[ G.R. No. 30364. July 28, 1969 ] 139 Phil. 110
[ G.R. No. 30364. July 28, 1969 ]
ANGEL C. BAKING AND SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, RAMON ESPIRITU, FEDERICO R. MACLANG, FEDERICO BAUTISTA, ONOFRE MANGILA AND CESARIO TORRES, PETITIONERS. D E C I S I O N
SANCHEZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are two identical petitions for habeas corpus filed by petitioners: (1) Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez in L-30364; and (2) Jose Lava, Ramon Espiritu, Federico R. Maclang, Federico Bautista, Onofre Mangila, and Cesario Torres in L-30603.
Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava, et al., G.R. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years’ imprisonment. This decision has since become final.
Previously, on March 31, 1969, petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez registered their petition for habeas corpus in G.R. L-30364, one of the cases at bar. They claimed that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. On May 24, 1969, after this Court rendered its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for early decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate release, based primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for habeas corpus before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969.
The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners should now be released because they have already served the ten (10) year sentences meted out to them. They give as reasons:
First. Petitioners have been detained in prison pending the decision of their cases for more than eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. By Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,[1] one-half of their preventive imprisonment is to be deducted from their sentence. In other words, they are already credited with more than nine (9) years and three (3) months, representing one-half of eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months. This is not disputed.[2]
Second. Petitioners would go farther and claim for themselves benefits accorded by Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code granting time allowance for good conduct. Petitioners would apply said Article 97 through all the time of their detention period of over eighteen years.
We directed respondent Director of Prisons to produce before us the bodies of the petitioners. He did. In his return, thru the Solicitor General, he balks vehemently at the application of Article 97 to petitioners’ case.
After hearing and submission of memoranda, the present cases are now up for decision.
1. The key problem that now confronts us in the two petitions at bar is whether or not Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to detention prisoners. Said provision of law in its English version reads:
“ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior;
During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;
During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and
During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.”
Petitioners, who have been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this Court’s judgment of May 16, 1969, lay heavy stress on the phrase “any prisoner” in the English text of Article 97. In asking that the provision be made to apply to them when they were still detention prisoners, they say that the law does not distinguish between a prisoner who is serving sentence and detention prisoner.
The Spanish text of Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“ART. 97. Abono de tiempo por buena conducta. - La buena conducta, observada por el penado en cualquier establecimiento penal le hara acreedor a las siguientes reducciones del tiempo de su condena:
1.a Cinco dias cada mes de buena conducta durante los dos primeros años de privacion de libertad;
2.a Ocho dias por mes durante los años tercero al quinto inclusive;
3.a Diez dias por mes, durante los demas años hasta el decimo inclusive; y
4.a Quince dias por mes desde el undecimo en adelante.”
It must be stated that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs.[3] The term “any prisoner” in the Spanish text is “el penado”. Who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final judgment, For, “el penado” means a “delincuente condenado a una pena.”[4] There is thus no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its reach. Because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado - not one under “prision preventiva.” The allowance for good conduct “for each month of good behavior” then unquestionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and not otherwise.
Indeed, under Article 24(1), Revised Penal Code, the arrest and temporary detention of accused persons are not considered as penalties. By necessary implication from the statutory scheme of the Revised Penal Code, especially Article 28 thereof,[5] the service of a sentence of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction becomes final.
More to this. While Article 97 talks of “any prisoner” in the English text, it speaks, however, of that prisoner as being entitled to deductions for good conduct allowances “from the period of his sentence” (“del tiempo de su condena”). An accurate reading, therefore, of the provision yields the plain implication that the prisoner concerned is one who already has a sentence clamped upon him, i.e., a definite sentence by final judgment. The term “any prisoner” should thus be limited to those convicted by final judgment. This is the import of the law as written.
2. And then, there is the familiar precept that a codal provision is not to be interpreted in isolation. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that a code, such as the Revised Penal Code, should be construed as a whole. Courts are duty-bound to harmonize the various provisions thereof. The rule we should go by is that “a code enacted as a single comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such, and not as a series of disconnected articles or statutes."[6]
The reason why we now take stock of the foregoing rule is that we find in the same Revised Penal Code, Article 94, which provides as follows:
“ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence."[7]
As originally written in Spanish, this article reads:
“ART. 94. Como se extingue parcialmente la responsabilidad penal. - La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente:
1.º Por indulto condicional;
2.º Por conmutacion de la sentencia; y
3.º Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.”
By the above provision, good conduct allowances are given only to the culprit who earns the same “while he is serving his sentence” (“el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia”).[8] What is crystal clear in Article 94 then is that good conduct allowances are awarded only to those who are serving their sentences. Petitioners, as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be serving sentence during the period of their preventive imprisonment. And this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code which reduces petitioners’ respective sentences by one-half of their preventive imprisonment. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Article 29 merely credits said time [of one-half of the preventive imprisonment] to convicts by final judgment. Said article does not in any way imply that detention prisoners, thereafter convicted by final judgment, have been serving sentence during their detention period.
So it is, that Article 97 is to be read in conjunction with Article 94 which, under the circumstances, should likewise be deemed to give meaning to the term “any prisoner” in Article 97. Article 94 above-quoted, we must say, is embraced in the same chapter of the Revised Penal Code as Article 97 relied upon by petitioners. Both of them are in Book One, Title Four, Chapter Two, entitled “PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY”, the very same heading of Article 94. And Article 94 appears to be the lead article of Chapter Two, because it talks in general terms of everything contained in said Chapter Two. To elaborate, Article 95 speaks of conditional pardon, provided in Article 94(1); Article 96 deals with commutation of sentence, mentioned in Article 94(2); and Articles 97, 98 and 99 (the rest of the Chapter) refer to good conduct allowances treated by Article 94(3). Obvious from all these is that it is from Article 94(3) that Articles 97 (the provision under interpretation), 98 and 99 should take their bearings. And it says - we repeat - that: “La responsabilidad penal se extinguira parcialmente: x x x 3.º Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.”
Our view on the meaning of Article 97 gets a tremendous lift from Article 98 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
“ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article."[9]
While Article 98 also contains the phrase “any prisoner” (transmitted from the Spanish text which uses the words “los penados”), it is clear that this phrase is confined to convicts who have “evaded the service of [their] sentence” (“que quebrantaren su sentencia”).
The position we here take is not without jurisprudential support. In People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122, the accused was convicted of abduction and sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. After having served 8 years, 1 month and 17 days, he was pardoned “on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime.” He left unserved 6 years, 6 months and 14 days. Subsequently, he was prosecuted, tried, found guilty of another crime - attempted robbery in band with physical injuries - and sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. He was thereafter charged with a violation of the condition of his pardon. After trial, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced “to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon, namely, six years, six months and fourteen days.” In upholding that judgment of conviction on appeal, this Court, amongst others, said: “The appellant’s contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence."[10]
We accordingly hold that, by a consideration of the terms of Article 97 alone, and also in conjunction with other parts of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase “any prisoner” in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as referring only to a prisoner serving sentence.
3. A formidable argument against the tenability of petitioners’ plea is Section 5 of Act 1533 of the Philippine Commission (enacted on August 30, 1906), the old law “providing for the diminution of sentences x x x in consideration of good conduct and diligence.” Section 5 of said Act 1533 reads:
“SEC. 5. Detention prisoners who voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them shall be entitled to a credit in accordance with the provisions of this Act, which shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction."[11]
This provision of law, it must be said, still subsists. The repealing clause of the Revised Penal Code, Article 367 thereof, expressly abrogated Sections 1, 2 and 6 only of Act 1533. Section 5 thereof must therefore be deemed to form part of the present law on good conduct allowances.
By Section 5 just transcribed, detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances if they “voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them.” In which case, the credit they receive “shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of their conviction.” This is the sole exception to the rule that only those serving sentence shall be entitled to good conduct allowances. If detention prisoners do not follow the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533, they cannot earn credit for good conduct.
In the cases before us, there is not as much as an intimation that petitioners have voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told us that they worked during the period of their preventive imprisonment. The burden to show that the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533 has been met, is certainly upon petitioners. They have not discharged this burden. It is thus our firm conclusion that they cannot avail of the benefits granted to detention prisoners under Section 5 of Act 1533.
Upon the law as we read it, petitioners’ remedy is not with this Court. The law is the law. We cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation. Under our system of government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds; we cannot rewrite the law. This is the function of Congress.[12]
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petitions herein to set petitioners at liberty are hereby denied.
No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Teehankee, JJ., concur. Castro, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., did not take part. Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.