[ G.R. No. L-32521. September 02, 1983 ] 209 Phil. 367
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-32521. September 02, 1983 ]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GUARDSON R. LOOD, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI, AND THE QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision dated August 6, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. N-7078, Rec. No. N-38401, granting the application for registration under Act 496, as amended, of a parcel of land in Malaking Bundok, barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, on the basis of possession by applicant-private respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation and its predecessors since 1892.
Records show that private respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation filed an application on January 13, 1970 with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, seeking the registration of title under Act 496, as amended, claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land (Plan Psu-226726) in the sitio of Malaking Bundok, barrio Dolores, municipality of Taytay, province of Rizal, containing an area of 8,840 square meters, with technical descriptions attached to the application, and assessed at P260.00.
The applicant, invoking the provisions of Section 48, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 107, amended by Republic Act 1942, and further amended by Republic Act 2061, claimed that it has acquired said property from Aurelia del Rosario and Fidel del Rosario and that applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, exclusive, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession and enjoyment of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial.
On July 27, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application, on the ground that the applicant has no sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be registered, not having acquired the same either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that applicant and its predecessors have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question for at least thirty years, and that the aforesaid parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
On August 6, 1970, respondent Judge rendered a decision as follows:
“The testimonial and documentary evidence presented has established that the parcel of land in question was formerly owned and possessed by Macario del Rosario since 1892 up to the time of his death during the Japanese Occupation when the same was inherited by Aurelia del Rosario and Fidel del Rosario, from whom the applicant herein acquired it by purchase on December 20, 1969 subject to certain terms and conditions, Exh. ‘I’; that the possession of the applicant, together with its predecessors in interest, has been peaceful, continuous, open, exclusive and adverse in the concept of owner since 1892; that the parcel of land classified as ‘montañoso’ is assessed at P260.00 under Tax Declaration No. 5854, Exh. ‘G’, that tax due for the current year has been paid, Exh. ‘H’; that the land is not within any government reservation and is free from all liens and encumbrances, except as to the terms and conditions of the deed of sale entitled ‘Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa’ (Doc. No. 102, Page No. 89, Book No. III, Series of 1969 of Not. Public Arsenio G. Velasquez), Exh. ‘I.’
“The applicant, Quezon City Development & Financing Corporation, represented by the Treasurer, Catalina B. Amante, is a corporation duly organized and registered with the Security and Exchange Commission, a 100% Filipino owned corporation with principal offices at 866 Aurora Boulevard Cubao, Quezon City, Exhs. ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘K’, ‘L’.
“WHEREFORE, finding that the applicant has a registrable title over the parcel of land applied for, Plan Psu-226726 and considering that the applicant, together with its predecessors in interest, has been in open, continuous, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owners since 1892, this Court hereby confirms the title of the applicant to the parcel of land in question and orders the registration thereof in its name, subject, however, to the reservation of 3.00 meters strip of plan Psu-226726 along Kay Tikling Creek and along the Creek without name to the easement of public use in the interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
“Upon this decision becoming final and executory, let the order for the issuance of the decree issued.
“SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in ruling that the applicant has registrable title over the parcel of land subject matter of the application based only on ownership through possession allegedly since time immemorial which, as found by the lower court, began in 1892. Further, petitioner argues that the applicant can no longer avail itself of the benefits of Section 47 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act 2061, because its application for registration of title was filed only on January 13, 1970, more than two (2) years after the expiration of Republic Act 2061 on December 31, 1968.
WE find the contention without merit. While it is true that Republic Act 2061 provides that the application for the registration of title expired on December 31, 1968, the period was extended up to December 31, 1976 by Republic Act 6236, which was approved on June 19, 1971, and further extended up to December 31, 1987 by Presidential Decree No. 1073, promulgated on January 25, 1977.
HOWEVER, WE take note of the fact that in its application for registration of title, private respondent invoked the provisions of Section 48, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 107, as amended by Republic Act 1942, and further amended by Republic Act 2061, as the latter itself and its predecessors in interest have been in possession of the land since time immemorial.
The Public Land Law provides:
“CHAPTER VIII. - Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
“x x x x x x x x x
“SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
“x x x x x x x xx
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
“x x x x x x x x x
“SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.”
Applicant-private respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, being a juridical person, is disqualified to apply subject property for registration under Section 48(b). In G.R. No. L-49623, entitled: Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Floreliana Castro Bartolome, et al., promulgated on June 29, 1982, this Court held that:
“As between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48(b), Meralco’s application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.”
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated August 6, 1970, is set aside, and the application for the registration of title filed by applicant-private respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., in the result. Teehankee, J., files a brief dissent, concurs with Justice Makasiar’s dissenting opinion. Makasiar, J., see dissent. Abad Santos, J., on the sole ground that the Public Land Act does not allow registration except to natural persons, votes to reverse the decision of the trial court. De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., see separate concurrence. Escolin, J., reserves his vote.