[ G.R. No. L-24162. January 13, 1973 ] 151 Phil. 382
[ G.R. No. L-24162. January 13, 1973 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ANTONIO TEJADA, AND FELICITACION VDA. DE GRAMAJE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ALFONSO P. DONESA, FORMERLY DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA, AND PRESENTLY DISTRICT JUDGE, BRANCH’IV CAVITE AT TAGAYTAY CITY, AND LAPAZ TUANQUIN, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question in this petition for certiorari is whether an order of then respondent Judge dismissing after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution an information imputing to the private respondent Lapaz Tuanquin the crime of homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, a dismissal which in law has the effect of an acquittal, may be nullified on the ground that it was issued after he was appointed and thereafter qualified as Judge of another district. It is contended that he lacked authority to do so. To avoid the operation of the well-settled principle that a dismissal having the effect of an acquittal cannot be the subject of an appeal or of a certiorari proceeding,[1] reliance is placed in the well-prepared petition as well as memorandum submitted by the then Provincial Fiscal, now Governor, Juvenal Guerrero, on the provision of the Rules of Court that would empower a judge to sign a decision outside of his province only if the case were “totally heard by him”[2] it being alleged that as of the time the order of dismissal was signed, there was still pending a motion for the translation into English of one of the exhibits presented by the prosecution. Considering that no Jess than the constitutional right of an accused not to be twice put in jeopardy calls for deference,[3] it is not an easy burden for petitioner in its task of persuading this Court that the particular rule of court invoked is susceptible to the interpretation that even after the prosecution had rested its case, with a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence sustained, it could be maintained that the case had not as yet been “totally heard” just because one of the exhibits had not been translated. To do so would certainly raise a constitutional question of the gravest character, with such dismissal amounting to an acquittal. This should be avoided, unless there be peremptory reasons for so ruling. Moreover there are previous pronouncements of this Court that militate against the stand of petitioner. Accordingly, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. As shown in the petition: ‘That on March 7,1962, an information was filed charging the respondent, Lapaz Tuanquin with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries through reckless imprudence for the death of the late Evaristo Gramaje and hospitalization of Antonio Tejada on December 23,1960, said information docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, then presided over by herein respondent judge; That after presentation of its evidence, the prosecution * * * rested its case on October 15,1963, whereupon, the accused * * * immediately made known her desire to file a motion to dismiss; That on April 23, 1964, respondent Lapaz Tuanquin, through her lawyers, filed a motion to dismiss, and on August 7, 1964, petitioner People of the Philippines, filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss, and on August 12, 1964, a motion to reopen the case for purposes of having some exhibits translated from the Ilocano dialect to English was submitted, * * *; That while respondent judge was still the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, he was nominated to his present position, which nomination was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and he qualified as District Judge of Cavite to preside at Branch IV of the Court of Tagaytay City on July 13, 1964, long before the opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion to reopen the case were filed, * * *; That on January 12, 1965, respondent judge issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 266 on the flimsy ground that the prosecution failed to present one witness, a witness whose presentation was made unnecessary in view of the admission of the accused-respondent as evidenced by her sworn statement and submitted during the course of presentation of evidence by the prosecution, * * * [4] The order of dismissal is dated November 27, 1964.[5]
It was not surprising therefore that on the above facts respondent could plausibly maintain that this petition is devoid of merit. To lend affirmance to the view that a case was not “totally heard” under the circumstances disclosed, after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had presented a motion to dismiss, thereafter sustained, would be to negate the intent of the rule,[6] which is a restatement of the former statutory provision on the subject.[7] Much less then is such a restrictive interpretation warranted considering that as has been made mentioned of, the dismissal order amounted to an acquittal. No less therefore than the constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy is a bar to the success of this petition.
A principle that holds undisputed sway ever since United States v. Yam Tung Way,[8] a 1911 decision, is that a dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. As was set forth in the opinion of Justice Carson: “Defendant was regularly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, put upon his trial by the calling of the government’s witnesses against him, and thereafter discharged by the trial court. It is true that the court made no express finding as to whether the defendant did or did not commit the specific acts set out in the information, and that the dismissal of the information was based on the court’s conclusion of law that there being no copyright law in force in these Islands, the acts which it is alleged were committed by the defendant do not constitute the crime with which he was charged, nor any other offense defined and penalized by law. But the reasoning and authority of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United Staes in the case of Kepner v. United States, * * * is conclusively against the right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether defendant’s discharge was based upon the trial court’s conclusion oflawthat the trial had failed for some reason to establish the guilt of the defendant as charged."[9] This ruling was cited with approval in People v. Bringas,[10] the first case to be decided on this point under the present Constitution. As was restated in Gandicela v. Lutero,[11] in the event of the failure of the prosecution “to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court, upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so called, but an acquittal of the defendant because of the prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal * * *."[12] This doctrine has been repeatedly adhered to.13 Such a principle, moreover, possesses an amplitude of scope. Witness this excerpt from Justice Labrador in People v. Labatete:[14] “We again call attention to the fact that judges should be careful in the use of the term ‘dismissal’ and not use the term in cases where there has been a trial on the merits and the court finds that the evidence is insufficient, in which case the judgment that should be entered is one of acquittal, not merely of dismissal. Even where the fiscal fails to prosecute and the judge ‘dismisses’ the case, the termination is not real dismissal but acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor came."[15] Such a dismissal then, as pointed out by Justice Endencia, in People v. Cabarles,[16] is that it “cannot be appealed from."[17] To do so, according to Justice Gutierrez David, in People v. Bao,[18] would thus be to do “violence to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy."[19] There is a 1970 decision, the opinion penned by Justice Dizon in City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,[20] which shows the continuing vitality of such a doctrine. Thus: “It appears that on March 18, 1969, an information was filed with the City Court of Cebu against Atty. Eleno Andales (Criminal Case No. R-29686) charging him with driving or operating motor vehicle No. V-1026 (1967) along Manalili and Magallanes streets, Cebu City, ‘with a delinquent driver’s license in the morning of March 18, 1968. Said defendant having entered a plea of not guilty, the case was called for trial before the respondent judge. After the prosecution has rested its case, the defendant moved for dismissal upon the ground that the prosecution evidence was not sufficient to establish the offense charged in the information. Thereafter, finding the motion for dismissal well taken, the Court dismissed the case on December 26,1969. After the denial of the second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner fiscal, he filed the present petition for certiorari."[21] The conclusion followed: “The petition must be dismissed upon the ground, firstly, that whatever error was committed by the respondent judge, was not an error of jurisdiction but one of judgment; secondly, the order of dismissal— considering the circumstances mentioned heretofore — amounted to and was, in effect, an acquittal — not reviewable neither by appeal nor by certiorari."[22] Even if this Court were freed from the compulsion that deference to the constitutional right against being twice put in jeopardy requires, still certiorari against the order of dismissal would not lie. As was pointed out in the memormdum of respondent, the holding in Baguinguito v. Rivera[23] precludes a successful outcome for this petition. There it was shown that on May 28,1930, after the submission of proof by both parties, who were present in person or by attorney, the court declared the trial terminated. Afterwards came this portion of the opinion of Justice Street, speaking for the Court: “The attorney for the plaintiffs then requested that a period of twenty-five days be allowed for the presentation of his written argument, and a like period was asked by the attorney for the appellees. The court, however, conceded a period of fifteen days only to all. This announcement met the approval of all concerned, except De Guia who was present in person and objected. Upon these facts the point is now made that the hearing of the cause on the date mentioned was incomplete and that, * * * the court had no jurisdiction to prepare the judgment later. The point, in our opinion, is not well taken. Section 13 of Act No. 867 of the Philippine Commission authorizes the judge to prepare his judgment after leaving the province where the case is tried, ‘if the case was heard and duly argued or an opportunity given for argument to the parties or their counsel in the proper province.’ Under the facts above stated it must be considered that the parties waived the opportunity to present an oral argument at the time the case was submitted; and the fact that they were permitted to file written memorandums later did not render the hearing incomplete. The submission of the memorandums was not, properly speaking, a part of the hearing or trial as understood in the provision cited."[24] Nor did the Baguinguito decision break new ground. As far back as 1905, in United States v. Baluyot,[25] it was already made clear that Section 13 of Act 867 was applicable to criminal as well as to civil cases. The reason for discretionary authority thus granted a judge was made clear by Justice Malcolm in Delfino v. Paredes.[26] Thus: “Obviously, the public interest and the speedy administration of justice will be best served if the judge who heard the evidence renders the decision. It might well happen that the full extent of the six months’ period would be used by the trial judge to receive the evidence, giving him no opportunity to promulgate decisions, with the result that all the mountain of evidence would be left for the perusal of a judge who did not hear the witnesses — a result which should be dodged, if it be legally feasible."[27] As emphasized by him: “The law does not mean to authorized a judge to try a case and then deprive him of the power to render his decision after he has taken cognizance of it."[28] It is to be admitted that a serious jurisdictional question would have arisen if the doctrine in People v. Soria,[29] were deemed controlling. There, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, ruled: “It may be noted therefrom that the signing or writing of judgments outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court where the cases are pending, is allowed when the judge leaves the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction,’ or ’expiration of his temporary assignment’ In other words, the rule contemplates of a temporary occupancy by the judge of either the post he has left or of the one he is going to assume."[30] Under such a doctrine, respondent Judge certainly would be devoid of jurisdiction to issue the challenged order of dismissal. It should not, however, be made to apply. The Soria decision was promulgated on March 1,1968. The two cases cited therein, Ong Siu v. Paredes[31] and Jimenez v. Republic,[32] were respectively decided on July 26, 1966 and January 31, 1968. The order of dismissal here was issued on November 27, 1964. Since, realistically, a judicial decision speaks as of the date it is handed down, Soria ought not to be given retroactive force and effect. For to do so, in a situation like the present, would amount to a deprivation of constitutional right which certainly is objectionable and should not be allowed. That is why, in whatever manner viewed, this petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.