[ G.R. No. 27169. October 20, 1977 ] 169 Phil. 473; 74 OG No. 726 (January, 1978)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 27169. October 20, 1977 ]
PURITA S. AGUILON, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, IGNACIO S. AGUILON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MONTANO BOHOL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to adjudicate the possessory rights over a parcel of land for which the plaintiff had filed a homestead application but against which application the defendant had filed a protest with the Director of Lands.
On October 21, 1964 Purita S. Aguilon sued Montano Bohol in the Court of First Instance of Davao to recover possession of a portion of Lot No. 3046 situated in Barrio Kinablangan, Baganga, Davao Oriental, with an area of more than twenty-one hectares (Civil Case No. 4464).
Plaintiff Aguilon alleged in her complaint that through her father she cleared, cultivated and improved the said land immediately after the war; that she declared it for realty tax purposes beginning 1954; that she paid taxes due thereon up to 1964; that she filed homestead application No. 20-1846 for that land; that in 1957 Montano Bohol, through his son-in-law, Crisanto Garay, usurped a portion of the land and refused to vacate it notwithstanding repeated demands, and that she filed a forcible entry case against Garay in the justice of the peace court but it was dismissed on February 18, 1958 on the ground that her alleged remedy was with the Director of Lands (Civil Case No. 66).
Purita S. Aguilon further alleged that after the dismissal of the forcible entry case, the district land officer, at her instigation, required Bohol to vacate the homestead because it was covered by her application and because Bohol had not filed any application nor obtained any permit from the district land office for his entry and cultivation thereof; that Bohol refused to vacate the homestead and, instead, enlarged his clearing and planted seasonal crops and coconuts thereon, and that on July 23, 1958 Bohol filed a formal protest against her application.*
Bohol in his answer alleged that since 1951 he has occupied about six hectares of the disputed lot and that in 1952 he declared for taxation the said six hectares and paid the taxes due thereon up to 1964.
Bohol pleaded prescription as a defense. His theory is that the action to recover possession should have been brought within ten years from 1951. He also pleaded lack of jurisdiction because the land in litigation is a part of the public domain under the control of the Director of Lands.
Purita S. Aguilon in her reply alleged that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case, following the rulings in Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5 and Bohayang vs. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390. She countered that her action had not yet prescribed because the disturbance of her possession occurred in 1957 when Garay, Bohol’s son-in-law, occupied the disputed area as found by the private land surveyor commissioned by the municipal judge in Civil Case No. 134 to make a relocation survey.
On April 21, 1966 the lower court, long after the pretrial and upon motion of Bohol (the record on appeal does not show that he filed a written motion to dismiss), issued a minute order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff Aguilon appealed to this Court.
Her appeal is meritorious. Her action is an acción publiciana, which action “corresponde al que tiene derecho á la posesión, contra el que posee sin derecho ó con título menos firme, para que se ponga la cosa en poder del actor con todas las accesiones, frutos, etc.” (1 Enciclopedia Jurìdica Española 450).
The trial court has jurisdiction over the acción publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession independently of title (Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291; Rodriguez vs. Taiño, 16 Phil. 301; Lagumen vs. Abasolo, 94 Phil. 455; Emilia vs. Bado, L-23685, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 183; Miranda vs. Legaspi, 92 Phil. 290).
Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land except ejectment cases filed within one year from the unlawful deprivation of possession (Secs. 44[b] and 88, Judiciary Law; Tenorio vs. Gomba, 81 Phil. 54).
“Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the law and the Rules of Court” (Art. 539, Civil Code).
Even in cases involving public lands, the courts may decree the restoration of the possession of the said lands to one who has been illegally deprived of his possessory right (Kimpo vs. Tabañar and Director of Lands, 113 Phil. 409).
A homesteader in possession of the land he has applied for, although his title thereto is still imperfect, cannot be forcibly dispossessed by a third party, and he, as sole lawful possessor of the land, is entitled to the protection of the law and the courts (Fabian vs. Paculan, 25 Phil. 26, 31-32).
Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action for forcible entry instituted by a bona fide applicant for public land, who is in occupation and peaceful possession thereof and who has introduced improvements, against one who deprives him of the possession thereof before the award and pending investigation of the application (Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5).
The reason is that, even pending the resolution of his application, the bona fide applicant and occupant, by the priority of his application and of his entry, acquires a possessory right over the public land applied for as against any other public land applicant. That prior possessory right may be protected by means of a forcible entry action or by means of the acción publiciana (Pitargue vs. Sorilla, supra).
It should be stressed that the authority given to the Director of Lands over the disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions over public lands (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956).
The instant case is similar to Bohayang vs. Maceren, 96 Phil. 390 to which the trial court’s attention was called and which it arbitrarily ignored.
In the Bohayang case, the plaintiff, who had possessed a homestead from 1935 to 1941, filed an acción publiciana against the defendants, who had usurped his homestead after he had abandoned it during the Japanese occupation because he had to evacuate to another place.
The trial court, on learning that the respective rights of the parties to the homestead were under consideration by the Director of Lands, ordered the suspension of the hearing until the Director had finally resolved the controversy. This Court issued the writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to set the case for trial because the suspension might last for a long stretch of time and because the Director would decide, not the issue of possession, but the question of who is entitled to the homestead.
This Court underscored that an action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter which must be decided promptly to-forestall breaches of peace, violence or even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal is reversed and set aside and it is directed to set the case for trial on the merits. Costs against the defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED. Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., separate opinion. Fernando, J., did not take part.