[ G.R. No. 26386. September 30, 1969 ] 140 Phil. 177
[ G.R. No. 26386. September 30, 1969 ]
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
Providence Washington Insurance Co. filed, on October 21, 1966, its brief as appellant against an order of the lower court dismissing its suit for the non-delivery of thirty cases of steel files, which cargo was insured by it against loss and damage, naming as defendants the Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs as the operator of the arrastre service, thus rendering unavoidable the invocation of the well-settled doctrine of non-suability of the government. Less than two months later, on December 17, 1966, our decision in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service was promulgated.[1] We there explicitly held: “The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.”
As of this date, thirty-six subsequent cases, certainly a figure far from unimpressive, have been similarly decided, expressly reaffirming the above ruling of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.[2] The futility of this appeal is quite apparent. We affirm the lower court order of dismissal.
The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway. Its primacy appears to be undeniable. For a suit of this character to prosper, there must be a showing of consent either in express terms or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Its absence being obvious, the lower court acted correctly.
Nor did the Mobil decision blaze a new trail. So it has been from the time the Constitution took effect in 1935. Bull v. Yatco, a 1939 decision during the Commonwealth, spoke to that effect.[3] Adherence to such a view is reflected in the various cases decided after independence before the Mobil Exploration case.[4] The classic formulation of Holmes of this doctrine of non-suability thus bears restatement: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."[5]
This is not to deny that while indeed logical and far from impractical the doctrine does give rise to problems considering how widely immersed in matters hitherto deemed outside its sphere the government is at present. Nor is it likely considering its expanding role, demanded by the times and warranted by the Constitution, that a halt would be called to many of its activities, at times unavoidably adversely affecting private rights. Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.
At any rate, in case of a money claim arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between private parties, such a consent has been given by a statute enacted by the Philippine legislature, even before the Constitution took effect and still applicable at present.[6] The procedure provided for in such a statute[7] was made more expeditious by a Commonwealth Act, enabling the party or entity, who feels aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General required to decide the claim within sixty days, having the right to go to this Court for final adjudication.[8] It is worthy of note likewise that in the pursuit of its activities affecting business, the government has increasingly relied on private corporations possessing the power to sue and be sued.[9]
Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of May 23, 1966 is affirmed. With costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., did not take part. Reyes, JBL, J., on official trip.