[ G.R. No. 60819. January 28, 1983 ] 205 Phil. 352
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 60819. January 28, 1983 ]
LAMBERTO DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, BRANCH VI, BALIUAG, BULACAN, MAXIMO M. ANDAL, AS DEPUTY SHERIFF, AND BENITA MARTINEZ, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Petition to review the legality of an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, sitting in Baliuag, Bulacan, filed pursuant to R.A. No. 5440.
In the above-mentioned court, Lamberto del Rosario, petitioner herein, filed Case No. 1364 against Benita Martinez, respondent herein. In his complaint Lamberto claimed that he was a share-tenant of Benita; that sometime in 1972, Benita who is his “ninang sa kasal” asked him to sign a certificate stating that he was her hired worker on the land; that he was not in fact a hired worker but he said so in the certificate only to enable his ninang obtain a bank loan; and that Benita sought to eject him forcibly from the land by having it plowed by a farm tractor. Lamberto prayed for the issuance of a restraining order and:
“2. After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant;
a) Confirming the status of the plaintiff as a legitimate and bona fide tenant on the landholding in question, and fixing the lease rental thereon at 13.5 cavans per agricultural year;
b) Ordering or decreeing a reliquidation of the harvests on said landholding for the last years that the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant was based on a 50-50 sharing system;
c) Ordering the defendant to pay unto the plaintiff attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in such amount as may be proved during the trial of this case as well as costs of suit;
d) Plaintiff also prays for such other measures of reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.”
Benita’s answer denied the allegations in the complaint. She made a counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation on the ground that the suit was malicious and unfounded. She prayed for the following:
“1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, with treble costs against him;
“2. On the Counterclaim, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00, as attorney’s fees in the sum of P2,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P500.00.
“Defendant further prays for such other reliefs and remedies which the Honorable Court may deem just and proper in the premises.”
After trial, a decision was issued with a dispositive portion which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant case.
“Defendant’s counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
“No pronouncement as to costs.”
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment above-quoted was affirmed in toto. (CA-G.R. No. 11515-CAR.) Thereafter, Benita moved for a writ of execution which was issued but the Deputy Sheriff assigned to carry it out made the following return:
“IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED, that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in the above-entitled case dated December 11, 1981, the undersigned on January 29, 1982, personally served a copy of the writ to the plaintiff Lamberto del Rosario informing him that the decision rendered by the Honorable Court is already final and executory, as per decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the finding of the lower Court and that his complaint filed against the defendants was dismissed.
“The undersigned also notified the defendants of the said writ informing them that their counterclaim was also dismissed as well as the costs of the suit. After a careful review of the contents of the said writ, the undersigned found out that there is nothing to be executed in the dispositive portions of the decision; thus the same status that the case is dismissed.
“WHEREFORE, said writ of execution dated December 11, 1981 together with the original copy thereof, is herewith returned satisfied.”
Nonetheless, the respondent judge issued an order, dated April 30, 1982, which reads as follows:
“Submitted for resolution is defendant’s ‘Motion for Execution’ filed through counsel on March 17, 1982. The said motion was set for hearing on April 20, 1982, whereat only counsel for the defendant appeared.
“An examination of the records show that per Order of December 11, 1981, the Clerk of Court was directed to issue the writ of execution of the Decision rendered in this case on August 22, 1980, it appearing that said decision has become final and executory. On December 14, 1981, the corresponding writ of execution was issued. On February 4, 1982, the Deputy Sheriff who implemented the writ of execution submitted his return of service with the following statements:
‘. . . After a careful review of the said writ, the undersigned found out there is nothing to be executed in the dispositive portion of the decision; thus the same status that the case is dismissed.
‘WHEREFORE, said writ of execution dated December 14, 1981 together with the original copy thereof is herewith returned satisfied.’
The decision subject of the execution decrees the following:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant case;
‘Defendant’s counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
‘No pronouncement as to costs.’
“From the context of the Decision dated August 22, 1980, this Court made the following finding:
‘. . . From the totality of the facts, circumstances in this case and the convincing evidence of defendant, there is no doubt that plaintiff is a mere laborer of the former and hence no security of tenure as tenant obtains in his favor and consequently no right to claim for fixing of lease rental over the landholding in question would accrue unto him in this case.’
“Therefore, the Court having declared in the body of the decision rendered on August 22, 1980, that plaintiff is a mere laborer of defendant in the landholding in question and, hence, not entitled to security of tenure, as tenant, he has no valid right over the land and should deliver possession of the same to the defendant, for it would be a useless and vexatious course to require defendant to obtain possession by another suit. (J. Flores Vda. de Yatco, et al. vs. L. Sumagui, et al., C.A. G.R. No. SP-01076, November 14, 1973.)
“Moreover, the dispossession is in consonance with the ruling of the Honorable Court of Appeals in the case of V. Tenarife vs. L. de Leon, CA G.R. No. SP-07540-CAR, May 23, 1978, as follows:
’the rule on conformity of the execution to judgment is not as vigorously undeviating and strait-jacketed as the plaintiff-appellant asserts. While the writ of execution may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, neither may the writ be so circumscribed in its ambit as to nullify the Court’s findings and decision and render the judgment incomplete, meaningless, or inutile.
‘Courts are established to settle disputes and controversies according to law, equity and justice. Recurring and prolonged litigation must be characterized by dispatch, reliability and finality. We are interpreting a system of living law. Consequently, a writ of execution must not be so restricted as to leave the controversies which gave rise to the litigation not only unsettled but festering and aggravated. Rather, a writ of execution must give life and meaning to the judgment in harmony with and according to its terms as gleaned from a reading of the dispositive portion and where necessary, by resort to the entirety of the decision.’
“Although the Deputy Sheriff in his report stated that execution was satisfied, this is only with respect to delivery of defendant’s unrealized share on the land.
“WHEREFORE, let an alias writ of execution of the Decision, dated August 22, 1980, be issued by the Clerk of Court, to be implemented by the Deputy Sheriff of this Court, with the assistance of the Integrated National Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.”
It is the above-quoted order which is assailed in the instant petition. To maintain the status quo and as prayed for by the petitioner, We issued a temporary restraining order and required the private respondent to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss notwithstanding which a motion to dismiss was filed.
The motion to dismiss argues “that under Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946, ‘No order or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations can be elevated directly to the Supreme Court by appeal or any other proceeding because the orders of the Courts of Agrarian Relations on any issue, question, matter or incident cannot be contested in any action or proceeding before the appellate courts.’”
P.D. No. 946 indeed provides that “No order of the Courts of Agrarian Relations on any issue, question, matter or incident raised before them shall be contested in any action or proceeding before the appellate courts until the hearing shall have been terminated and the case decided on the merits.” But the same is found in Section 17, not in Section 18. Moreover, the provision is inapplicable to the case at bar because what is contemplated therein are orders issued during a trial but not an order issued after a decision has become final and which is assailed on the ground that the CAR lacks jurisdiction to issue it - as the petitioner herein claims.
It is elementary that what can be executed is what is adjudged in the decision and what is adjudged is contained in the dispositive portion - the fallo - of the decision.
The respondent judge contends that he made a finding that the petitioner was a mere laborer of the respondent. If that is so, he should have made an adjudication to that effect. Such an adjudication can be justified in the answer’s prayer for general relief. But the judgment which he rendered gives no affirmative relief to neither of the litigants. Hence the deputy sheriff is correct and the respondent judge is wrong; there is nothing to execute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the assailed order is set aside; and the temporary restraining order which We issued in this case is hereby made permanent. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, Jr., JJ., concur. Makasiar (Chairman) J., dissents. Aquino, J.: I concur because the trial judge did not order in his decision that the petitioner should vacate the landholding and deliver its possession to the landowner who failed to ask for such relief in her answer. Petitioner’s right to stay on the land should be threshed out in another action. De Castro, J., I join Justice Makasiar’s dissent.