[ G.R. No. 38135. July 25, 1975 ] 160 Phil. 467; 72 OG No. 2, 300 (January 22, 1976)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 38135. July 25, 1975 ]
HILARIO C. ANTONIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBSTITUTED FOR BY HON. JOSE LEIDO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES; FELIX R. GONZALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF FISHERIES, AND HON. MANUEL DELIMA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PERSON ACTING AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION IV OF THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
On September 5, 1973 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 6, which amended certain rules on discipline of government employees (68 O.G. 7971), and upon the recommendation of the Acting Director of Fisheries, charged Hilario C. Antonio, the Regional Director of Regional Office No. IV of the Bureau of Fisheries, with incompetence and conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was embodied in a “formal charge with order of suspension” which was served upon Antonio on September 14, 1973. The suspension took effect immediately. In that indictment it was alleged that Antonio on May 31, October 31 and November 30, 1972 issued to eleven persons closely related to, or associated with, each other twelve seaweed permits covering the whole seaweed areas of Manila Bay despite his knowledge that the official policy was that no exclusive rights over the whole seaweed areas in Manila should be awarded under exclusive seaweed licenses. It was further charged that Antonio on May 24, 1973 became a witness for the said eleven permitees, who had filed a cage in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio and the Acting Director of Fisheries, so that in effect Antonio testified against himself. Other glaring inconsistencies committed by Antonio were recited in the complaint. Antonio through counsel filed an answer which was not under oath. He justified the issuance of the seaweed permits by citing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 45 and 45-1, which require permits for gathering seaweeds, and by invoking a precedent established by Acting Director Felix Gonzales, who, when he was Supervising Fishery Technologist, issued a seaweed permit to Francisco Hilvano for the Manila Bay area. Some weeks after his suspension, or on October 24, 1973, Antonio sent the following telegraphic request for reinstatement to the President of the Philippines (capitalization supplied):
“His Excellency President Ferdinand Marcos Malacañang, Manila Requesting His Excellency my immediate reinstatement as Fisheries Regional Director Region IV. Arbitrarily suspended indefinitely without investigation before suspension by Secretary Tanco since September 14 for implementing existing fisheries laws and Presidential Decree 43, section 6B, paragraph 5, regarding issuance seaweeds permits, Manila Bay area. Secretary Tanco for free seaweeds gathering without first amending seaweeds laws. Present seaweeds controversy caused filing injunction case due to suspended permit with Pasig CFI Judge Navarro, preliminary hearing anti-graft practices Fiscal Puno, Manila, deportation proceeding against Chinese seaweeds dealer and administrative charges incompetency and ignorance of law against Acting Fisheries Director. Referring His Excellency to Secretary Raquiza (for) more information.
HILARIO ANTONIO Regional Director”
The Assistant Executive Secretary referred the foregoing telegram to Secretary Tanco on December 18, 1973 for appropriate action or comment. Secretary Tanco on April 17, 1974 informed the Assistant Executive Secretary that:
“Hilario Antonio stands charged by the undersigned for: (1) incompetence in the performance of official duties, and (2) conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is presently suspended while case is being heard by the DANR Special Committee on Investigation chaired by Fiscal Ramon Tuason of the Department of Justice. “Enclosed are the comprehensive comments and recommendations of the Acting Director of the Bureau of Fisheries, Felix R. Gonzales, to which we fully concur, containing the facts and circumstances resulting in the formal charge with order of suspension dated September 5, 1973. x x x. “It is our considered opinion and recommendation that Mr. Antonio’s appeal to the President for reinstatement should be denied.”
Up to this time no final action has been taken on Antonio’s request for reinstatement and on the Secretary’s recommendation. On November 16, 1973 or sixty-three days after his suspension, Antonio informed the Director of Fisheries that by virtue of section 35 of the Civil Service Law he was going to return to duty as Regional Fishery Director. The Secretary in his reply of November 21, 1973 informed Antonio that his reinstatement could not be given due course under Presidential Decree No. 6 and that the charge against him was serious and the evidence of guilt was strong. On January 29, 1974 Antonio, without awaiting the decision of the President on his request for reinstatement, ventilated his grievance in the judicial forum by filing the instant petition for mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition against the Secretary, the Director of Fisheries and Manuel Delima who was designated to take Antonio’s place as Regional Director for Region IV. The Solicitor General, in behalf of respondent officials, has advanced the contention that mandamus would not lie in this case because under Presidential Decree No. 6 and Letter of Instruction No. 14-A a respondent in an administrative case may be summarily dismissed or suspended. He opines that those martial law measures rendered inoperative the legal provision that a suspended employee should be reinstated after the expiration of sixty days from the date of his suspension. He argues that the suspended employee can be reinstated only after he is exonerated and that, therefore, he can remain under suspension indefinitely. For that reason, he concludes that Antonio has no cause of action for mandamus. The respondents also contend that Antonio has no cause of action for quo warranto because in 1964 Antonio was appointed Regional Director without a specification in his appointment of any region or district. He was assigned to Region IV. The Solicitor General argues that Antonio’s suspension does not mean that he ceased to be a Regional Director. His assignment to Region IV was simply revoked. Delima did not usurp Antonio’s position as Regional Director. The respondents point out that Antonio has no cause of action for prohibition because the law empowers the Secretary to initiate the filing of charges against his erring subordinates and to refer the charges to the proper agency for investigation. In Antonio’s case, a committee of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources was assigned to investigate the charges against him. As the Secretary and the investigating committee have jurisdiction over Antonio’s case, the investigation cannot be enjoined. The respondents further contend that Antonio’s instant actions were premature because, as already noted, his telegraphic request to the President for reinstatement was referred to the Secretary who on April 17, 1974 recommended that Antonio’s appeal for reinstatement should be denied. The respondents assume that Antonio should have awaited the Presidential action on his request for reinstatement before going to court. On August 28, 1974 the investigating committee submitted its report to Secretary Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. In view of the creation of the Department of Natural Resources, headed by Jose Leido, Jr., that report presumably was referred to the new Secretary. At this writing Secretary Leido has not yet decided Antonio’s case. The issue is whether Antonio is entitled to the writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Natural Resources to reinstate him, it appearing that his suspension has lasted for more than twenty-one months, and, under section 35 of the Civil Service Law, as applied in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L-19748, September 13, 1962, 6 SCRA 1, when the administrative case against an employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided within sixty days after the date of the suspension, the respondent should be reinstated in the service. The quo warranto and prohibition aspects of Antonio’s petition are of no moment. We are of the opinion that the mandamus action was prematurely filed, or, as the respondents put it, the case is not yet ripe for adjudication in a court of justice, in view of the pendency in the Office of the President of Antonio’s request for reinstatement. As long as that request is pending, the matter of his reinstatement is not justiciable. A mandamus action against administrative officers should not be entertained if their superiors can grant relief (Ang Tuan Kai & Co. vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil. 143; Resolution in Subido vs. Sarmiento, L-5322, December 14, 1951; 3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 196). A mandamus action against the Director of Private Schools was dismissed because the matter involved in the case was still pending before the Secretary of Education. (Peralta vs. Salcedo, 101 Phil. 452. See Dajao vs. Padilla, 63 O.G. 3579). Parties asking for a judicial review of administrative official action must first exhaust their remedies in the executive branch (Madriñan vs. Sinco, 110 Phil. 160; Gonzales vs. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo, L-20568, December 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 711; Garcia vs. Teehankee, L-29113, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 937). The purpose behind the policy of requiring a party to first exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the court is to provide “an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary administrative sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative authority” (42 Am. Jur. 581 cited in Santiago vs. Cruz, 98 Phil. 168, 173). Where, as in this case, the President might be able to grant the remedy sought by the petitioner, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that his decision be awaited before resort to the courts can be had (Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490, 493). “When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government but nevertheless a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to (the) courts” (Cruz vs. Del Rosario, L-17440, December 26, 1963, 9 SCRA 755, 758). As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Antonio, by requesting the President to revoke Secretary Tanco’s suspension order precluded judicial intervention in his case while his request is pending consideration (Compare with Kordovez vs. Carmona, L-21473, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 678 and Romero vs. Municipal Mayor of Baljoon, Cebu, L-22062, March 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1374, where the petition for reinstatement after the expiration of the sixty-day period was denied because the petitioners had contributed to the delay in the disposition of their administrative cases by appealing to the Commissioner of Civil Service). WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., see concurring opinion. Teehankee, J., took no part.