[ G.R. No. 76001. September 05, 1988 ] 247-A Phil. 372
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 76001. September 05, 1988 ]
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ELEUTERIO YAP, FERDINAND LAZO, ROBERT TAN, ALBERTO BRILLO, FREDERICK CASES, MARILOU VILLENA, AND ARLENE VILLARO, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is the resolution of this Court dated May 25, 1988[1] dismissing the petition for review on certiorari[2] on the ground that the same raises essentially factual issues and in view of the absence of any showing that the findings[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission were not supported by substantial evidence and that the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner anchors its motion on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT NLRC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION IN THAT - a)
THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA SON WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MODIFIED IS ITSELF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONFIRMING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ USE OF VIOLENCE DURING THE STRIKE.
b)
THE GOVERNING LAW WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MISAPPLIED CATEGORICALLY IMPOSES DISMISSAL UPON EMPLOYEES GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ACTS IN THE COURSE OF A STRIKE.
The sole issue raised is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it modified the Decision[4] dated March 12, 1985 of the Labor Arbiter.[5] The petitioner maintains that the dismissal of its petition was unwarranted. It argues that the very basis of the NLRC’s decision was the findings of the Labor Arbiter, that the strike of October 1, 1984 was illegal, as the same was attended by violence, coercion, intimidation, destruction of properties, and other unlawful acts which were all properly substantiated by it and which were not controverted by the respondents, hence, they were deemed to have been established.[6] It avers that on appeal the function of the National Labor Relations Commission, if it finds the Labor Arbiter’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence, is to affirm the same.[7] It asserts further that when the public respondent modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondents, it acted with grave abuse of discretion, as it in effect violated the provisions of sub-section (e) of Art. 265 (now Art. 264)[8] of the Labor Code. The petitioner-movant submits that the coercive picketing by private respondent cannot be viewed in isolation from the overall illegal conduct of the strikers and the climate of violence that characterized the strike, that the coercive picketing contributed to the heated strike atmosphere which induced the commission of other unlawful acts by strikers, who were ordered dismissed; and without such coercive picketing on the part of the respondent, the acts of grave threats, coercion, and malicious mischief on the part of the other strikers would not have happened.[9] We have held in a long line of decisions that the findings of fact of the Department (Ministry) of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect, unless the said findings and the conclusions made therefrom are not supported by substantial evidence.[10] By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880, George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.], September 11, 1987).[11] Considering all the foregoing, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission, and therefore we find no cogent reason to justify a reconsideration of our resolution. WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. This denial is FINAL. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, and Medialdea*, JJ., concur. Paras, J., no part. Son is a partner in law firm of petitioner’s counsel. Padilla, J., no part due to exixting lessor-lessee relationship with petitioner.