[ G.R. No. L-40948. June 29, 1976 ] 163 Phil. 540
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-40948. June 29, 1976 ]
GREGORIO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE FRANCISCO CONSOLACION, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, BR. II, CORAZON RAMIREZ UY, AND LUCIO GALAURA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
ANTONIO, J.:
Certiorari with prohibition to annul the Order, dated May 20, 1975, of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 8739, which “decreed that defendants have judgment summarily against the plaintiff for such amount as may be found due them for damages, to be ascertained by trial upon that issue alone on June 9, 1975 at 8:30 a.m.”.
On February 14, 1975, petitioner Gregorio Estrada filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Corazon Ramirez Uy and Lucio Galaura, owner and driver, respectively, of an AC Jeep, with Plate No. ZE-501, for breach of their obligations as a common carrier, in view of the death of his wife while she was a passenger of the vehicle.
The complaint alleges that: on January 1, 1975, plaintiff’s wife, Simeona Estrada, was a passenger of the AC Jeep, with Plate No. ZE-501, owned and operated by defendant Corazon Ramirez Uy and driven by defendant Lucio Galaura; while said jeep was cruising along Claro M. Recto Avenue, heading towards the direction of the Jones Circle, Davao City, the driver (Lucio Galaura) “without regard for the safety of plaintiff’s wife who was among his passengers and without taking the necessary precaution” in accordance with the situation, bumped a Ford pick-up truck; as a consequence of the incident, plaintiff’s wife sustained a fractured left humerus, fat (pulmonary) embolism and shock due to respiratory failure; she was brought to the San Pedro Hospital where she died.
Plaintiff further alleged in his complaint that defendant Corazon Ramirez Uy, as owner of the AC jeep and a common carrier, in violation of the contract of carriage, failed to safely conduct the plaintiff’s wife to her place of destination by reason of her “failure to exercise even the diligence of a good father of a family” and her “gross and evident bad faith, malevolence and wantonness” in discharging her obligation as a common carrier. Plaintiff, therefore, asked for actual damages, indemnification for the death of his wife, moral damages and attorney’s fees in specified amounts.
Defendants, in their answer, while admitting that plaintiff’s wife was a passenger and that she died as a result of the accident, alleged that the proximate and only cause of the accident was the negligence of third persons (the drivers, Danilo Ang and Rodolfo D. Endino, of a Toyota pick-up truck bearing Plate No. T-RU-221, and a Ford pick-up truck with Plate No. T-RU-420, respectively) over whom defendant Corazon Ramirez Uy had no supervision and control, and who were then driving their respective vehicles at a fast rate of speed and from different directions, as a result of which said vehicles collided, and because of that collision the Ford pick-up truck was deviated from its lane and hit the jeep of defendants. Defendants likewise set up a counterclaim for damages by reason of plaintiff’s institution of the clearly unfounded suit against them.
On April 16, 1975, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages defendants are seeking from plaintiff by way of counterclaim. In support of their motion for summary judgment, certain annexes to the answer were incorporated therein, as follows:
(a) The sketch of the accident made by Traffic Investigator J.S. Formeloza of the Davao City Police Department, marked as Annex ‘3’ of the defendants’ answer’
(b) Said investigator’s affidavit detailing his findings upon investigation stating that the pick-up with plate No. T-RU-420 upon reaching the intersection of Recto and Bonifacio Streets collided with the pick-up with plate No. T-RU-221, and that upon impact, the latter pick-up collided with the jeep driven by Lucio Galaura that was coming from the opposite direction. (Annex ‘4’ of defendants’ answer)’
(c) The respective sworn statements of the drivers of the two pick-ups (Danilo Ang and Rodolfo Endino) taken by the Traffic Division of the Davao City Police Department after the accident, marked as Annexes ‘5’ and of the defendant’s answer wherein each driver respectively claimed that he exercised due care but attributed to the other negligence as the cause of the collision; and
(d) The sworn statement of defendant driver, (Lucio Galaura) of said A.C. Jeep, likewise taken by the Traffic Division of the Davao City Police Department detailing what he did in order to prevent or minimize damages to his vehicle and his passengers, marked as Annex ‘7’ of defendants’ answer.
By means of the foregoing annexes, respondents sought to prove that they were relieved of any liability to petitioner inasmuch as the accident which caused the death of petitioner’s wife “resulted from the negligence of third persons over whom defendants had no supervision or control, namely, the drivers of the two pick-up trucks which collided at the intersection of C.M. Recto Ave. and Bonifacio St., Davao City, as a result of which collision, one of them was deviated from course to the lane where defendants’ A.C.-Jeep was then travelling, where it also collided with the latter.”
Petitioner opposed the above motion, relying heavily on the presumption that in case of death of the passenger, the common carrier is presumed “to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,"[1] unless the carrier proves that he has observed extraordinary diligence with due regard to all the circumstances, which movants failed to do.
Notwithstanding the opposition filed by the plaintiffs, respondent Judge issued the order of May 20, 1975, stating, in part, as follows:
“The Court has considered at length and thoroughly the pleadings in the action, the affidavits and other pertinent annexes (Annexes 1 to 6), of the movants and has found that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and no controversial question of fact to be submitted to the trial court, and has concluded that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law except as to the amount of damages recoverable.
“It is therefore ordered and decreed that defendants have judgment summarily against the plaintiff for such amount as may be found due them for damages, to be ascertained by trial upon that issue alone on June 9, 1975 at 8:30 a.m.”
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted Order, on the ground that said Order, having failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court, was denied “for lack of merit” on June 9, 1975, hence the present petition for certiorari with prohibition.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34, of the Revised Rules, “A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."[2] The defendant who believes that he is entitled to a judgment either on the pleadings or on the basis of extrinsic facts established by affidavits or depositions may move for summary judgment in his favor.[3] In other words, when the moving party is a defending party, his pleadings, depositions or affidavits must show that his defenses or denials are sufficient to defeat the claimant’s claim. The affidavit submitted by the party moving for summary judgment shall be by persons having personal knowledge of the facts; it shall recite all material facts and show that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action has no merits.[4] This motion shall be served on the adverse party at least ten (10) days prior to the time specified in the hearing. The adverse party may also, prior to said date, serve opposing affidavits. The opposing papers, including pleadings, depositions, and affidavits must establish a genuine issue of fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. After hearing, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted if, on the basis of all the papers and proofs submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party. The motion shall be denied if any party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact other than an issue as to the amount or extent of the damages.[5] This Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.[6] The very object is “to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.[7] In conducting the hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but merely to determine whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried. Where a motion is made for summary judgment, such motion is not directed to the pleadings and deals only with the question of whether there are triable issues of facts and where such issues exist summary judgment must be denied.[8] Summary judgment should not be granted where it fairly appears that there is a triable issue to be tried.[9] “The Court should not pass, on questions of credibility or weight of evidence, and that the summary judgment procedure ‘should not be perverted to the trial of disputed questions of fact upon affidavits’’’.[10] The test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is - whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of the motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious.[11]
In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay.[12] After plaintiff’s burden has been discharged, defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.[13]
Under the contract of carriage, private respondents assumed the express obligation to transport the wife of petitioner to her destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and that any injury suffered by her in the course thereof, is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.[14] To overcome such presumption, it must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence,[15] which means that the carrier must show the “utmost diligence of very cautious persons * * * as far as human care and foresight can provide”,[16] or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.[17] In order to constitute a case fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of a concurrent or contributory fault or negligence.[18] It was precisely because of the legal presumption that once a passenger in the course of travel is injured or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and the driver are presumed to be at fault, that private respondents submitted affidavits to prove that the accident which resulted in the death of petitioner’s wife was due to the fault or negligence of the drivers of the two pick-up trucks over whom the carrier had no supervision or control. Having, therefore, shown prima facie that the accident was due to a caso fortuito and that the driver of the respondent was free of concurrent or contributory fault or negligence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to rebut such proof. Having failed to do so, the defense of the carrier that the proximate cause of the accident was a caso fortuito remains unrebutted. We are not unmindful that the issue as to whether a carrier used such reasonable precautions to avoid the accident as would ordinarily be used by careful, prudent persons under like circumstances is a question essentially one of fact and, therefore, ordinarily such issue must be decided at the trial.[19] But where, as in the case at bar, petitioner has not submitted opposing affidavits to controvert private respondents’ evidence that the driver of the passenger jeepney was free of contributory fault as he stopped the jeepney to avoid the accident, but in spite of such precaution the accident occurred, respondent Judge did not, therefore, act arbitrarily in declaring in his Order of May 20, 1975, that “there is no genuine issue to any material fact and no controversial question of fact to be submitted to the trial court.” This was, however, a mere interlocutory order directing that a hearing be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the amount or the assessment of damages which may be adjudged in favor of the prevailing party. It is a determination of the court of a preliminary point or directing some steps in the proceedings, but not a disposition of the merits.[20] “Upon the rendering of the assessment, the Court shall direct the entry forthwith of the appropriate summary judgment."[21]
In the absence of any findings of fact and conclusions of law, the aforesaid order of respondent Judge cannot be considered a judgment. It has been held that “a trial court in granting summary judgment should file findings of fact and conclusion of law or a memorandum opinion so as to disclose grounds upon which the trial court reached its determination."[22] In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 9 of Article X of the Constitution and the procedural rules, all judgments determining the merits of cases should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[23]
There being no judgment, the present petition is, therefore, premature. Certainly, petitioner could move for the setting aside of the aforesaid Order of May 20, 1975 by the presentation of opposing affidavits showing that, other than the issue as to the amount or extent of damages, there is a genuine issue of fact on the carrier’s liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari with prohibition is dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Fernando, (Chairman), and Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur in a separate opinion.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.