty. Amauri Tiglao for and in behalf of respondent Raquel Edralin, by Atty. Raul Roco for and in behalf of respondents Victor Magdaraog and Linda Taruc is hereby DENIED on the same ground that the Court denied similar motion to dismiss.”

In an Order dated February 4, 1972, respondent Judge denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of arrest but granted her petition for bail in the amount of P30,000.00 (Rollo, p. 24). On February 9, 1972, petitioner, again through counsel, filed a motion to reduce the bail from P30,000.00 to P10,000.00 (Rollo, p. 25) which was denied by respondent judge in an Order dated February 10, 1972 (Rollo, p. 28). Instant petition was filed by petitioner on March 14, 1972 (Rollo, p. 1). The Solicitor General filed the Answer on behalf of Respondents on April 8, 1972 (Rollo, p. 42). Having practically terminated the preliminary investigation, on May 18, 1972, respondent Judge ordered the City Fiscal of Quezon City to file the information against petitioner and 55 others as officers or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive organization penalized by the first proviso of Section 4 of Republic Act 1700 with the penal­ty of prison mayor to death (Rollo, p. 70). The information was filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City on June 14, 1972 (Rollo, p. 81). The memorandum for the respondents was filed by the Solicitor General on June 30, 1972 (Rollo, p. 95); the memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 1, 1972 (Rollo, p. 144). The legal issues raised by petitioner (Rollo, p. 145) for resolution of the Court are the following:

Whether or not R.A. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law is unconstitutional; Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint filed against petitioner under R.A. 1700 which petitioner claims to be patently unconstitutional.

It is evident that the main issue is the constitutionality of R.A. 1700. The Court has already resolved the issue in the case of People v. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382, where it upheld the constitutionality of the Act, declaring it not to be a bill of attainder, nor an infringement of the freedom of expression and freedom of association. Acting on the petition, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the same for lack of merit. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., concurs in the result. Cruz, J., joins Mr. Justice Sarmiento in his excellent dissent. Sarmiento, J., dissents in a separate opinion. Narvasa, J., is on leave.