[ G.R. No. 60210. March 27, 1984 ] 213 Phil. 385
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 60210. March 27, 1984 ]
ARTURO P. SANTOS AND ADELINA Y. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND AURORA GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-13056, affirming the one rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI, in Civil Case No. 138472.
Records show that herein private respondent Aurora Gutierrez instituted an unlawful detainer case in the then City Court of Manila against herein petitioners Arturo P. Santos and Adelina Y. Santos on grounds that she needs the premises for her personal use and the necessity of repairs thereon, and that the petitioners were delinquent in the payment of rentals.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners, among others, admitted that they are “the legitimate tenants and/or lessees of the subject apartment with the present rental rate of P250.00 a month on a month-to-month contract of lease.” (p. 62, Rollo)
After trial, the City Court rendered judgment -
“Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendants and hereby orders the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate the premises in question known as No. 1836 Cavite St., Sta. Cruz, Manila and surrender its possession to the plaintiff.
“The defendants are further ordered to pay the plaintiff P2,500.00 as rentals for the period December 1978 through September 1979, and, further to pay the plaintiff rentals at the rate of P250.00 per month from October 1979 until such time as possession of the premises in question shall have been restored to the plaintiff minus whatever amounts may have been already received by the plaintiff from deposits made in Court. The defendants are further ordered to pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus costs of suit. All claims by the defendants against the plaintiff are dismissed, for lack of merit.” (p. 74, Rollo)
Petitioners appealed the foregoing judgment to the then Court of First Instance which found the same “in accordance with both the evidence and the law” and affirmed the decision. Thereafter, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review and the latter, on January 29, 1982, rendered judgment as follows:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, there being substantial evidence to support the decision under review, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is resultantly hereby DISMISSED.” (p. 22, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, the Santoses submitting that (1) they were never delinquent in the payment of rentals only the collector failed to get the money and since they whereabouts of private respondent was unknown, they were forced to deposit them to the bank; (2) the mere sending of a notice to vacate by registered mail which the postal clerk refused to deliver to them for the reason of wrong name cannot be considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of notice; (3) they have been leasing the apartment for 28 years and are therefore entitled to preferential right to purchase their unit under Presidential Decree No. 1517; (4) there is no real need of the premises by private respondent; (5) it was an error to order their ejectment without complying with the mandatory requirements of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 and the ruling in Rantael vs. Llave, 97 SCRA 453; (6) respondent court erred in stating that a contract of lease of residential apartment involving a rental of P250.00 a month may be terminated at the end of the month without default on the part of the lessee; (7) there was improper change of theory on appeal on the part of private respondent; and, (8) there was error in affirming the decision of the lower court.
We find no merit in the petition.
- Petitioners, in their “Answer with Counter claim” (Annex “B”, Petition, page 62, Rollo) admit that they are “the legitimate tenants and/or lessees of the subject apartment with the present rental rate of P250.00 a month on a month-to-month contract of lease.” (Italics supplied).
The aforequoted provision of the agreement on occupancy of the apartment cannot but mean as providing for a definite period of the lease. The parties expressly agreed that upon proper notice, one may terminate the agreement. As stated in Rantael vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 453, 459 -
“x x x The contractual relations between petitioner Rantael and respondent have ceased after the expiration of the first thirty days reckoned from August 1, 1974 but continued for the next thirty-day period and expired after the last day thereof, repeating the same cycle for the succeeding thirty-day periods, until the said respondent have exercised her express prerogative under the agreement to terminate the same.”
- Paragraph 1 of Article 1673 of the Civil Code is an exception to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20. Said Section 1 of Article 1673 provides -
“Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of lease under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;”
Thus, judicial ejectment lies when the lease is for a definite period or when the fixed or definite period agreed upon has expired. The lease in the case at bar having a definite period, it follows that private respondent’s right to judicially eject petitioners from the premises may be enforced. As aptly stated by respondent Court of Appeals, “[e]ven on the strength alone of the Rantael ruling, the petitioners can be lawfully ejected, regardless of the motive or intent of the lessor-private respondent. We thus see no point in discussing the other issues raised except to state that P.D. No. 1517, in referring to the preemptive or redemptive right of a leassee speaks only of urban land under lease on which a tenant has built his home and in which he has resided for ten years or more. If both land and the building belong to the lessor, the right referred to hereinabove does not apply.” (p. 22, Rollo)
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition for review and AFFIRMING the decision of respondent Court of Appeals. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Acting Chairman), see dissenting and concurring opinion.
De la Fuente, J., no part.