[ G.R. No. 29938-39. March 31, 1971 ] 148 Phil. 344
[ G.R. No. 29938-39. March 31, 1971 ]
SAMAR MINING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, EMETERIA VDA. DE MENDOZA AND TRINIDAD VDA. DE MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and its resolution en banc denying the petition of herein petitioner, for the consolidation of two cases filed in two different regional offices for compensation for the death of one and the same person.
As a consequence of the death on April 5, 1967 of Fernando Mendoza, an employee of petitioner at its mining operations in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, two separate claims for death compensation were filed against petitioner in two different regional offices of respondent Commission. The records, upon examination, show that one was first filed on May 4, 1967 with Regional Office No. IV, Manila, by Trinidad Vda. de Mendoza;[1] and the second was filed afterwards on July 31, 1967 with Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City by Emeteria Vda. de Mendoza.[2] Each claimant claims to be the legal wife and surviving spouse of the deceased and entitled to the compensation payable for his death.
As both claimants insisted on their separate claims being heard and tried by the respective regional offices where they were filed, and the regional office referees were disposed to proceed separately, notwithstanding their being aware of the pendency of the two cases, petitioner filed with respondent commission its petition for consolidation of the two cases. It alleged that since the cases involved a common question of law and fact concerning the death of the decedent, consolidation of the cases would avoid confusion and best serve the interests of all parties concerned and therefore prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing by one referee either in Manila or Zamboanga City of the two cases.
Respondent commission, through its chairman, issued its order dated October 7, 1968, holding that consolidation would serve the best interests of petitioner alone’ in that: “such a concession in its behalf would prejudice one or the other of the two claimants. If the cases were to be consolidated and heard in Zamboanga City, the claimant who resided in Manila would have to go all the way to Zamboanga City with all her witnesses for every hearing conducted therein until such time as the cases can be terminated. On the other hand, if the cases were to be heard in Manila, the same inconvenience would result to the claimant who resided within the jurisdiction of the Zamboanga City regional Office. In other words, while one or the other of the claimants would be prejudiced in either case, the petitioner would be spared from a similar inconvenience, and in fact, its best interest alone would be served. Such situation was never contemplated in the pertinent Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission governing venue.”
It therefore denied consolidation ruling that “(U)nder Sec. 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Commission, the claim shall be filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit of the Regional Office where the injury or illness was received or contracted or where the claimant or any of the claimants reside or where the respondent or any of the respondents reside or has his place of business, at the option of the claimant (underscoring supplied). Implicit in this provision is that the claimant, or claimants where there are several of them, are given the right to select such venue of action as are legally provided for their benefit.”
Reconsideration of the denial order having been denied by the resolution of November 22, 1968 of the commission en banc, petitioner filed this appeal.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The commission’s Rules, particularly, Rule 6, section 2, provide for the proper venue of claims and adequately cover the case at bar. Said Rule provides:
“Sec. 2. Where Filed. The claim shall be filed in triplicate, with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit of the Regional Office where the injury or illness was received or contracted or where the claimant or any of the claimants reside or where the respondent or any of the respondents reside or has his place business, at the option of the claimant. The unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case. x x” (Underscoring ours)
Thus, as restated by the Court in Philippine Cotton Development Corp. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,[3] “a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the regional office of any of the following places: where the accident occurs; where the claimant, or any of them, if more, resides, or where the respondent or any of them, if more resides, at the option of the claimant.” The Commission’s rules contemplated that as in the case at bar, there may be more than one claimant for the same compensable death against the same employer and granted the choice of venue to the claimants as a whole, but expressly provide that where there is a conflict as to choice of venue among the claimants, the unit where the claim is first filed shall assume exclusive jurisdiction over the case. This is but in accord with the analogous rule on venue for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons that" the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."[4]
To construe the rule, as respondent commission did, as allowing several conflicting claimants to select as many venues of action as are legally provided for the same compensable claim and against the same employer would not be conducive to the orderly administration of justice. There is only one subject matter and one cause of action against petitioner-employer involved in the case at bar, arising from the death of the decedent, even though there are two claimants claiming the right to receive the same death compensation, each claiming to be the legal widow and dependent. They cannot each claim the right to pursue their respective claims in separate and independent proceedings, with unnecessary duplication of hearings and reception of evidence on the common and identical question of compensability of the claim to the detriment of the public interest and of the parties themselves, when they are in effect alternative claimants and the validity of their conflicting claims to the same death compensation must be determined and resolved in one proceeding. The possibility of confusion that would result should the two referees arrive at conflicting decisions on the merits of the identical question of fact and of law presented with the compensability of the death being upheld in one case and the claim for compensation being dismissed in the other case, should be avoided.
The principal question of compensability of the death of the deceased should therefore be heard and resolved in the first case filed in Manila, pursuant to Rule 6, section 2 of the commission’s Rules, with the claimant-widow in Zamboanga City, Emeteria, considered an intervenor therein, with a claim adverse to that of the first claimant, Trinidad.
With reference to the commendable concern of the commission for Emeteria, the claimant in Zamboanga City, who would in such case, according to the commission, have to come all the way to Manila with all her witnesses for the hearings, it might be stated that Emeteria’s attendance at the Manila hearings may well be dispensed with. The fact of death on April 5, 1967, of the decedent “when seized by sudden hemiphlegia” while in the employ of petitioner is after all not disputed and is of record per the employer’s reports to the commission. What is simply at issue is stated in the employer’s controversion “that the deceased succumbed to a non-industrial illness” and the attendance at the hearings of Emeteria is not necessary for the resolution of this medical question. Whoever of the claimants is finally upheld has in her favor the law’s presumption of compensability of the death[5] as well as the general rule of the commission governing proceedings therein that “(T)he hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmen’s compensation cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award."[6]
What is really essential for Emeteria is to establish her claimed personal status as the legal wife and dependent spouse of the deceased entitled to payment of the compensation, in the same manner as it is equally essential for the first claimant in Manila, Trinidad, to establish her claimed personal status as such as against Emeteria. Again, here it would be principally a matter of documentation and Emeteria may submit the documents in proof of her marriage to the referee in the Zamboanga City case, who would forward the same to the case in Manila to be considered with the documents submitted by Trinidad. Any supplemental testimonial evidence that Emeteria might wish to submit could likewise be taken by the referee in the Zamboanga City case by deposition upon written interrogatories under Rule 24, sections 25 to 27 Will due notice to Trinidad, who may submit cross-interrogatories. By analogy to the same Rule, Emeteria may further submit written interrogatories questioning Trinidad’s claimed status to the referee in Manila, who may propound them to Trinidad at the hearings here, and take all such evidence under consideration in resolving the conflict between the two claimants.
The procedure above suggested is in consonance with the commission’s own Rule 11, section 9 for consolidation and joint hearing of claims, to wit:
“Sec. 9. Joint Hearing of Claim. – The referee to whom cases or claims involving a common question of law or fact arising from the same occurrence or accident against a common employer, are assigned for hearing and decision may order a joint hearing on said cases and render only one decision thereon when he believes that justice can best be served thereby.”
as well as with Rule 31, section 1 of the Rules of Court, applicable in a suppletory character,[7] which provides that the court ordering consolidation of actions or joint hearing thereof “may make such orders concerning proceedings, therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”
The two cases shall therefore be consolidated with the case filed in Manila, RO4-WC Case No. 7052, prevailing, subject only to the right reserved to Emeteria to submit in Zamboanga City, upon due notice to the other parties, to the referee in the Zamboanga City case her documentary evidence and testimonial evidence upon deposition by written interrogatories, as well as any interrogatories she may wish to have propounded to Trinidad, which shall be forwarded to the Manila case to form part of the record thereof. Only one decision shall be rendered in the said Manila case, resolving the compensability of the death of the deceased Fernando Mendoza as well as the question of who among the two claimants is the legal wife and dependent of the decedent entitled to receive any compensation payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for the purposes of the Act.
The Commission’s determination as to who of the two claimants is the legal wife of the decedent and as such a dependent entitled under section 9 of the Act to the compensation[8] is a legal question that is subject to appeal in a proper case to this Court for final determination. The hearing referee is therefore enjoined to receive all evidence from the complainants as to their respective claimed status as dependent wife of the decedent, and to resolve the issue, subject to the commission’s decision on review, conformably to the provisions of substantive and adjective law. In Republic vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,[9] the Court overruled the commission’s award of compensation to two alleged illegitimate children of the deceased that to the widow, which was not disputed by the employer) on the ground that their filiation, on which was based the commission’s award to them as dependent children, had not been established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and that the baptismal certificates presented by the claimants did not satisfy the Code’s requirement of a record of birth or authentic writing for purposes of meeting its provisions on voluntary recognition of the claimed filiation.
It should be noted, however, that the commission may, in accordance with section 8 of the Act,[10] act as referee and arbitrator between the two claimants and help them reach a mutually acceptable compromise settlement of allotting the compensation among themselves and their dependent children, if any, in order to avoid unnecessary expense, delay and litigation between them. It should be borne in mind that in cases where the second wife had in good faith contracted marriage with the decedent notwithstanding the subsistence of his marriage with the first wife, the Court has generally sought and applied a just and equitable solution and division of the decedent’s estate among the two innocent surviving parties.[11]
ACCORDINGLY, the order and resolution en banc appealed from are hereby reversed, and the two cases are ordered consolidated, heard and decided by only the referee in Manila in RO4 -WC Case No. 052 (Manila), who shall proceed in accordance with the procedure stated in the three preceding paragraphs. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Fernando, JJ., concurs and in addition files a separate opinion. Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.