[ G.R. No. L-33211. June 29, 1981 ] 192 Phil. 430; 78 OG No. 15, 1845 (April 12, 1982)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-33211. June 29, 1981 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO PUNO Y FILOMENO, ACCUSED WHOSE DEATH SENTENCE IS UNDER REVIEW. D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o’clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal.
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: “Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog”. Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno’s eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: “Huag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda.” Or, according to Lina, Puno said: “Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko.”
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents’ house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.
Disregarding Puno’s threat, Una, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead. Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15-17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument. On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno’s father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay. He believes that there are persons who are “mangkukulam”, “mambabarang" and “mambubuyog” and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swell. Puno believes that a person harmed by a “mambabarang” might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the “mangkukulam” and “mambabarang’'.
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh. B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno’s wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno’s eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida’s elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno’s eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called “Diablo”. He called for Teotimo’s mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo’s father. When told that Teotimo’s father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with “schizophrenic reaction”; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilla that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 24, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from “schizophrenic reaction”, his symptoms were “not socially incapacitating” and that he could adjust himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla’s testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 11, 1971).
Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn January 11, 1971).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
“Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
“His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
“MENTAL CONDITION
“x x x. Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
x x x x x x x x x
“REMARKS
“In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
“The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly retarded individual of which he is not.
“However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.”
The foregoing report was submitted pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman’s companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he “meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand” and he was convinced “that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening” in his environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
“Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.” (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to “el trastorno mental transitorio” as an exempting circumstance, see 1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974, pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio’s contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisca Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim “Diyos ko”.
Thus, it was held that “an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was unable to defend herself” (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Abletes, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).
The essence of premeditation “es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo”. It is characterized (1) “por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme„ fria, reflexiva, meditada y detenida” and (2) “por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho”. Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should be shown by “signos reiterados y externos, no de meras sospechas” (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp. 582-3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404; People vs. Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are offset by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender’ s mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that “la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsesion de que los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa, pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad” (People vs. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805, 810).
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., he unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned an scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US,[1] therein cited. For some eminent commentators, the M’Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with authority. In the light of the advances in medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this subject. Teehankee, J., concurs J. Makasiar in his dissent.