[ G.R. No. 27126. May 29, 1970 ] 144 Phil. 291
[ G.R. No. 27126. May 29, 1970 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF LOU C. LIM (LIM CHAT) TO BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS LOU C. LIM (LIM CHAT), PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court denying a motion of the then Solicitor General, now Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, for the cancellation of the naturalization proceedings had the order allowing the oath-taking of applicant Lou C. Lim, the oath of allegiance subscribed to by him, the certificate of naturalization issued in his favor as well as a later order declaring his wife likewise a citizen, the motion[1] for cancellation being premised on the rather unique circumstance of the petition for naturalization filed on September 26, 1960 being based on the former Naturalization Act[2] when since June 17, 1939, the present Naturalization Law[3] has already come into full force and effect, with the expected consequence of such a petition showing on its face that certain mandatory requirements were not satisfied at all, the Solicitor General’s office moreover having been notified only of the first hearing, thereafter to be completely ignored. The case as above set forth would thus seem to call for an affirmative response from us. We reverse the lower court.
To repeat, the petition was accomplished on the form prescribed under a law no longer in force. It thus failed to allege petitioner’s good moral character, as well as his belief in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, both requisites not being found in the former act. Nor was there any allegation as to the education in local prescribed schools of petitioner’s two elder children, namely: Helen and Ben, both surnamed Lou C. Lim, born on December 16, 1938 and June 12, 1936, notwithstanding their being of school age during the entire period of petitioner’s residence in the country. A defect, grave and fundamental in character, was petitioner’s failure to file a declaration of intention, a matter sufficient to call for a denial of his application, again understandable but certainly not excusable as there was no such requirement under the former law.
Hearings were had before the lower court in the absence of any further notice to the office of the Solicitor General, as was already made mention of. The patent defects of the petition, notwithstanding, sufficient to indicate the lack of all the qualifications of petitioner, the lower court, on September 18, 1961 rendered a decision in his favor. Again, the Solicitor General was not notified. Neither was he informed of the subsequent petition, filed on September 21, 1963, of appellant’s proposed oath-taking.
On September 26, 1963, the lower court, “satisfied that the petitioner has complied with the requisites provided for in Section 1 of Republic Act 530,” allowed him “to take his oath on any date from today.” On the same day, he was allowed to do so, a certificate of naturalization being issued to him. Again, the Solicitor General was not notified. Then, on June 6, 1966, came an order declaring applicant’s wife Tan Hiu Wan as a citizen of the Philippines, the pattern of ignoring the Solicitor General being adhered to, no copies of the petition and notices of hearing relative to said order being furnished him. Consequently, on August 25, 1966, the Republic filed with the lower court a motion for cancellation of proceedings. This was followed by an opposition on the part of applicant and the denial of the lower court in an order of November 14, 1966. It is from this order that the present appeal is taken. As set forth at the opening of this opinion, we find the appeal meritorious.
1, In raising the objection that there was a grave error committed by the lower court in taking cognizance of the present naturalization proceedings, it is the contention of the Solicitor General that the petition is void on its face. This objection is well-grounded. It is an express requirement of the present naturalization law that the petition must declare that the applicant has “the qualifications required by [it]; specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under [its] provisions * * *."[4] Petitioner Lou C. Lim explicitly alleged that he was possessed of “the qualifications required by Act No. 2927 to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands."[5] He likewise expressly stated that he was “not disqualified for naturalization under Act No. 2927."[6] Even if the rather patent mistake of referring to this country as the Philippine Islands, when as far back as November 15, 1935 the appropriate name was first that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and thereafter, on July 4, 1946, the Republic of the Philippines, be ignored, it is obvious that such a petition failed to satisfy the requirements of the present law. Insofar as qualifications are concerned, the present law requires a ten-year period of residence, not the former five-year period.[7] Likewise, there is the added requisite that the applicant must show that he possesses good moral character and that he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. There was no Philippine Constitution as of the time Act No. 2927 took effect.[8]
An even more fatal omission was the failure of such a petition to show that he was possessed of one of the additional qualifications imposed by the present Naturalization Act. Thus: “He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.[9] It must be noted likewise that relying as he did on the former act, it was more than possible that he was not aware that another ground for disqualification was the failure of an applicant to have mingled socially with the Filipinos or to have evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of our people.[10]
There is no resisting the conclusion, then, that on its face, the petition was fatally defective. It could not have been the basis of a favorable decree of naturalization. From Orestoff v. Government of the Philippines,[11] it has been our constant holding that for an applicant to be considered truly deserving of the privilege of Philippine citizenship, he must show strict compliance, with all the requirements of the Naturalization Act.[12] It goes without saying that the requisites to be satisfied must be those of the present law, not those of a former enactment, which as far back as 1939 had ceased to have any force and effect. .
- Again no doubt misled by the inexplicable reliance on the former naturalization law, Act No. 2927, petitioner ignored the fundamental requirement that a declaration of intention had to be filed by him.[13] Such a requirement is mandatory. It is jurisdictional in character. An indispensable prerequisite to naturalization, it cannot be waived. Failure to file the same is thus fatal to the application. It is, to put it differently, a condition sine qua non to the consideration of the petition for naturalization.[14]
Nor may such a failure be condoned because petitioner was included among the persons exempt from such a requirement.[15] It is true that at the time of hiss application, he had resided in the Philippines for a period of more than thirty (30) years but it was not continuous as he did admit on the witness stand that he had gone back to China on at least two occasions.[16] Our ruling in Law Tai v. Republic[17] ought to have admonished him that he did not fall within the language of the law. Thus: “Petitioner did not file a declaration of intention as required by the Naturalization Law: He claims exemption thereof. The Solicitor General challenges this position, draws attention to jurisprudential doctrine that residence, as here understood, contemplates ‘actual and substantial,’ not legal residence alone. Reason for this is that ‘only by actual and substantial residence may the said qualification be acquired by an applicant.’”
An even more insurmountable obstacle to any claim for exemption from the filing of the declaration of intention was the fact manifest on the face of the petition that failed to comply with the mandatory requirement that all his children be educated in the public schools or private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.[18] He mentioned six children[19] but he alleged only four of them as having been enrolled in a school duly recognized by the government, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught.[20] As stated earlier, there was no allegation as to the compliance with such requisite concerning the two elder children, Helen and Ben.
- Another infirmity that vitiated the validity of the proceedings here had was the failure, other than the initial notice of hearing issued on October 3, 1960 by the clerk of court setting the initial hearing on July 27, 1961 which, incidentally was postponed to later dates, to notify the Solicitor General. So the law requires. Instead, he was thereafter kept in the dark. Only much later did he come to know, and not through the formal notices required, that there was a decision favorable to petitioner, who thereafter took the oath of citizenship. Moreover, there was likewise a lower court order conferring such a boon on his wife. Again, the Solicitor General was ignored. Since it is a matter of jurisdictional requirement that notices a hearings and other proceedings be given to the Solicitor General, the fact that such notices were given to the Provincial Fiscal, even if the latter was duly authorized by the Solicitor General to appear in his behalf, not being a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement, it was indeed error on the part of the lower court not to grant his motion for the nullity of the proceedings had.[21] Necessarily, the cancellation of the certificates of citizenship in favor of petitioner and his wife thus shown to be totally bereft of any justification in law was inescapable. The lower court order now challenged cannot stand.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of November 14, 1966 denying the motion of the Solicitor General for the cancellation of the proceedings had in this petition for naturalization is reversed and set aside, and judgment is entered declaring void its decision dated September 18, 1961 granting the petition for naturalization, its order dated September 26, 1963 allowing petitioner’s oath-taking, as well as the oath of allegiance subscribed to by him, and its order dated June 6, 1966 declaring Tan Hiu, Wan, the wife of petitioner, as citizen of the Philippines. The certificate of naturalization issued to petitioner and the certificate of naturalization issued to her, if any, are hereby cancelled and must be surrendered to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. It is further ordered that the corresponding alien certificates of registration of petitioner Lou C. Lim, his wife Tan Hiu Wan, and their children with the Bureau of Immigration on the basis of the naturalization papers wrongfully acquired, be validated anew. Costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., did not take part. Ruiz Castro, J., on leave.