[ G.R. No. L-47462. February 28, 1980 ] 185 Phil. 266; 76 OG No. 43, 8010 (October 27, 1980)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-47462. February 28, 1980 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILSON PAROHINOG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs, Wilson Parohinog appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified this case to us on October 27, 1977, on the ground that only questions of law are involved in the appeal. The procedural background of the case is as follows: Wilson Parohinog, together with Soterania Parohinog, Robinson Parohinog, Loreto Parohinog and Rodulfo Teodore were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Criminal Case No. 121. Upon arraignment they pleaded not guilty to the information. After the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Tomas Navarro who was counsel for all the accused, announced in open court that Wilson Parohinog wanted to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The prosecuting fiscal gave his conformity, so Wilson Parohinog was re-arraigned and thereupon pleaded accordingly. He was not sentenced immediately and the trial was continued. On March 16, 1973, after the defense had presented its first witness, Wilson Parohinog, through counsel, filed a written MOTION TO CHANGE PLEA OF GUILTY TO THAT OF NOT GUILTY on the grounds that he did not comprehend the consequences of his plea of guilty and he had a valid and meritorious defense. Acting on the motion, the trial court on the same day issued the following Order: “As prayed for by the accused that the motion to his plea of guilty to that of not guilty be withdrawn, and finding it to be justified, the same is granted.” During our deliberations on this case the question arose as to what the trial court granted in the above-quoted order which is obviously vague. An opinion was advanced that what the trial court granted was the withdrawal of the motion of the accused to change his plea of guilty to that of not guilty. Under this construction, the accused reverted to his plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. Another opinion which is shared by this writer is that the trial court granted the withdrawal of the plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide so as to substitute it with that of not guilty to crime charged which is murder. Howsoever the order might be construed, the legal question is the effect of the plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after the prosecution had rested its case. In this case Wilson Parohinog was accused of murder. After the prosecution had rested its case he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The change of plea at that stage would have been highly improper and irregular if the evidence for the prosecution had made out a case of murder against him for then both the trial court and the prosecuting fiscal would be helping the accused to avoid receiving a more severe penalty. Attributing good faith to both the trial court and the prosecuting fiscal, the plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide must have been allowed only because the evidence for the prosecution had proved that homicide, not murder, had been committed. In fact, a reading of the trial court’s decision shows this to be the case. The information alleged evident premeditation and abuse of superiority but the trial court said that the latter was not present and made no finding as to the former. It found that Wilson Parohinog was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. Additionally, he is also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender for at the back of the warrant for his arrest is the notation: “The accused Wilson Parohinog voluntarily surrender in this department,” meaning the Police Department of Sapian, Capiz. In the light of the foregoing, even assuming that Wilson Parohinog did withdraw his plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and reverted to his former plea of not guilty, he cannot be convicted of murder because the evidence for the prosecution made out a case of homicide only with no aggravating circumstance but with two mitigating circumstances. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by finding Wilson Parohinog guilty of the crime of homicide penalized by reclusion temporal but with the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance has to be reduced to prision mayor (Art. 64, par. 5, Rev. Penal Code). Accordingly, Wilson Parohinog is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio. In closing we have to point to the fact that the trial court in convicting the accused of murder imposed a straight penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. It found no aggravating circumstance out appreciated one mitigating circumstance. The minimum period of the penalty is, therefore, applicable, i.e., 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. However, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should have been applied. Accordingly, we urge the trial judge, Tomas R. Leonidas to re-read the Indeterminate Sentence Law. SO ORDERED. Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion. Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.