[ G.R. No. 47771. March 11, 1978 ] 172 Phil. 31; 75 OG 1114 (February, 1979)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 47771. March 11, 1978 ]
PEDRO G. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NATIONAL TREASURER, AND KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. L-47803. MARCH 11, 1978] JUAN T. DAVID, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC); LEONARDO B. PEREZ, CHAIRMAN-COMELEC; VENANCIO S. DUQUE, FLORES A. BAYOT, CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, VENANCIO L. YANEZA, COMMISSIONERS-COMELEC; JAIME LAYA, BUDGET COMMISSIONER; AND GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, NATIONAL TREASURER, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. L-47816. MARCH 11, 1978] YOUTH DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, RAMON PAGUIRIGAN, AND ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO. L-47767. MARCH 11, 1978] IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTION CODE OF 1978 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, PETITIONER. [G.R. NO. L-47791. MARCH 11, 1978] B. ASUNCION BUENAFE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO. L-47827. MARCH 11, 1978] REYNALDO T. FAJARDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JAIME LAYA, AS THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, AS THE NATIONAL TREASURER, KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, AND LAKAS NG BAYAN, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
ANTONIO, J.:
These six (6) consolidated petitions pose for the determination of this Court the constitutionality of specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1296).
I
The first issue posed for resolution is: Whether or not the voting system provided for in Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, granting to the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation, violates Section 1 of Article IV and Section 9(1) of Art icle XII-C of the Constitution.
The specific provisions of the 1978 Election Code which are assailed as being in violation of the equal protection clause are the following:
“SEC. 140. Manner of preparing the ballot.-The voter upon receiving his folded ballot shall forthwith proceed to one of the empty voting booths and shall there fill his ballot by writing in the proper space for each office the name of the candidate for whom he desires to vote: Provided, That in the election of regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the voter may choose to vote for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces of the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, but if for any reason he chooses to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation, by writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation: Provided, further, That the ballots for the election of regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prepared by the Commission in such manner that the voter may vote for the straight ticket of a political party, group or aggrupation or for individual candidates, and for this purpose, the ticket of a regularly organized political party, group or aggrupation as certified under oath by their respective directorates or duly authorized representatives as well as candidates not belonging to any particular political party, group or aggrupation, shall be printed in the upper portion of said ballots in a manner which does not give undue advantage to any political party, group or aggrupation or candidate, and there shall also be a column containing blank spaces for the names of such candidates which spaces are to be filled by the voter who does not desire to vote for a straight ticket: Provided, finally, That a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party, group or aggrupation; if he is included in the ticket of more than one political party, group or aggrupation presenting different sets of candidates, he shall immediately inform the Commission as to which ticket he chooses to be included, and if he fails to do so, he shall cease to be considered to belong to any ticket. The following notice shall be printed on the ballot: ‘If you wart to vote for all the official candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation to the exclusion of all other candidates, write the name of such political party, group or aggrupation in the space indicated. It shall then be unnecessary for you to write the names of candidates you vote for. On the other hand, if you want to vote for candidates belonging to different parties, groups or aggrupations and/or for individual candidates, write in the respective blank spaces the names of the candidates you vote for and the names written by you in the respective blank spaces in the ballot shall then be considered as validly voted for.’
*** *** ***”
“SEC. 155. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. - In the reading and appreciation of ballots, the committee shall observe the following rules:
“26. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation.
“27. If a voter has written in the proper space of the ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, a vote shall be counted for each of the official candidates of such party, group or aggrupation and the votes for the individual candidates written on the ballot shall be considered as stray votes.
“28. If a voter has written in the proper space of his ballot the name of a political party, group or aggrupation which has nominated official candidates and the names of individual candidates not belonging to the ticket of the same political party, group or aggrupation in the spaces provided therefor, all of the votes indicated in the ballot shall be considered as stray votes and shall not be counted: Provided, however, That if the number of candidates nominated by the political party, group or aggrupation written by the voter in the ballot is less than the number of seats to be filled in the election and the voter also writes the names of individual candidates in the spaces provided therefor not belonging to the ticket of the political party, group or aggrupation he has written in the ballot, the ballot shall be counted as votes in favor of the candidates of the political party, group or aggrupation concerned and the individual candidates whose names were firstly written by the voter in the spaces provided therefor, until the authorized number of seats is filled.”
The system which allows straight party voting is not unique in the Philippine experience. As early as 1941, the Second National Assembly of the Philippines enacted Commonwealth Act No. 666, entitled “An Act to Provide for the First Election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives, Under the Constitution and the Amendments Thereof.” Said Commonwealth Act enabled the voter to vote for individual candidates or for a straight party ticket by writing either the names of the candidates of his choice or of the political party he favored on designated blank spaces on the ballot.[1]
While the original Election Code, Commonwealth Act No. 357, dated August 22, 1938, did not carry provisions for optional straight party voting,[2] the system was, however, substantially reinstituted in Republic Act No. 180, or the Revised Election Code, enacted on June 21, 1947.[3] The only important difference introduced was that in appreciating ballots on which the voter had written both the name of a political party and the names of candidates not members of said party, Republic Act No. 180 provided that the individual candidates whose names were written shall be considered voted for,[4] whereas Commonwealth Act No. 666 provided that the vote shall be counted in favor of the political party.[5]
Likewise, it should be noted that in other jurisdictions, ballots providing for optional straight party voting have been accepted as a standard form, in addition to the “office-block” ballots, in which all candidates for each office are grouped together. Among the different states of the United States, for example, the following has been observed:
“The party-column ballot, used in about 30 states, is sometimes called the Indiana-type ballot because the Indiana law of 1889 has served as a model for other states. In most states using the party-column ballot, it is possible to vote for the candidates of a single party for all offices by making a single cross in the circle at the head of the column containing the party’s candidates. In some states, the party emblem is carried at the top of its column, a feature which, in less literate days, was of some utility in guiding the voter to the right column on the ballot. To vote a split ticket on a party-column ballot usually requires the recording of a choice for each office, a path the voter will presumably hesitate to follow when he has the alternative of making a single cross mark. Professional party workers generally favor the use of the party-column ballot because it encourages straight ticket voting.* * *.
“In contrast with the party-column ballot is the office-block ballot, or, as it is sometimes called by virtue of its origin, the Massachusetts ballot. Names of all candidates, by whatever party nominated, for each office are grouped together on the office-block ballot, usually with an indication alongside each name of the party affiliation. The supposition is that the voter will be compelled to consider separately the candidates for each ballot, in contrast with the encouragement given to straight-ticket voting by the party column ballot. Pennsylvania uses a variation of the office-block ballot: the candidates are grouped according to office but provision is made for straight-ticket voting by a single mark."[6]
Election laws providing for the Indiana-type ballot, as afore-mentioned, have been held constitutional as against the contention that they interfere with the freedom and equality of elections. Thus, in Oughton, et al. v. Black, et al.,[7] assailed as unconstitutional was a statutory proviso which required that ballots should be printed with the following instructions: “To vote a straight party ticket, mark a cross (x) in the square opposite the name of the party of your choice, in the first column. A crossmark in the square opposite the name of any candidate indicates a vote for that candidate.”
It was contended that such provision interferes with the freedom and equality of elections, and authorizes a method of voting for political parties and not for men. It was alleged that the special privilege given to straight ticket voters and denied to others injured appellants, who, as candidates, were opposed by other candidates who can much more easily be voted for. In resolving such question and declaring the law valid, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the “free and equal exercise of the elective franchise by every elector is not impaired by the statute, but simply regulated. The regulation is for the convenience of the electors. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark while another may be required to make two or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in the sound discretion of the Legislature."[8]
The Pennsylvania Court further emphasized that elections are equal when the vote of every candidate is equal in its influence on the result, to the vote of every candidate; when each ballot is as effective as every other ballot.[9]
To the same effect is the holding in Ritchie v. Richards, which sustained the validity of a statute containing a similar provision.[10]
At any rate, voting by party has been accepted in various states as a form of democratic electoral process. In Israel, for example, where the election system is one of proportional representation in which each political party presents a list of candidates to the citizenry, the voter selects a party, not a candidate, and each party is then represented in the Knesset in proportion to its strength on the polls. The head of the largest party is asked to form a government.[11] In France, on the other hand, under the electoral law of October 5, 1946, providing for the selection of National Assembly members, a list system of proportional representation was set up, whereby each electoral area elected several candidates in proportion to its voting strength. The voter was required to vote only for one party list; he could not split his vote among several candidates on different party lists, but could depart from the order of preference set up by the party. Commissioners then count the ballots for each party list and distribute the total number of seats among the different successful parties.[12] In Italy and West Germany, party voting is likewise in practice, and proportional representation seats are distributed on the basis of the number of votes received by the successful parties.
Petitioners in the cases at bar invoke the constitutional mandate that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws (Article IV, Section 1) and the provision that “bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment or discrimination” (Article XII-C, Section 9[1]). The word “discrimination” in the latter provision should be construed in relation to the equal protection clause and in the manner and degree in which it is taken therein, since said provision “is in line with the provision of the Bill of Rights that no ‘person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws’”.[13]
The main objection of petitioners against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 1 of Article IV, in relation to Section 9 of Article XII, of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.[14] The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.[15] There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made in accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded. There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike. It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to foresee and provide for every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division.[16] Classification which has some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety.[17]
In the cases at bar, the assailed classification springs from the alleged differential treatment afforded to candidates who are party members as against those who run as independents. It must be emphasized that one who assails the classification contained in the election law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon a reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.[18] The factual foundation to demonstrate invalidity must be established by the litigant challenging its constitutionality.[19] These principles are predicated upon the presumption in favor of constitutionality.
This has to be so because of “the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.[20]
Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be “a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication."[21] There is practical unanimity among the courts in the pronouncement “that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt."[22]
We shall now test the validity of petitioners’ arguments on the basis of these principles.
In the challenged provision of the electoral law, unlike the previous block-voting statutes, all the names of the candidates, whether of parties, groups or independent candidates, are printed on the ballot. Before he prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party, group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party, group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.
In the ordinary course of things, those who join or become members of associations, such as political parties or any other lawful groups or organizations, necessarily enjoy certain benefits and privileges which are incident to, or are consequences of, such membership. Freedom of association has been enshrined in the Constitution to enable individuals to join others of like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in lawful activities. Membership in associations is considered as an extension of individual freedom. Effective advocacy of both public and private views or opinions is undeniably enhanced by group association. Freedom to engage in associations for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is, therefore, an inseparable aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the fundamental law. Therefore, if, as an incident of joining a political party, group or aggrupation, the candidate is given certain privileges, this is constitutionally permissible. Thus, under the provisions of the previous election laws, only the parties who polled the largest and the next largest number of votes in the last preceding presidential elections were entitled to representation in the Board of Election Inspectors.[23] Independent candidates had no representation in the Board; and yet it was never contended that the independent candidates were denied the equal protection of the laws.
The official candidates of an organized political party may be distinguished from an independent candidate. The former are bound by the party’s rules. They owe loyalty to the party, its tenets, its policies, its platforms and programmes of government. To the electorate, they represent the party, its principles, ideals and objectives. This is not true of an independent candidate. If the electoral law has bias in favor of political parties, it is because political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, active or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. In modern times the political party has become the instrument for the organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists with the consent of the governed. Political parties perform an “essential function in the management of succession to power, as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy. They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the national weal."[24]
The Constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government. Such a system implies the existence of responsible political parties with distinct programmes of government. The parliamentary system works best when party distinctions are well defined by differences in principle. As observed by a noted authority on political law, under a parliamentary system, “the maintenance and development of the party system becomes not only necessary but indispensable for the enforcement of the idea and the rule of government responsibility and accountability to the people in the political management of the country."[25] Indeed, the extent to which political parties can become effective instruments of self-government depends, in the final analysis, on the degree of the citizens’ competence in politics and their willingness to contribute political resources to the parties.
It is also contended that the system of optional straight party voting is anathema to free, orderly and honest elections or that it encourages laziness or political irresponsibility. These are objections that go to the wisdom of the statute. It is well to remember that this Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom or expediency of legislation. We have reiterated in a previous case that: “It is * * * settled * * * that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid."[26] This notwithstanding, We deem it necessary, for the information of everyone concerned, to explain why such fears, in a growing climate of political maturity and social responsibility, appear conjectural.
There are no data to show that the system herein assailed was the proximate cause of all the frauds in the 1941, 1947 and 1949 elections. Besides, all procedures or manners of voting are susceptible to fraud. The important thing to consider is that the 1978 Election Code is replete with new provisions designed to guarantee the sanctity and secrecy of the people’s vote.
As demonstrated in the experience of other democratic states, such a system has its advantages. It may enable deserving young candidates — but without adequate financial resources of their own to win, with party support, in countrywide or regional elections. Since candidates of a party or group may pool their resources, it will tend to make elections less expensive. As this system of voting favors the strongly organized parties or groups, it tends to prevent the proliferation of political parties or groups. It thus results in the formation of stable and responsible political parties. On the part of the electorate, such a system of voting facilitates the exercise of their right of suffrage. It enables the laborer, the farmer and the voter of ordinary education to vote with greater facility for all the official candidates of the party of his choice. It thus broadens the ways and means by which the sovereign will can be expressed.
Nor could it be true, as petitioners contend, that a system which allows straight ticket voting encourages laziness and political irresponsibility. While there may be those who may be moved to vote straight party by reason of lack of interest, nevertheless, there are still those sufficiently interested to cast an intelligent vote. It has been observed that in a straight ticket the motivated voter is more likely to organize his ballot in a highly structured pattern. His motivation may derive from an interest in parties, candidates, or issues or any combination of those. As observed by a survey research group: “Motivated straight ticket voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible. Such a voter does not scatter his choices casually, he has a political direction in mind and he implements it through the choice of one party or the other on the ballot. The more highly motivated he is toward this political objective, the less willing he is to dilute his vote by crossing party lines."[27]
II
The second issue before Us is: Whether or not the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 14 of the 1978 Election Code, which authorize the election the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa by regions, violate Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the members of the National Assembly shall be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities.
Assailed as unconstitutional are the following provisions of the 1978 Election Code:
“SEC. 11. Composition. - The interim Batasang Pambansa shall be composed of the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet.”
“SEC. 12. Apportionment of regional representatives. - There shall be 160 regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen regions of the nation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio * * *:
“The foregoing apportionment shall not be considered a precedent in connection with the reapportionment of representative districts for the regular National Assembly under Section 2, Article VIII and Section 6, Article XVII of the Constitution.
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the number of regional representatives for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. There are also allotted two additional seats for regional representatives to Region IV in view of inhabitants, such as students, in the region not taken into account in the 1975 census.”
“SEC. 14. Voting by region.– Each region shall be entitled to such number of regional representatives as are allotted to it in Section 12 of Article II hereof. All candidates for regional representatives shall be voted upon at large by the registered voters of their respective regions. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes from the entire region shall be declared elected.”
The constitutional provision relied upon is Section 2 of Article VIII, which provides:
“SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall be composed of as many Members as may be provided by law to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Representative districts or provinces already created or existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall have at least one Member each.”
In resolving the issue, the provisions of Amendment No. 1 to the Constitution, which took effect on October 27, 1976, should be considered and not, as pointed out by petitioner Juan T. David, those of Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which deal with the composition of the regular National Assembly.
It should be recalled that under the terms of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution,[28] the membership of the interim National Assembly would consist of the Incumbent President and Vice-President, the Senators and the Representatives of the old Congress and the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention who have opted to serve therein. The Filipino people rejected the convening of the interim National Assembly, and for a perfectly justifiable reason.
By September of 1976, the consensus had emerged for a referendum partaking of the character of a plebiscite which would be held to establish the solid foundation for the next step towards normalizing the political process. By the will of the people, as expressed overwhelmingly in the plebiscite of October 15 and 16, 1976, Amendments Nos. 1 to 9 were approved, abolishing the interim National Assembly and creating in its stead an interim Batasang Pambansa. This was intended as a preparatory and experimental step toward the establishment of full parliamentary government as provided for in the Constitution.
Amendment No. 1 provides:
“1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa, which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, while the sector shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law. (Italics supplied.)
The provisions of the above Amendment are clear. Instead of providing that representation in the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be by representative districts, it specifically provides that: (1) the representatives shall be elected from the different regions of the nation; and (2) the “Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sector shall be determined by law.” No mention whatsoever is made of “provinces, representative districts and cities”. Where the intent is to relate to the regular National Assembly, the Constitution made it clear and manifest, as indicated in Amendment No. 2 of the Constitution.[29] It is significant to note that nowhere in the said amendment is it provided that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned among the representative districts, in the same manner as the regular National Assembly. The clear import and intent of the Constitutional Amendment is, therefore, the election of the representatives from the different regions of the nation, and such regional representatives shall be allotted or distributed among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Neither does the Amendment provide that the members of the interim Batasang Pambansa “shall be elected by the qualified electors in their respective district for a term of six years * * *” as provided in Section 3[1] of Article VIII of the Constitution. To hold that Section 3[1] of Article VIII is applicable to the interim Batasang Pambansa would lead to the conclusion that the members of the Batasan shall have a term of six years, which is of course inconsistent with its transitory character. That the interim Batasang Pambansa is a distinct and special body, which, by reason of its transitory nature should be governed by specifically formulated rules, is apparent from the constitutional amendment which created it. Thus, its membership “shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law.” Furthermore, it “shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the Members of the Cabinet.” The regular National Assembly, on the other hand, is limited in its membership to representatives to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts and cities. By reason of its provisional character, the interim Batasang Pambansa has to be more flexible, both in its representation and the manner of election of its members. There is no denying the fact that as wide a range of representation as possible is required in order to hasten the nation’s return to normalcy. It is for this reason that sectors are given adequate representation[30] and are considered as “national aggrupations.” Elections of sectoral representatives are specially provided for in the 1978 Election Code.[31] It should be emphasized that the regular National Assembly is distinct and different in composition, powers and manner of elections of its members from the interim Batasang Pambansa. The two legislative bodies were intended to operate in different situations – the interim Batasang Pambansa is to function during the period of transition while the regular National Assembly is to operate upon the restoration of normalcy.
The composition of the interim Batasang Pambansa is indeed experimental. It is an experiment in size, form and distribution of constituencies in the hope of securing a legislature most truly representative of the views of the electorate. It would, therefore, be ludicrous to confine the members of such body within the strictures of the representative districts of the regular National Assembly. The fear of petitioner Juan T. David that several representative districts will be deprived of representation misconstrues the concept of regional elections. The representatives are to be elected by the voters of the entire region. They will represent the whole region and not merely its integral provinces, districts or cities. Moreover, Section 12 of the Code ensures that there shall be sufficient representatives for each region by providing that “the number of regional representatives for any region shall not be less than the number of representative districts therein existing at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.”
III
The following two issues raised by petitioners are interrelated and must be jointly discussed herein. They are:
(a) Whether or not the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) may be registered and accredited ass political parties under Section 8 of Article XII-C the Constitution, so that their respective candidates for membership in the interim Batasang Pambana may be voted for a group under the 1978 Election Code; and
(b) Whether or not members a political party in the 1971 elections may run under the ticket sponsored by any other party, group or aggrupation, considering the provisions of Section 10 of Article X11–C of the Constitution, which prohibit candidates for any elective public office from changing party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.
The resolution of the foregoing issues calls for the determination of the constitutionality of Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code, questioned by petitioners. Said section provides:
“SEC. 199. Registration of political parties.– Pending the promulgation of rules and regulations to govern the registration and accreditation of political parties by the Commission in accordance with Article XII[C] of the Constitution, the registration with the Commission previous to 1972 of the Nacionalista Party, Liberal Party, Citizens’ Party, and other national parties shall be deemed to continue and they may, upon notice to the Commission through their respective presidents or duly authorized representatives, amend or change their names, constitutions, by-laws, or other organizational papers, platforms, officers and members, and shall be entitled to nominate and support their respective candidates for representatives in the interim Batasang Pambansa. Similarly, any other group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in government may register with the Commission and be entitled to the same rights and privileges.”
Invoked by petitioners are Sections 8 and 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, which provide:
“SEC. 8. A political party shall be entitled to accreditation by the Commission if, in the immediately preceding election, such party has obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party, and no political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence or subversion shall be entitled to accreditation.”
“SEC. 10. No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.”
It should be recalled that the object of the afore-quoted provisions of the Constitution was to develop a third party and break the heretofore dominant hold on the political system by the two major political parties which have been in existence since the birth of the republic. These two major parties were considered as “in fact a one party system with two factions openly disagreeing on fringe issues but tacitly united by one common aim: alternate monopoly of power through a pattern of patronage politics."[32] The framers of the Constitution examined the weaknesses of the party system and saw the need “for discarding the old two party system as a political farce that has been largely responsible for many of the country’s ills * * *”.[33] They envisioned, therefore, a new era in Philippine politics, where elections were to be decided on issues rather than on personalities, and where the electoral process was to be free, less expensive, and more democratic. Effective and responsive government depends on an organized and vigorous citizenry. Such can only exist if citizens can increase their effectiveness in politics by modernizing and using political parties to set the general directions of public policy and to influence the specific decisions of public institutions that affect their daily lives.
It was intended, however, that some of these provisions would not operate during the interim period. Thus, from the wording of Section 8, it is obvious that said section is incapable of application during the first election because it states that no political party shall be entitled to accreditation unless in the immediately preceding election, it obtained at least the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation. That there cannot be any accreditation during the first election under the 1973 Constitution is evident from the sponsorship speech of the proponent of this constitutional provision.[34]
Although their members are united by common policies and principles of government and apparently impelled by the same political ideals, neither the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) nor the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) professes to be a political party in the sense of a stable organization with a degree of permanence, imposing strict discipline among the members, and with a party platform drafted and ratified in a party convention. It does not follow, however, that the KBL and LABAN are not political parties, in a generic sense, since a political party has been generally defined as “an association of voters believing in certain principles of government, formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like belief."[35] Political parties “result from the voluntary association of electors, and do not exist by operation of law. The element of time is not essential to the formation of a legal party; it may spring into existence from the exigencies of a particular election, and with no intention of continuing after the exigency has passed."[36] As a matter of fact, it is only the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) that have polarized the major differences on vital public issues affecting the nation. And, during this first election in this period of transition when, obviously, no political party can be accredited, does the Constitution, in Article XII-C, Sections 2[5] and 8 limit registration to political parties as strictly understood by withholding it from aggrupations of persons pursuing the same political ideals of government as provided in Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code? It clearly does not. The listing of political parties appears to have a dual aspect registration and accreditation. Registration is a means by which the government is enabled to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.
It would appear from Section 8 of Article XII-C that the only groups which cannot be registered are: (a) religious groups or sects; and (b) those political parties or groups who seek “to achieve its goals through violence and subversion”. Accreditation is the means by which the registration requirement is made effective by conferring benefits to registered political parties. The condition for accreditation, aside from those mentioned, is that the political party must have obtained, in the immediately preceding election, at least “the third highest number of votes cast in the constituency to which it seeks accreditation.” The Constitution, however, does not state what are the effects of accreditation. There is, therefore, necessity for legislation. Moreover, to construe the term “political party” restrictively would delimit the supervisory authority of the Commission on Elections. More specifically, it would exempt aggrupations or other political groups from certain requirements. Under Section 199, the 1978 Election Code allows the registration of aggrupations or groups of persons “pursuing the same political ideals in government”; consequently, they are subjected to the regulation of propaganda materials (Sec. 41) and the limitation of expenses for candidates (Sec. 52).
From another point of view, a narrow construction may discourage the robust exercise of the right of association guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which at this stage of our political history, appears necessary.
The fact that the coming polls will be the first that we shall hold since the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972 makes it an event of no ordinary significance. “The Filipino society has outgrown its age of innocence. Today the acts of Filipino politicians must be judged by more mature standards and the test of national allegiance has become more strict and more demanding, even more binding."[37] By this election, we shall inaugurate a new stage in our political life, and commence our fateful transition from crisis government to a parliamentary system.
But as President Ferdinand E. Marcos has significantly observed:
“* * * this step, I repeat, is no mere restoration of electoral processes and representative government. The coming elections would be a perilous exercise indeed if they would merely return us to elections and representative institutions as we had known them in the past, and compromise what had taken us so much time and effort to construct over the last five years.
“What we envision in this initiative is the permanence and continuity of the reforms that we have launched under the aegis of crisis government. We envision in it the full emergence of a new political order that will give life and sustenance to our national vision of a new society. And it will have permanence and continuity because by the grace of suffrage and representative government, we shall thereby attain a formal mechanism for the exercise of participation and involvement by our people in nation-building and national development."[38]
It is, therefore, necessary at this stage to encourage the emergence or growth of political parties that will truly reflect the opinions and aspirations of our people. The right of individuals to form associations as guaranteed by the fundamental law, includes the freedom to associate or refrain from association.[39] In accord with this constitutional precept, it is recognized that no man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party, or, after having become such, to remain a member.[40]
The existence of responsible political parties with distinct programs of government is essential to the effectiveness of a parliamentary system of government. It is in recognition of this fact that Section 199 of the 1978 Election Code allows or sanctions the registration of groups of persons “pursuing the same political ideals in government” with the Commission on Elections. Moreover, to what extent the rights of organized political parties should be regulated by law is a matter of public policy to be determined by the lawmaker – a matter which does not concern the courts.[41]
This brings us to the next point raised by petitioners, namely, that under Section 10 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, no candidate for elective office may change his party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election. In the cases at bar, We understand that no candidate voluntarily changed his party affiliation. On the contrary, the claim that the KBL and the LABAN are not “political parties” is based partly on the fact that the candidates running under their banners have retained their party affiliation. Section 10 is a statement of a basic principle against political opportunism. To begin with, no legislation has been enacted to implement this constitutional prohibition. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how the courts may apply the prohibition, in all the varied facts and circumstances under which it may be invoked, without the aid of supplementary legislation. For instance, the provision in question states that no elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office. Suppose an elected representative in the legislature, belonging to one party, shall always vote and side with another political party. Will he be considered a “turncoat” even if he does not formally change his party affiliation? Suppose it be decided that he is a “turncoat”. What sanctions should be adopted? Should he be suspended or ousted from the legislature?
When one turns to political candidates, the same questions as to what should be considered “political opportunism” or “turncoatism” will be encountered. But the problem of procedure for hearing and deciding infringements of the prohibition or the determination of the appropriate sanction becomes more acute. Is the sanction to be found in the refusal by the Commission on Elections to register the party or group, or in the denial of his certificate of candidacy, or are there other ways? Should political parties be prevented from “adopting” candidates? Or from forming coalitions?
All of these are questions of policy, in resolving which many immensurable factors have to be considered. The afore-cited constitutional provisions are commands to the legislature to enact laws to carry out the constitutional purpose. They are, therefore, addressed initially to the lawmaking department of the government. It is not part of the judicial department to deal with such questions without their authoritative solutions by the legislative department. It may be relevant to emphasize here that the jurisdiction of this Court is “limited to cases and controversies, presented in such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial power is capable of acting upon them, and pronouncing and carrying into effect a judgment between the parties, and does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or a real case."[42]
In any event, We cannot perceive how such constitutional prohibition could be applied in this first election. Precisely, the overriding constitutional purpose is to remove the dominant hold of the two major political parties and encourage the formation of new political parties. The intention is not to rebuild old party coalitions but to define new political means and instruments, within the parties or beyond them, that will allow the Filipino people to express their deeper concerns and aspirations through popular government.
IV
The fourth issue is: whether or not the forty-five-day period of campaign prescribed in the 1978 Election Code violates the Constitution because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 Article XII-C; and (b) the period should cover at least ninety (90) days.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides:
“SEC . 4. Election and campaign periods.—The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978.”
In support of the allegation of unconstitutionality, petitioners rely on Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, thus:
“SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.”
At the outset, it should be considered that Amendment No. 1 provides that the “number of representatives from each region and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law” (italics supplied). Under Amendment No. 5, “the incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.” The power conferred by these Amendments upon the lawmaker necessarily included the authority to prescribe the date and procedure for the holding of such elections. It should be borne in mind that the forthcoming election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa will be a special election during a regime of martial law. It is, therefore, an election in a state of emergency. The exigencies of the situation require that it be governed by special rules. At this point, the objective is to hasten the normalization of government and, at the same time, to ensure that the nation is not exposed to the same critical problems that necessitated the declaration of martial law. In conferring upon the incumbent President the authority to determine the date of the election, those who drafted the Amendments must have realized that it is only the incumbent President who has the authority and the means of obtaining, through the various facilities in the civil and military agencies of the government, information on the peace and order condition of the country, and to determine the period within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all the regions of the nation. Thus, the 1978 Election Code was formulated to meet a special need, and this is emphasized by the fact that the Code itself limits its application.[43]
Even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period for campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission on Elections has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code.
At any rate, insofar as objections to the fixing of the campaign period for elections in general are concerned, it is apparent that there is a distinction between the terms “election period” and “campaign period”. Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code provides that the “election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII(C) of the Constitution.” The “campaign period”, however, has been fixed so that “it shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978.” The distinction is further made apparent by the fact that the “election period” under Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution extends even beyond the day of the election itself, while the “campaign period”, by reason of its nature and purpose, must necessarily be before the elections are held. There is, therefore, no conflict with the constitutional provision.
At this juncture, it may be relevant to note the efforts of the Commission on Elections to give more substance and meaning to the intent and spirit of the Constitution and the 1978 Election Code by giving the same practicable opportunities to candidates, groups or parties involved in the April 7, 1978 interim Batasang Pambansa elections. Thus, in Resolution No. 1289, the COMELEC removed the so called undue advantage which the Nacionalista Party and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) had over the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) in terms of authorized election expenses, appointment of election watchers and use of print and broadcast media. This circumstance, contrary to the claims of petitioners, shows that the Commission on Elections, as a constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, and with broad powers, functions and duties under the 1973 Constitution, can give candidates, irrespective of parties, equal opportunities under equal circumstances.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions DISMISSED, without costs.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs except for the exclusion on the rule of appreciation of ballots in par. 28 of election 155 of the 1987 Election Code and submits a separate opinion.
Teehankee and Muñoz Palma, JJ., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.