[ G.R. No. 29217. May 11, 1978 ] 172 Phil. 423; 75 OG 1565 (February, 1979)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 29217. May 11, 1978 ]
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, VICENTE DUMAGUENG, OLEGARIO SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN, DIONISIO TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO ALCOVER, ALFONSO ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO BAGUIO, ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTINIANO IGNACIO AND ANGEL SANTIAGO, SR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. L-33935. MAY 11, 1978] MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALU, VICENTE DUMAGUENG, OLEGARIO SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN, DIONISIO TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO ALCOVER, ALFONSO ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO BAGUIO, ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTINIANO IGNACIO AND ANGEL SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, JOSE MARCELO AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
These two cases have a common factual background. L-29217 is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte to entertain an action for damages arising from unfair labor practices and to issue an injunction restraining the picketing concomitant with the strike. And L-33935 is a consolidation of two unfair labor practice cases originating from the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).
The first case was filed by the employer against the union in connection with an alleged illegal strike and picketing. The second case was filed by the union against the employer for the latter’s alleged refusal to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. The salient facts are as follows:
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, a company engaged in the manufacture of fertilizer and chemicals at its plant in Iligan City, had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association expiring on December 31, 1967. In September, 1967 the union submitted to the company a draft of a new CBA. The company countered with the suggestion that the existing CBA be renewed for a five-year period.
Believing that the company did not want to negotiate a new CBA, the union on November 2, 1967 sent to the company a notice of strike. The company clarified that it was not refusing to negotiate. It sent to the union its own draft of a new CBA. In December, 1967 fruitless negotiations regarding a new CBA were held on several occasions between the company and the union.
On January 5, 1968 the company proposed that all regular employees would be given an increase of twenty pesos and that those whose monthly salary was below P130 would be paid P150 a month. The union rejected the proposal. On January 15, 1968 the company president sent a radiogram to the union president, requesting the latter to specify the provisions in the draft of the CBA, which were unacceptable, and appealing to the union members to take into account the problems facing the company.
The union in its letter of January 16, 1968 reminded the management of its four major demands previously submitted to the company president. The letter ended with this ominous warning: “Until midnight tonight, we beg your understanding and acceptance.” (Exh. M or 17). On that same day, the company president sent a wire to the union president, suggesting mediation and conciliation by the Department of Labor. The union president promised to reply in the afternoon of the next day, January 17, after consultation with the officers of the union.
Without having made any reply, the union declared a strike in the evening of January 17, 1968. The declaration of a strike, which was served upon the plant manager at eleven-thirty in the evening, reads as follows:
“Please be informed that the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association is declaring a strike against the management of the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation at 10:47 p.m. on January 17, 1968 for the following reasons:
“1. For the refusal of the Management to grant the reasonable Union demands.
“2. For violation of the Minimum Wage Law by the management.
“3. For the anti-unionism attitude of the management.
“4. For various unfair labor practices.
“Any negotiation the management wants will be coursed on the picket lines.
“The Union will maintain a peaceful and lawful picket lines around the premises of the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Compound to effect its strike until their grievances are given redress.
“Yours truly,
“MC-Fertilizer Plant Employees Assn. (MCFPEA) “By: Sgd. Vicente Dumagueng President”
In view of the strike and the picketing, the company’s operations were paralyzed.
Two weeks after the strike was declared, or on January 30, 1968, the company filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte against the union and its officers a complaint for damages with a petition for preliminary injunction. The company alleged that the strike and picketing were illegal and that it was suffering a loss of P39,000 daily as a result of the strike. The union alleged in its answer that the lower court has no jurisdiction because the case involves a labor dispute which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. The union opposed the issuance of an injunction on the ground that the strike was lawful, peaceful and orderly. (Civil Case No. 1262).
On February 8, 1968 the lower court issued an injunction restraining the union and its agents and representatives from preventing the employees, who are not members of the union, from entering the fertilizer plant and performing their usual duties and from going out of the same and from preventing the customers from loading the fertilizer and other products purchased from the company.
Not content with filing an action for injunction and damages, the company on January 31, 1968 filed against the union and its officers a charge of unfair labor practice with the CIR’s regional office at Cagayan de Oro City. After due investigation, the CIR’s prosecution division on March 12, 1968 filed in behalf of the company a complaint for unfair labor practice against the union and its officers for having declared an illegal strike and resorted to unlawful picketing which were the same acts complained of in Civil Case No. 1262. (CIR Case No. 109-ULP-ORO).
On the other hand, the union on March 8, 1968 charged the company and its president with unfair labor practice. After due investigation, the prosecution division filed on October 30, 1968 in behalf of the union a complaint for unfair labor practice against the company, its president and personnel officer for having allegedly refused to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, for restraining the members of the union in exercising their right to self-organization, and for discriminating against them by not giving them the privileges enjoyed by non-union members (CIR Case No. 111-ULP-ORO).
The strike was terminated on October 18, 1968 when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement which took effect on the following day. The picketing was lifted. But before that settlement was made, or on July 9, 1968, the union filed in this Court the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition against the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte and the company in order to nullify the injunction and to secure a declaration that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262. On July 17, 1968, or after the petitioners had posted a bond in the sum of P500, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 1262 and from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction dated February 8, 1968. (L-29217). Hence, Civil Case No. 1262 was frozen.
The two unfair labor practice cases were heard jointly. The CIR trial judge in a decision dated May 4, 1970 held that the strike was illegal because there was no notice of intention to strike, as contemplated in section 14 of Republic Act No. 875, and because the picketing was highly coercive in character. The officers and members of the union named as respondents were declared to have lost their status as employees of the company. A motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in the CIR’s resolution en banc dated May 14, 1971.
On August 19, 1971 the union filed in this Court a petition for the review of that decision. The petition was given due course. (L-33935).
L-29217 - Jurisdictional issue: Can the CFI enjoin a strike and award damages arising from alleged unfair labor practices? -We hold that the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262 which is interwoven with the unfair labor practice case, CIR Case No. 109-ULP-ORO. The two cases involve the legality of the strike and picketing conducted by the union against the company.
An illegal strike, accompanied by violent or intimidatory picketing, may constitute an unfair labor practice insofar as it amounts to a refusal on the part of the union to bargain collectively with the employer (Sec. 4[b][3], Industrial Peace Act; Art 249[c], Labor Code).
The Court of Industrial Relations used to have exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices, a power which was not affected “by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise” (Sec. 5, Industrial Peace Act).
It is settled that where the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with, the alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the jurisdiction properly belonged to the Court of Industrial Relations (Associated Labor Union vs. Central Azucarera de La Carlota, L-25649, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 564; Progressive Labor Association vs. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp., L-27585, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 349; Goodrich Employees Association vs. Flores, L-30211, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 297; Holganza vs. Apostol, L-32953, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 190).
For the same reason, the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunction against the union. Where the issue in an action filed in the Court of First Instance was tied up with an unfair labor practice case pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, the action was outside the jurisdiction of the regular courts even if acts of violence, intimidation and coercion were imputed to the union. The injunction should have been obtained from the Industrial Court which was empowered to restrain such acts under the Industrial Peace Act. That rule obviates multiplicity of suits. (BCI Employees and Workers Union vs. Marcos, L-21016, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 793).
Applying the above-cited rulings, we come to the unavoidable conclusion that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1262 are void for lack of jurisdiction. That case should be dismissed.
L-33935 - Legality of the strike. - The union and its officers, as appellants in the unfair labor practice cases, contend that the Industrial Court erred in not holding that the strike was staged against an unfair labor practice; in finding that the strike was illegal because the requisite thirty-day notice was not given; in holding that illegal acts were resorted to in the prosecution of the strike, there being no substantial evidence to prove the alleged illegal acts; in declaring that the individual petitioners had lost their status as employees, notwithstanding their good faith in declaring a strike; in not finding that the petitioners did not take part nor authorize the alleged illegal acts; in not finding that the company and its president were estopped to claim that the strike was illegal; in not declaring the company guilty of unfair labor practices, and in not ordering the reinstatement of the individual petitioners with back wages.
The union has not raised clear-cut or pure legal issues. This Court may review the CIR’s decision in unfair labor practice cases only on questions of law. The CIR’s findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive (Sec. 6, Industrial Peace Act. See sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended). The review is proper if the CIR has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or with this Court’s applicable decisions (Sec. 3, Rule 43, Rules of Court).
The CIR’s factual findings should be set aside if they are completely devoid of basis and if it acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its factual findings are final and binding when (1) the parties were given the opportunity to present evidence; (2) the tribunal considered the evidence presented; (3) there is something in the record to support the findings, and (4) the evidence supporting the findings is substantial (Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. Tantongco and CIR, 116 Phil. 883, 890).
Substantial evidence means evidence which is more than a mere scintilla. It is relevant and credible evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635).
In this case, the CIR on the basis of the evidence found (a) that in no instance did the company refuse to negotiate with the union on the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement; (b) that the company did not coerce the employees to resign from the union on the promise of increased compensation and, therefore, it did not interfere in the right of the employees to self-organization; (c) that the company did not perpetrate acts of discrimination against the members of the union, and (d) that the strike was staged because of the company’s refusal to grant the union’s four demands regarding the inclusion of foremen and casuals in the union, the increase of the basic monthly pay to P180 and the increase to P240 a month of the salaries of employees already receiving P180 a month, free medical and dental treatment for the employees and their families, and gratuity pay.
The CIR found that the union struck in order to attain those demands and not because of the alleged refusal of the company to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement. The company had a pending suggestion for mediation by the Department of Labor when the strike was declared.
Hence, the union should have filed with the Conciliation Service or with the Director of Labor Relations thirty days prior to the strike a notice of its intention to strike, as required by section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The CIR also found that the union resorted to unlawful acts in the conduct of the strike. The picketing was highly coercive. The union prevented the plant supervisor from checking the leak in the ammonia pipeline, threatened with harm or violence a contractor dealing with the company, barred the entrance into the company compound trucks loaded with pyrite, used a human barricade to block the ingress of nonstrikers and supervisors, and displayed a placard with the words “Blast off Cahanap”.
The lower court arrived at those factual conclusions after analyzing the evidence presented by the parties at a full-dress hearing. Those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Specifically, we are bound by the finding that the alleged letter of November 2, 1967 was not the notice of intention to strike contemplated in section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace Act. That letter was sent to the company and not to the Conciliation Service or Director of Labor Relations. The chief conciliator of the Department of Labor testified that his office did not receive any notice of the impending strike. That testimony was given credence by the CIR. We cannot reverse that finding.
Nor can we ignore the CIR’s explicit finding that the strike was not peacefully conducted and that the picketing was characterized by coercion and intimidation. Only peaceful picketing is allowed (Republic Act No. 1167; De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil. 789).
As has been said, a strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. But to be lawful, a strike must be preceded by the requisite notice of intention to strike. It should have a lawful purpose and it should be executed through lawful means. (See sec. 264[b] of Labor Code).
Since the strike was found by the CIR to be illegal, we cannot say that it gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the union officers and members, who took part in the strike, authorized the unlawful acts, committed them, or ratified them, had lost their status as employees. (See Almeda vs. CIR and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 306, 317.)
WHEREFORE, in L-29217 the order and writ of injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte are set aside for lack of jurisdiction and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent. In L-33935 the CIR decision and resolution under appeal are affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., (Chairman), concurs in L-29217 and dissents in L-33935 in a separate opinion.