[ G.R. No. 76353. May 02, 1988 ] 244 Phil. 8
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 76353. May 02, 1988 ]
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILLA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNAC1ON,ETAL.,PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, QUEZON CITY BRANCH (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with motion for preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to nullify the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School . of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch, in violation of petitioners’ constitutional rights. The factual background of this case is as follows: Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City, while respondents, are: the Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon City Branch, a non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice President for Admission and Registration of PSBA, Q.C.; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-Charge; and Ramon Agapay, Director of the Office of Student Affairs of PSBA, Q.C. and Romeo Rafer, Chief Security of PSBA, Q.C. As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern them activities within the school (Rollo, p. 75). Among the agreements reached at that time were:
“On the exercise of student’s democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements: a)
that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 pm to 1:00 pm only;
b)
that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit;
c)
that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 pm;
d)
However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days before, or if on the same day, it still be under the ‘first-come-first-served’ basis in the use of facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.
“It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in the policy-making body of the school, as this is provided by law. However, the administration will be open to suggestions and questions, especially those regarding tuition fee increases and other policies that directly affect us.”
In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances (Rollo. p. 20; 347-348). “Subsequently dialogues proved futile.” Finally, petitioners received uniform letters from respondents dated October 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 23) giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on Thursday (Oct. 2). Friday (Oct. 3) and Tuesday (Oct. 7). The aforestated letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter dated October 22, 1982 Annex “E” (Rollo, p. 26). During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. On October 28. 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. (Annex “F.” Rollo, p. 30). Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment (Rollo, p. 31). Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within forty-eight (48) hours (Rollo, p. 33). All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming, hence this petition. In the resolution of November 7, 1986, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required respondents to comment thereon and set the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction on November 10, 1986 (Rollo, p. 35). In compliance therewith on November 9, 1986, respondents filed their comment and opposition to the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the petition for the issuance of a writ be denied not only for lack of merit but also for being barred by res judicata (Rollo, p. 67). Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on November 10, 1986, by the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Faculty Union. (PSBA, QC-FU for brevity) representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as intervenors, on the ground of commonality of issues and cause of action with that of the petitioners (Rollo, p. 36). At the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, where counsel for all the parties appeared and argued their causes, the Court Resolved to grant the motion for intervention and to require the intervenors to comment on the petition and the petitioners to file a reply thereto (Rollo, p. 66, copy corrected, p. 167). On the same day respondents filed their comment and opposition to the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp. 67-74). On November 12. 1986. this Court resolved to issue a temporary mandatory order directing the respondents herein (a) to re-enroll the petitioners herein and (b) to re-admit the intervenors to their former positions without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the school authorities (Rollo, p. 141). Said Order was issued on November 14. 1986 (Rollo, pp. 142-143). A supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 11, 1986 was filed by herein respondents (Rollo, p. 150), while an urgent motion to reiterate prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 13, 1986 was filed by herein petitioners (Rollo, pp. 162-163). Instead of complying with the resolution of November 12, 1986, an urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by herein respondents on November 15, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194) praying that this Court reconsider the aforesaid resolution. On November 18, 1986 petitioners and intervenors filed a joint urgent motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 199), while respondents filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, also on the same date (Rollo. p. 205). In the resolution of November 19. 1986. respondents” motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were denied for lack of merit, and the denial was declared FINAL. The urgent motion of counsel for petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court was NOTED (Rollo. p. 225). An urgent motion for intervention and answer in intervention was filed by Nelia M. Lat, Annalisa T. Geronimo, Leonora Q. Bueniraje, Maria L. Aranas. Eduerijes Llanto. Charita R. Chong, Marilou Garcia, Amelita R. Sia. Loida O. Ladines, Dominic P. Santos, Noly R. Chong, and Arthur R. Cacdac for themselves and on behalf of other students of the PSBA. Quezon City, who are similarly situated, to allow them to intervene as respondents dated November 11, 1986 (Rollo, p. 227) which was granted by this Court in a resolution dated December 3, 1986 (Rollo, p. 240) On November 20. 1986, the respondents filed their compliance with the temporary mandatory order issued by this Court pursuant to its resolution dated November 12. 1987 (Rollo. p. 237). On November 29, 1986, respondents filed their comment on the motion for intervention of the PSBA Quezon City Faculty Union (Rollo, p. 252). A consolidated reply to respondents’ supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, urgent motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by herein intervenors on December 2, 1986 (Rollo, p. 242). In the resolution of January 21, 1987, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Rollo. p. 266). Accordingly, respondents filed their memorandum on February 23, 1987, (Rollo, p. 269) while the intervenor Union filed its memorandum on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 296). Respondents filed their reply memorandum on April 13, 1987 praying that the intervention of the intervening teachers be dismissed (Rollo, p. 328). Respondents filed their manifestation and motion dated April 27, 1987 stating that pursuant to this court’s order dated November 12, 1986, the school authorities created a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, which submitted a report with recommendations (Rollo, p. 335), the report reading as follows: “After due deliberation, the Committee hereby submits the following recommendation:
STUDENT-RESPONDENTS
RENATO PALMA. BERNADETTE ANG. ROGELIO TAGANAS are hereby recommended to be EXONERATED of ail charges. SOPHIA ALCUAZ (up to No. 19) are hereby recommended to be HONORABLY DISMISSED from PSBA Q.C roll of students without prejudice to re-enrollment on a case to ease basis if found suitable and justified.
FACULTY- RESPONDENTS
To be EXONERATED of all charges JOSE C. ANTONIO. DONALLY BRINGAS. DANTE CA.IUCOM. LEO LOQUELLANO. SOLITA A. CRUZ, and VIVIAN TOLENTINO. To be reprimanded with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely FLORANTE BAGSIC and ATENOGENES BONDOC. MR. SEVERINO CORTES. JR. is hereby recommended for non-renewal of his semester to semester appointment. MESSRS. ASSER (BONG) TAMAYO and RENE Q. ENCARNACION are hereby recommended for termination of their services as faculty members.”
Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for having become moot (Rollo, p. 341). On April 30, a second urgent manifestation and motion was filed by respondent praying that the recommendation of special Committee as implemented by its president be made effective by the discontinuance of the summer enrollment of petitioners Anna Shiela A. Dinoso, Zeny Gudito and Ma. Shalina Pitoy upon the refund to them of all the fees they have paid to the school (Rollo, p. 397). An urgent motion to cite for contempt herein respondents was filed on May 5, 1987 for violating this court’s temporary mandatory order on November 12, 1986, by discharging and striking off from the roll of students petitioners Dinoso, Gudito and Pitoy (Rollo, p. 400) while an opposition to urgent motion to cite for contempt was filed by herein respondents on May 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 413). On May 20, 1987, Intervenor Union filed their Intervenor’s Comment on Respondents’ reply memorandum and manifestation and motion with motion to cite respondent in contempt (Rollo, p. 417). On June 8, 1987, petitioners filed their very urgent motion for an order to re-enroll (Rollo, p. 620) followed by an urgent supplemental motion and Reply to opposition dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. ,623). Later on, an Opposition to “very urgent motion for order to re-enroll was filed by herein respondents on June 11, 1987 (Rollo, p. 625) while on June 15, 1987, herein intervenor Union filed its manifestation and motion with urgent motion reiterating intervenor’s motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 629). On June 16, 1987 respondents filed their opposition to urgent motion to oppose petitioners’ urgent motion dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. 795). Petitioners filed their memorandum on June 17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 799). On June 18, 1987, respondents filed their counter-comment and opposition to motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 815). Subsequently, on June 25, 1987, respondents filed their Reply Memorandum on the petitioners’ memorandum (Rollo, p. 820.). In the resolution of June 29, 1987 the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmifor re-enroll herein petitioners was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the investigating committee and who had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. This court further stated that the reason for the non-enrollment of the others is that the results of the investigation conducted indicate prima facie the violation by the majority of the petitioners of the rules and regulations of respondent school (Rollo, p. 793). The Court further resolved to require respondent school to show cause why it should not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-facuity members in the interim. Respondents filed the manifestation on July 3,1987 informing this Court that they did not refuse to reinstate the intervenors/ faculty members: that they were in fact actually reinstated in compliance with the Court’s temporary mandatory order (Rollo’, p. 829). Hence, the motion for contempt should be dismissed. The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as “anarchic” rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly. Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due notice and hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. They claim that barring them from enrollment for the second semester is equivalent to expulsion which cannot be valid and effective without the required MEC’s approval (Rollo, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, petitioners point out that the acts of respondents constitute a wanton and deliberate disregard of petitioners’ freedom of expression (ibid.). In the same manner, intervenors-teachers claim that their constitutional right to due process has been violated when they were summarily dismissed without affording them the opportunity to be heard (Rollo, p. 301). It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the “written contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester.” It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987. citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCR A 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. “The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties.” (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra). Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them: (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]). Tested under said standards, the records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3. 4 and 5 had evidently not been complied with. It is not disputed that printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. are distributed at the beginning of each school year to the students including petitioners. The Rules, among other things, provide:
“Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the- School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/relations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration.”
As previously stated, in violation of aforesaid Rules and Regulations, some students staged noisy demonstrations in the premises of the school. For the settlement thereof, an agreement was reached providing among others the regulations for the conduct of protest actions. Despite said agreement, it was alleged that petitioners, acting as the core group of a noisy minority, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening teachers, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority of the students including the intervening ones: which acts now constitute the subject of this controversy (Rollo, p. 271). Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of their participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated. Respondents alleged that none of the students ever filed a reply thereto. The records show however that a letter was sent by Atty. Alan Roullo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students to the President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said students are not guilty of the charges filed against them (Rollo, pp. 26-28). Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed his answer in a letter to the same President of the school, where he denied the charges against him (Rollo, p. 52). It therefore becomes readily apparent that while the students and the teachers have been informed in writing of the charges filed against them and they in turn filed their answers thereto, no investigating committee or official was designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case upon the presentation of evidence of both parties. Presumably, the school banking on the theory that the contracts have already expired, said procedural steps are no longer necessary. At any rate, this Court obviously to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986. The investigating committee found among others that: there were concerted mass assemblies conducted on October 2, 3, 7 and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said students and teachers, and which disrupted classes. The disruption of classes and the barricades in the school entrances constitute violations of existing MECS and PSBA rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 348-349). It is ironic that many of those who claim that their human rights have been violated are the very ones who emasculate the human rights of the innocent majority. Moreover, petitioners named in the report were found to be academically deficient (Rollo, p. 273) while the intervening teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the school were found to have committed various acts of misconduct (Rollo, p. 275). Accordingly, three students were recommended for exoneration from all charges, and some to be honorably dismissed. Of the faculty members eight were recommended to be exonerated of all charges, two to be reprimanded, one for non-renewal of his semester-to-semester appointment and two to be terminated (Rollo, pp. 359-360). The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. Paño, 137 SCRA 246 [1985]: Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, the Court has ruled that the school’s refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution. More specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court as follows:
“This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they sec it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them the grant being to institutions of higher learning — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.” (Tangonan vs. Pano. supra).
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. (Ateneo de Manila University vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 106 (1986); citing: International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leonardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61 and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569). A careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under. any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent that the investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. Accordingly, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the findings of said committee and as manifested by the respondents, the report of said committee has virtually rendered this petition moot and academic. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable. Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. (Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]). In the case at bar, there appears to be no defiance of authority by the mere filing by respondents of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 12, 1986. In fact respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction. Thus, in the compliance submitted by said school on November 20, 1986, it manifested that “without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, xxx and in order the dislocations may not result with respect to the academic activities of the students and the distribution of teaching loads among the teachers, the respondent school has created new classes for the petitioners and the intervening teachers” beginning November 20, 1986. The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was ohly after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic. Otherwise stated, respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the temporary mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp. 830-832). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, and Padilla, JJ., concur.