[ G.R. No. L-28340 & L-28374. December 29, 1967 ] 129 Phil. 781
[ G.R. No. L-28340 & L-28374. December 29, 1967 ]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO AND MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. L-28374. DECEMBER 29, 1967] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO AND MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SAN JUAN, RIZAL. RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
MAKALINTAL, J.:
These two cases, although filed separately, were argued by the parties and submitted for decision jointly.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada and respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo were contending candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, in the election held on November 14, 1967.
G. R. No. L-28340. This is an original petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction, directed against an order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch. The petition alleges in substance that by order dated September 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, had authorized petitioner, whose real name is Joseph Ejercito, to use his screen name “Joseph Estrada;” that his certificate of candidacy for the position in question carries the name “Joseph Ejercito Estrada;” that in precinct No. 93 of San Juan, Rizal, the board of election inspectors, by a vote of two to one resolved not to count in favor of petitioner ballots wherein he was voted for under the names “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” “Joseph,” “J. Estrada,” or “Estrada” on the ground that none of them is his real name; that pursuant to such resolution at least 36 votes cast for petitioner were not counted or included in the tally; that subsequently, or on November 20, 1967, two of the three members of the board of election inspectors (Josefino A. Bueno and Emilia Suarez) filed with the court of respondent Judge a petition for correction or amendment of the election return in the aforesaid precinct by adding at least 36 votes to those credited therein to petitioner; that petitioner herein as well as respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo were allowed to intervene in the proceedings below; that upon motion to dismiss filed by said respondent the court dismissed the petition, and denied the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by petitioner.
We gave due course to the petition and issued a temporary restraining order to prevent the proclamation of any of the candidates for the municipal office of San Juan, Rizal.
The only question here is whether under the allegations in the petition the correction of the election return in precinct No. 93 of San Juan, Rizal, is justified and proper and may be judicially ordered. Section 154 of the Revised Election Code provides:
“Section 154.- Alterations in the statement. After the announcement of the result of the election in the polling place, the board of inspectors shall not make any alteration or amendment in any of its statements, unless it be so ordered by a competent court.”
In a number of decisions this Court has held that there are two requisites that must concur in order to make out a case for correction of an election return: (1) there must be an error therein; and (2) the members of the board of election inspectors must be unanimous in the fact that such an error exists and they are willing to rectify the same. Benitez vs. Paredes and Dizon, 52 Phil. 1; Board of Inspectors of Bongabong vs. Sison, 55 Phil. 914; Gumpal vs. C.F.I. of Isabela, G. R. No. L-16409, Nov. 19, 1960; Astilla vs. Asuncion, et al., G. R. No. L-22245, Feb. 29, 1964.
The reason for the requirement of unanimity is that the proceeding for correction is a summary one, is not supposed to raise controversial issues, and does not call for a recount or revision of the ballots themselves, either of which contemplates a different remedy.
In the instant case the aforesaid requisites are not present. In the first place, there is no error alleged as to the election return itself. The error lies in the appreciation of the ballots or, more specifically, in the decision of the election inspectors not to count in favor of petitioner those ballots wherein the names “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” “Joseph, “J. Estrada,” or “Estrada” appear. The return, in other words, reflects accurately the result of the tally of votes as read and counted, and consequently cannot be considered erroneous for purposes of correction under Section 154 of the Revised Election Code.
In the second place, there is no unanimity among the members of the board of election inspectors. In support of the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo before the court below, there is attached an affidavit signed by the third inspector (Santiago Cardona) and by the poll clerk (Evangeline Salgado), stating as follows: “That we are not aware of the existence of any error or mistake in said election statement or returns and we are not giving our consent or conformity to the correction or amendment of the same.” This may not be as categorical an opposition to the petition for correction as might be desired, but it certainly shows such a lack of unanimity among the members of the board as to preclude summary correction and call instead for an examination of the ballots themselves to determine whether or not they tally with the number of votes credited to petitioner.
Moreover, the petition itself is not even definite as to the error that is sought to be corrected. It alleges that “at least 36 votes validly cast for one or another of the names hereinabove mentioned were not counted in favor of herein petitioner.” The evidence presented in the lower court and referred to in the instant petition consists of (a) the minutes of voting, showing that 158 votes cast in precinct No. 93 were tallied and counted; and (b) the certificate of votes which shows that at least 156 of the said 158 votes were counted for one or another of four candidates for Vice-Mayor, while only 122 votes were counted for one or another of the only four candidates for Municipal Mayor. From this evidence, together with the admitted fact that the inspectors, by a vote of two to one, had resolved not to count for petitioner the ballots wherein the names hereinbefore mentioned appear, petitioner draws the conclusion that the difference of 36 votes (between the 158 tallied and the 122 counted for him) must be the number of votes to be additionally credited in his favor. This conclusion, while seemingly logical, is too tenuous and speculative to justify simple correction of the return. For to properly consider those additional 36 votes involves more than mere mathematical computation. It would require looking into the ballots themselves, ascertaining the names of the candidate or candidates for mayor written thereon, their legibility, their placement, even the very fact that any particular name is written at all.
We are not unmindful of the apparent injustice to petitioner in the resolution of the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 93 of San Juan, Rizal, considering that there was already a court decision authorizing him to use the name “Joseph Estrada.” The resolution assumes more serious implications, directly affecting public interest, in view of the allegations in the petitions, both here and below, supported by the affidavit of one of the election inspectors that they had been threatened and intimidated by men belonging to the faction of respondent Sto. Domingo, and ordered to ignore ballots cast for petitioner wherein the surname “Estrada” was written. A timely remedy should have been obtained then and there from the Commission on Elections or its representative so that the popular will would be accorded free, untrammelled and legitimate expression. As it is, the proceeding now resorted to, namely, correction of the return, is not justified under the facts and circumstances of this case. For the petition assumes the existence of an error in the election return itself - which is not true - and assumes likewise certain other facts as to the contents of the uncounted ballots, as to which facts there is no unanimity among the election inspectors.
G. R. No. L-28374. This is a petition for review of an order of the Commission on Elections involving the election return in precinct No. 94 of San Juan, Rizal. Petitioner applied to the Commission for an order directing the municipal board of canvassers to reject or disregard the said return on the ground that it was “clearly manufactured.” Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Lagumbay vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-25444, January 31, 1966. The return in question shows the following data:
Number of voters registered in
precinct ……………………… Four hundred nine - 409
Number of voters who actually
voted ………………………… Two hundred twenty nine- 229
Ballots found in compartment
for valid ballots………. Three Hundred - 300
The same election return shows the following number of votes received by the various candidates for Mayor, to wit:
NAMES OF CANDIDATES
TOTAL VOTES OBTAINED (In Words)
TOTAL VOTES
OBTAINED
(In figures)
- Domingo, Braulio Sto.
One hundred seven
107
2. Estrada, Joseph
Eighty two
82
3. Ibuna, Nicanor
One hundred eight
108
4. Lenon, Enrique
One
1''
It is claimed by petitioner that the return is obviously manufactured, considering that while there were only 229 voters who actually voted 300 ballots were found in the box for valid ballots. Upon its face the claim would seem clear and irrefutable, for it is mathematically impossible for 229 voters to cast 300 valid votes, or 298 votes in the aggregate for the four contending candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor.
However, a conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing proof. The decision in the Lagumbay case speaks of “inherent improbability” in the data shown on the return. Any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification with the resulting disfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. In this case there is such an explanation. The minutes of voting prepared and signed by the election inspectors in precinct No. 94 show that the total number who voted is two hundred ninety-nine (299), in both words and figures, and that of the 300 ballots in the box for valid ballots one (1) was found to be marked and placed in the envelope for “marked ballots.” These minutes of voting constitute an official document, accomplished pursuant to Section 142 of the Revised Election Code. It is a fair presumption that the number 229 entered in the election return as the number of those who actually voted is a mere clerical error, and that the correct figure is 299 as shown in the minutes of voting. The correctness of this figure is supported by the other entries in the return, and by the fact that the sum total of the votes counted for the four candidates for Municipal Mayor is 298, with one ballot rejected and placed in the envelope for marked ballots.
Everything considered, we find no justifiable ground on which the return in question may be annulled.
Both petitions are therefore dismissed, and the restraining orders we issued in the two cases are lifted. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur. Dizon and Fernando, JJ., took no part. Sanchez, J., concurs in a separate opinion.