[ G.R. No. 47342. July 25, 1978 ] 173 Phil. 433; 75 OG 3678 (April, 1979)
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 47342. July 25, 1978 ]
NICOLAS GALDO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE EULALIO D. ROSETE, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH IX, AND ROSARIO B. ROA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner seeks to nullify the orders of respondent Judge dated September 28, 1977 and October 18, 1977, with the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin private respondent from filing a motion for execution of judgment and from disturbing petitioner’s possession of the disputed parcel of rice land, as well as for an order directing the respondent Judge to approve petitioner’s on appeal and to give due course to his appeal.
The records disclose that on March 23, 1977, petitioner received a copy of the decision dated March 19, 1977 of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 5105 entitled “Nicolas Galdo, Plaintiff, versus Rosario B. Roa, Defendant.”
On April 15, 1977, petitioner filed his notice of appeal and deposited the cash appeal bond.
On the same date, April 15, 1977, about one week before the expiration of the 30-day reglementary period within which to perfect the appeal (Sec. 3, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court), petitioner filed a motion for extension of this to file his typewritten record on appeal up to May 5, 1977.
Because counsel for petitioner had no clerk then, he himself had to type his record on appeal which he finished in the afternoon of May 5, 1977. Forthwith, that same afternoon, he furnished counsel for herein private respondent a copy of his typewritten record on appeal and thereafter proceeded to the court to file the typewritten record on appeal, but the same could not be filed because it was already past five o’clock in the afternoon, the office of the clerk of court was closed and nobody was present to properly receive the typewritten record on appeal, which at any rate he filed the following morning of May 6, 1977.
Petitioner set the hearing for the approval of his record on appeal on May 20, 1977, which was postponed by respondent Judge upon oral motion of counsel for private respondent on the ground that private respondent would file a motion to cite herein petitioner and other persons in contempt of court and which motion for contempt should be given preference.
Because not all respondents in the contempt citation were notified of the same, hearing of the contempt motion was deferred.
On August 3, 1977, the date set for the hearing of the contempt proceedings, respondent Judge, without benefit of hearing, ordered the arrest of one Mrs. Florecita G. Bahala, one of those persons listed in the contempt citation, who was immediately jailed.
On that same day, counsel for private respondent filed an o position to the approval of the record on appeal on the ground that it was filed one day late.
Despite objection of counsel for petitioner to the opposition, respondent Judge, in an order dated September 28, 1977, disapproved the record on appeal, which was reiterated in an order dated October 18, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
This Court has time and again reiterated its adoption of a liberal posture in respect to procedural technicalities beginning with the case of Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals (53 SCRA 228 [1973]). We see no compelling reason in the case at bar to deviate from the rule against the rigorous adherence to technical rules of procedure.
It is not disputed that the notice of appeal, the cash appeal bond, and the motion for extension of time to file typewritten Record on Appeal were all filed within the reglementary period. The records likewise disclose that the petitioner personally furnished a copy of the record on appeal to counsel for the private respondent, Rosario B. Roa, within the reglementary period as extended, more specifically in the afternoon of May 5, 1977. The failure of the petitioner’s counsel to file with the court the original copy of the record on appeal on May 5, 1977, and his being able to do so only on the following morning of May 6, 1977, considering the attendant circumstances, do not warrant such a cavalier disapproval of such record on appeal, and the consequent denial of his appeal. For one, the delay - which was but less than one day – in the filing of the record on appeal with the lower court was patently not intended to delay nor prejudice the private respondent. The fact of the matter is that the petitioner through counsel exerted earnest efforts to finish by himself - as he had no clerk - the typewritten record on appeal for the purpose of serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party - which petitioner’s counsel had done within the reglementary period as extended, as well as for the purpose of filing a copy thereof with the lower court - which his counsel did attempt to no avail inasmuch as the office of the clerk of court was already closed when he arrived at past five o’clock in the afternoon that May 5, 1977.
Respondent Judge’s contention that there were at least two court stenographers working overtime that day until late in the night, with whom the record on appeal could have been filed does not deserve consideration; because it is not just any employee in the lower court who can properly receive pleadings, but it is the receiving or docket clerk in the office of the clerk or deputy clerk of court particularly assigned to receive pleadings.
The ends of substantial justice could have been better served had respondent Judge approved the record on appeal - thereby giving due course to petitioner’s appeal, in the light of petitioner’s substantial compliance with the rules. Strict interpretation of the pertinent rule in the instant case would mean sacrificing justice to technicality.
The Supreme Court, as far back as Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]) frowns upon such application of procedural rules with pedantic rigor", thus:
“The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. x x x Technicality, when it desert its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities. x x "
The foregoing oft-cited ruling has been heavily relied on by this Court in the landmark case of Berkenkotter v. CA (supra), which set the mood for a more liberal construction of the rules as mandated in Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, “in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”’ We ruled therein:
“x x x although there is no vested right in technicalities (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315), in meritorious cases like the present case, a liberal (not literal) interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules – the proper and just determination of a litigation” (see also Lopez, et al. vs. CA, et al. [75 SCRA 401, (1977)], Maqui and Maqui vs. CA [69 SCRA 368 (1976)], Heirs of Ceferino Morales vs. CA [67 SCRA 304 (19751] and Pimentel vs. CA [64 SCRA 476 (1975)].
Subsequent decisions of this Court in respect to the same question were mere reiterations of the liberal stance adopted by this Court. In Heirs of Ceferino Morales vs. CA (supra), WE said:
“The intent is thus clear that every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. x x x”
And in the more recent case of De las Alas vs. CA, et al. (L-38006, May 16, 1978), We declared that “litigations s should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality x x “, citing Gregorio vs. CA (72 SCRA 120, 26 [1976]) wherein We stated:
“x x x Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.'”
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1977 AND OCTOBER 18, 1977 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID AND RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO TRANSMIT ALL RECORD ON APPEAL AND TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDS TO THE COURT OF APPELAS FOR A DECISION ON THE MERITS AND/OR ANY APPROPRIATE PROCEEDINGS. NO COSTS.
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), concurs in a separate opinion.
Muñoz Palma, J., in the result.