[ G.R. No. 24528. July 31, 1970 ] 145 Phil. 115
[ G.R. No. 24528. July 31, 1970 ]
DOMINGO T. LAO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE MOYA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND LAO KANG SUY, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N
MAKALINTAL, J.:
In its decision promulgated January 31, 1968 this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari to set aside the pre-trial order of respondent Court of First Instance dated April 13,1964 and its subsequent orders of January 25, 1965; April 21, 1965; and May 3, 1965. The pre-trial order; issued upon agreement of the parties, bound the petitioner herein, Domingo T. Lao, defendant in Civil Case No. 54689 of said. Court, to sell his hacienda Mapaya in Occidental Mindoro within a period of four (4) months at a price of not less than P1,000,000, failing which the plaintiff therein, now respondent Lao Kang Suy, was authorized to offer it for sale at the same minimum price. Out of the proceeds of the sale an amount to cover the plaintiff’s claim would be deposited in Court to await the result of the action, which was for the collection of certain sums for which the plaintiff might be held liable as indemnitor on a number of obligations incurred by the defendant in favor of several creditors.
The defendant failed to sell the property within the four months mentioned in the pre-trial order, nor within the extension of four months subsequently granted to him by the trial court, by reason of which failure the plaintiff was authorized to offer the property to the Independent Investment Co., Inc. for P1,000,000, and such offer having been made and accepted, the defendant was ordered to execute the corresponding deed of sale within 10 days, otherwise the same would be executed by the Clerk of Court. These are the orders which the petitioner here asked us to set aside in this proceeding. We denied the petition as aforestated, and we now take up the matter anew on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
A perusal of our decision reveals that it turned upon one important factual question whether or not when the pre-trial order of April 13, 1964 was issued by the trial court, the hacienda Mapaya had already been sold by the petitioner, as he alleged, to the Republic of the Philippines. The pivotal character of this question is implicit in the decision, as the following excerpts there-from show:
“. . . In the course of the discussion+ respondent learned of a supposed sale made by petitioner of the Hacienda to the Land Authority for P3,503,162.57 on August 2, 1963. The court then ordered the parties to go together to the Land Authority Office to check the status of the alleged sale.
“The parties were never able to check the alleged sale as directed by the Court. . . "
x x x x x x x x x
“Petitioner submits, in support of the petition, that the pre-trial order is invalid and does not bind him because it did not faithfully and truthfully reflect what actually transpired in the pre-trial conference. According to petitioner, contrary to all that is stated in the pre-trial order, what he actually did was to disclose to Judge Moya, the trial judge, in the strictest confidence, that he had already sold Hacienda Mapaya to the Land Authority for P3,303,162.57 on August 2, 1963 and was just awaiting payment of said amount.”
The foregoing submission of the petitioner was not accorded credence in our decision for the reason that if it were true he would have assailed before the trial court itself the veracity of the pre-trial order instead of not only acquiescing to it but even asking for an extension of time within which to carry out the mandate therein given to him, namely, to sell the hacienda for the price of not less than P1,000,000. Under the factual setting as it then appeared to us, we ruled that the respondent Court committed no such grave abuse of discretion as to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
Since then and during the pendency of the present motion for reconsideration, however, a number of developments have been brought to the attention of this Court by the petitioner, tending to confirm the truth of the sale of the hacienda Mapaya to the Republic on August 2, 1963.
On December 15, 1965, upon recommendation of the then Governor of the Land Authority, President Macapagal approved the negotiated purchase of the hacienda as aforesaid; and on December 27, 1965, Assistant Executive Secretary Froilan R. Montalban authorized the Budget Commissioner to release the sum necessary for the payment of the purchase price.
On March 25, 1968 the new Governor of the Land Authority (Conrado F. Estrella) sent a 1st Indorsement to the Executive Secretary wherein he stated, inter alia:
“In 1963, when R.A. 1400, otherwise known as the Land Reform Act of 1955, was in vigor a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE was executed by and between the owners (of the Hacienda Mapaya) and the Chairman-Administrator of the Land Tenure Administration containing terms and conditions conformably to the aforesaid governing statute. This Deed of Sale was later CONFIRMED OR RATIFIED ON DECEMBER 27, 1965 BY THE FORMER GOVERNOR OF THE LAND AUTHORITY AND FORMER PRESIDENT DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL.
x x x x x x x x x
“From the report and recommendation herein submitted, it appears conclusively that there was a perfected contract of conveyance between the Government and the landowners regarding the subject land. This ratification made by former Governor Gozon and the former President purges the contract of all defects to which it may have been subjected.”
After a number of communications on the matter among the officials concerned the petitioner agreed, in a letter addressed to the Governor of the Land Authority on January 24, 1969, to accept payment of the purchase price in negotiable land certificates. Such manner of payment was favorably endorsed by the Land Authority and was approved by the office of the President on February 26, 1969, subject to the condition that the negotiable land certificates would be presented to the Central Bank for encashment in staggered amounts as follows: P1,000,000 for the fiscal year 1970; P1,000,000 for the fiscal year 1971; and P842,000 for the fiscal year 1972.
On June 9, 1969 a formal contract embodying the aforesaid conditions was executed by the petitioner and Governor Estrella of the Land Authority “amending and supplementing the deed of absolute sale (of August 2, 1963) over the Mapaya Estate.”
On August 14, 1969 the sum of P1,000,000 in negotiable land certificates was personally handed by the President to the petitioner, the rest to be delivered later.
In the meantime the Development Bank, of the Philippines had foreclosed the mortgage it was holding over the hacienda Mapaya and purchased the same at the ensuing public sale. In view thereof the petitioner assigned his right of redemption to the Land Authority, and agreed that the amount to be paid for that purpose be taken from the negotiable land certificates due and payable to him in the fiscal year 1970.
The one overriding and inescapable fact which appears to have been established by these supervening developments is that the orders of the trial court complained of by the petitioner cannot now be legally carried out. The hacienda Mapaya has been acquired by the Republic, such acquisition being on the basis of the original sale executed way back in 1963, before the said orders were issued. From the manifestations submitted by the petitioner it also appears that the respondent himself has accepted this fact and indeed acted upon it to protect his claims in the action below by filing a motion in the trial court an May 15, 1969 for the issuance of an alias writ of attachment specifically against the amounts due to the petitioner from the Land Authority. The issuance of the writ prayed for was ordered by the Court on June 2, 1969.
While the writer of this resolution, with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, personally believes that in the light of the subsequent developments hereinabove set forth, supported as they are by copies of official documents and records the truth or authenticity of which is not disputed, the instant petition for certiorari may here be finally decided on the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the majority of the members of this Court are of the opinion that since the primordial issue before us is whether or not respondent Court acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders complained of, the new matters raised in connection with the motion for reconsideration should be submitted to said Court so that it may properly pass upon them and render a ruling thereon.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, without prejudice to the petitioner’s asking the trial court to reconsider the orders complained of and submitting for that purpose the new matters aforestated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Dizon, Fernando, and Barredo, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, and Villamor, JJ., concurs with the separate opinion of J. Teehankee. Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.