[ G.R. No. 22294. January 12, 1968 ] 130 Phil. 24
[ G.R. No. 22294. January 12, 1968 ]
DIONISIA PARAMI VDA. DE CABASAG, PETITIONER, VS. AMADOR P. SU, RICARDO BORBON, ROQUE L. SU, SR., TIMOTEO LOZADA, MARIA (NIEVES) LOZADA VDA. DE SU AND HONORABLE ALFREDO CATOLICO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for certiorari to reverse a decision of the Court of First Instance (Branch I) of Misamis Occidental in its Civil Case No. 2418, then presided by the Honorable Alfredo Catolico.
Petitioner Dionisia Parami Vda. de Cabasag had filed a complaint in said case entitled “Recovery of Actual Damages of Real Property” wherein she pleaded three causes of action against the private respondents herein. Basic facts alleged were that she and her late husband were holders and possessors of a parcel of coconut land in Salimpono, Sapang Dalaga, Misamis Occidental, covered by Tax Declarations No. 3976 and 3977, and by Homestead Application No. V-73776 (E-V-65535) duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; that being illiterate and ignorant, the plaintiff and her late husband were induced to live in the house of defendant Su, where the husband subsequently died; that while there, the defendants conspiring together, induced the couple to execute and thumbmark a document deceitfully represented to be a deed acknowledging an indebtedness of P4,000.00 which plaintiff and her husband had borrowed to repay a previous obligation to a chinaman in Dipolog, Zamboanga, but which deed turned out to be one of absolute sale of the land previously mentioned and its improvements, for an alleged price of P11,000.00 that was never received by the purported vendors.
In the first cause of action, it is averred that defendants took physical possession of the land on the strength of the alleged sale and reaped the fruits thereof, to the damage of the real owners in the sum of P57,000.00.
For a second cause of action, it is pleaded that the defendants (respondents here) “confabulating, cooperating and helping one another” demolished the plaintiff’s house in said land, valued at P10,000.00.
And for a third cause of action, it is alleged that plaintiff suffered “financial anguish, mental torture and social humiliation” resulting in moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees.
The complaint therefore prayed for a declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and recovery of damages and attorneys’ fees totalling P122,000.00.
After answers traversing the averments of the complaint, pleading misjoinder of defendants and counterclaiming for P105,000.00 damages and attorney’s fees, the Court below remanded the case to the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapang Dalaga, in an order reading as follows (Petition, Annex 4):
“When this case was called for hearing today, for the purpose of finding out which court has original jurisdiction to try the same, it appearing on the record that this court has already ordered or authorized a witness for the plaintiff in this case to take the corresponding deposition but by reason of the expressed provisions of Republic Act No. 3828 regarding the original jurisdiction of Municipal Courts with respect of cases of this nature, the same falling squarely in the provisions of said Republic Act 3828, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapang Dalaga for trial on the merit and for proper disposition.
“SO ORDERED.”
Reconsideration having been asked and denied, the petition for certiorari was filed in this Court. Defendants answered that the order complained of was rendered “in the honest belief that the case was really within the competent jurisdiction of the said Municipal Court” of Sapang Dalaga.
Plainly, the lower Court’s order, Annex “4” of the complaint is not only erroneous but indefensible. Republic Act 3828 merely increased the Civil jurisdiction of Municipal Courts to cases involving not more than P10,000.00,[1] which is but a tenth of the damages claimed both in the complaint and the answer. Moreover, the complaint also prayed for the nullification of the deed of sale, and consequent recovery of a piece of land, which placed the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and not that of the inferior courts (Cf. Pajarillo vs. Manahan, 99 Phil. 1000, 1003) that can only pass upon title to land as incident to forcible entry and detainer suits (Judiciary Act, sec. 88).
By what process the Court of First Instance arrived at its extraordinary conclusion, we are at a loss to understand, because the order sets forth no reasons. That His Honor, the trial judge, honestly believed that he had no jurisdiction is not relevant, since the question is one of law. Plainly, the matter was not given proper attention.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the order complained of is annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Court of origin, for further proceedings conformably to law. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.