[ G.R. No. 28113. March 28, 1969 ] 137 Phil. 358
[ G.R. No. 28113. March 28, 1969 ]
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AND AMER MACAORAO BALINDONG, PETITIONERS, VS. PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NORODIN MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE, MODACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR LAO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
RUIZ CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Benito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios[1] of the latter municipality.
The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective offices, relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General[2] and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.[3]
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a “statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,” and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10(1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President’s power over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: “In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.”
On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government.[4] But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation.[5] For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.[6]
And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation. As earlier stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was orgnized before the promulgation of this Court’s decision in Pelaez.[7]
Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.
This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States. Thus, some hold that a de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be no de facto corporation where there can be no de jure one,[8] while others hold otherwise on the theory that a statute is binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional.[9]
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
“It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the absence of any legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can exist under color of an unconstitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created. …
“The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where there is some other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least an authority in potentia by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative propositions that there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de facto municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply the imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper. …
“As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which seem to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:
“I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:
“1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
“2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state
“II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
“III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
“IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be an usurper."[10]
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,[11] this Court granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted, was invalidated. Of course the issue of de facto municipal corporation did not arise in that case.
In Norton v. Shelby County,[12] Mr. Justice Field said: “An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioner’s created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 “created no office.” This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order “is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” For the existence of Executive Order 386 is “an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.” As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank:[13]
“The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”
There is then no basis for the respondents’ apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many en act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.[14]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., as clarified in the concurring opinion of J. Fernando. Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Capistrano, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., concurs fully and, in addition, submits a separate opinion. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., did not take part.