[ G.R. No. 25577. March 16, 1966 ] 123 Phil. 200; 62 OG 4160 (June, 1966)
[ G.R. No. 25577. March 16, 1966 ]
ONOFRE P. GUEVARA, PETITIONER, VS. RAOUL M. INOCENTES, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This decision is written in keeping with the statement we made in our resolution dated February 16, 1966.
Petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965, having taken his oath of office on November 25 of the same year, and considering that the ad interim appointment for the same position extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966 is invalid in spite of Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued by the latter on the same date declaring all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966, petitioner brought before this Court the instant petition for quo warranto seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to said office of Undersecretary of Labor.
The petition is predicated on the following grounds: (1) under Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner’s ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress of 1966; (2) here there has been no express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments because the same has never been constituted during the special session called by President Marcos in his Proclamation No. 2, series of 1966; and (3) there has been no adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because (a) the aforesaid special session was suspended by the House on Saturday, January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m.; (b) the resolution approved by the Senate on January 23, 1966 at past 2:00 a.m. for adjournment sine die is not the adjournment contemplated in Article VII, Section 10(a) of our Constitution; (c) the suspension by the House or the adjournment by the Senate to resume the session on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. meant the end of the Special session and the start of the regular session as a continuous session without any interruption; and (d) the phrase “until the next adjournment of the Congress” must be related with the phrase “until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments” so that the adjournment contemplated should refer to a regular session during which the Commission on Appointments may be organized and allowed to discharge its functions as such.
Respondent, on the other hand, set up the following defenses: (1) petitioner’s ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session called under Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos; (2) an ad interim appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress and so petitioner’s appointment must have lapsed as early as December 30, 1965; (3) petitioner’s ad interim appointment, as well as others made under similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and hence null and void; and (4) petitioner’s appointment is void in the light of he doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino, G. R. No. L-19800, October 28, 1953.
After due deliberation, the Court resolved that the ad interim appointment extended to petitioner on November 18, 1965 by the former Executive lapsed when the special session of Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966, as embodied in our resolution dated February 16, 1966.
We will now elaborate on the reasons expressed in said resolution.
The important provision to be considered is Article VII, Section 10, Subsection 4 of our Constitution, which provides:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
A perusal of the above-quoted provision would at once reveal that it is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make a recess appointment effective only (a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or (b) until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned. And this is so considering the plain language of the aforesaid provision which is free from any ambiguity in the light of the well-settled rule of statutory construction that “when the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for construction” (Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 316). Hence, the above provision contemplates two modes of termination of an ad interim appointment, or of one made during the recess of Congress, which are completely separate from, and independent of, each other. And while during the special session called under Proclamation No. 2 no Commission on Appointments was organized by Congress, the second mode of termination, however, had its constitutional effect, as when Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966. Such adjournment, in legal contemplation, had the effect of terminating petitioner’s appointment thereby rendering it legally ineffective.
Petitioner’s theory that the first mode of termination consisting in the disapproval by the Commission on Appointments should be inseparately related with the clause “until the next adjournment of Congress” in the sense that the Commission has to be first organized in order that the last mode may operate is untenable considering that the latter is not dependent upon, nor influenced in any manner by, the operation of the former. As already stated, the two modes of termination are completely separate from and independent of each other. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to make the operation of the second clause dependent upon the prior constitution of the Commission on Appointments they should have so stated in clear terms considering that the first clause implies a positive act of the Commission while the second an entirely separate and independent act of Congress. Indeed, the theory of petitioner, if carried to its logical conclusion, may result into the anomaly that, should Congress be controlled by a party not inclined to organize said Commission, or should there arise a group which for reasons of its own indulges in obstructionism, the Commission on Appointments contemplated in the Constitution is never organized as a consequence of the action of either, any appointment made during the recess of Congress would never run the test of legislative scrutiny and would thereby then be always considered permanent even if it is extended ad interim, a result which, to be sure, was never intended by the framers of our Constitution. It thus becomes imperative that we avoid such absurd result.
It is true that the provision of the Constitution we are now considering in speaking of the mode of termination epitomized in the phrase “until the next adjournment of the Congress” does not make any reference to any specific session of the Congress,- whether regular or special,- but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS (Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Company, et al., G.R. No. L-12560, September 30, 1958). Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of our Constitution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner.
Under our tripartite form of government predicated on the principle of separation of powers the power to appoint is inherently an executive function while the power to confirm or reject appointments belongs to the legislative department, the latter power having been conferred as a check on the former. This power to check may be exercised through the members of both Houses in the Commission on Appointments. But although the Commission on Appointments is provided for in the Constitution, its organization requires congressional action, and once organized, by express provision of the Constitution, it “shall meet only while Congress is in session.” Consequently, if for any reason Congress adjourns a regular or special session without organizing the Commission on Appointments, Congress should be deemed to have impliedly exercised said power to check by allowing the ad interim appointment to lapse as provided for in the Constitution.
The next important inquiry is: Since Congress in its special session held under Proclamation No. 2 of the President, series of 1966, did not deem it wise to organize the Commission on Appointments to act on the recess appointments made by the former Executive, can it be said that Congress is deemed to have impliedly exercised its power to check on such recess appointments when it adjourned its special session at about 12:00 o’clock midnight of January 22, 1966?
The answer must of necessity be in the affirmative inasmuch as that special session actually adjourned in legal contemplation at about 12:00 midnight of January 22, 1966 considering that the Senate adjourned sine die at about said hour. Although the House allegedly suspended its session at 10:55 p.m. on January 22, 1966 to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966, at 10:00 a.m., Congress cannot be considered to be in special session subsequently to January 22 for the reason that the House, without the Senate which had adjourned sine die, is not “Congress.” Indeed, when the Senate adjourned at 12:00 midnight on January 22, 1966 this adjournment should be considered as the “next adjournment of the Congress” of the special session notwithstanding the alleged suspension of the session earlier by the House for the reason that neither the House nor the Senate can hold session independently of the other in the same manner as neither can transact any legislative business after the Adjournment of the other. None other than President Macapagal and Speaker Cornelio Villareal expressed such opinion when as members of the Lower House in 1954 they expoused and defended the same on the floor as can be seen from the following transcript of the congressional record:
“Mr. MACAPAGAL—* * * Since the Senate has, by its own responsibility, adjourned one and a half hours ago, therefore, under the present facts, in our Constitution this House is automatically adjourned, and therefore it is improper and illegal for us to continue the proceedings farther.
“* * * * * * *”
“Mr. VILLAREAL—Mr. Speaker, although it is true that I do not want to appeal from the ruling of the Chair, nonetheless, I maintain that our actuations from the time we approved that resolution will be illegal acts, and I do not want this Congress to commit illegal acts because it will affect the dignity of this Chamber. We are not unaware of the facts. I invite the Presiding Officer and everybody here to go to the Senate now, and if they accept my challenge, let us go so that I can prove to them that there is not one ghost of any Senator in that Chamber. The Senate has actually adjourned, Mr. Speaker, and are we to have a fiction here that the Senators are still holding a session? We approved that resolution of adjournment before twelve o’clock tonight knowing that the Senate adjourned two or three hours ago. Are we crazy here to believe that the Senators are still holding session? How can we in conscience justify our actuations here that we are still doing something for the benefit of the people when in fact and in truth we are not because we cannot do so? * * *
“Mr. Speaker, let us be frank; let us be honest to ourselves; let us not ridicule ourselves; let us adjourn now because we have nothing to do and all that we will do will be illegal beginning now. * * *
“Mr. Speaker. I honestly believe that legally we cannot do anything any further, and if I am the author of a bill pending approval, I would not submit the bill for passage now because that will be the subject of litigation in court as to whether such approval will be legal or not, and I would never risk my committee report to be submitted after the approval of that resolution, knowing fully well that actually and physically that Upper Chamber has already adjourned.” (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 3rd Congress, Republic of the Philippines, First Regular and First Special Sessions, Vol. I, pp. 4091 and 4094).
As a corollary, the theory that there was a continuous session without any interruption when the House allegedly suspended its session at 10:55 p.m. on January 22, 1966 to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. cannot be accepted, because such theory runs counter to well-established parliamentary precedents and practice. Thus, for one thing, between January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. and January 24, 1966 at 10:35 a.m. when the House opened its regular session, there intervened January 23, 1966, which was Sunday, and as such is expressly excluded by the Constitution as a session day of Congress. For another, it is imperative that there be a “constructive recess” between a special and regular session, as when a regular session succeeds immediately a special session or vice-versa, and so a special session cannot be held immediately before a regular session without any interruption nor can both be held simultaneously together. Hinds’ Precedents has the following to say on the matter:
“The commissions granted during the recess prior to the convening of Congress in extraordinary session November 9, 1903, of course furnished lawful warrant for the assumption by the persons named therein of the duties of the offices to which they were, respectively, commissioned. Their names were regularly sent to the Senate thereafter. If confirmed, of course they would hold under appointment initiated by the nomination without any regard to the recess commission. If not confirmed, their right to hold under the recess commission absolutely ended at 12 o’clock meridian on the 7th of December, 1903, for at that hour the extraordinary session ended and the regular session of Congress began by operation of law. An extraordinary session and a regular session can not coexist, and the beginning of the regular session at 12 o’clock was the end of the extraordinary session; not a constructive end of it, but an actual end of it. At 12 o’clock December 7 the President pro tempore of the Senate said:
Senators, the hour provided by law for the meeting of the first regular session of the Fifty-eighth Congress having arrived, I declare the extraordinary session adjourned without day.
“Aside from the statement upon the record that the ‘hour had struck’ which marked the ending of the one and the beginning of the other, the declaration of the President pro tempore was without efficacy. It did not operate to adjourn without day either the Congress or the Senate. Under the law the arrival of the hour did both.
“The constitutional provision that the commission shall expire at the end of the next session is self-executing, and when the session expires the right to hold under the commission expires with it. If there be no appreciable point of time between the end of one session and the beginning of another, since of necessity one ends and another begins, the tenure under the commission as absolutely terminates as if months of recess supervened.” (Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, Vol. V, p. 854)
Considering now petitioner’s ad interim appointment and others extended under similar conditions in the light of the doctrine we laid down in the Aytona case, we may say that they were even more irregular than those involved in said case to the extent that they may be voided even on this ground alone. Thus, while President Garcia only extended 350 ad interim appointments after he had lost the election, President Macapagal made 1,717 ad interim appointments most of which were made only after the elections in November, 1965. As a consequence, the following anomalies were noted: a former presidential assistant was appointed judge of three different salas, another was appointed to a non-existing branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, while still another who had a pending disbarment case received an ad interim appointment as judge of first instance. This is indeed a far cry from the following admonition we made in the Aytona case:
“Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a ‘caretaker’ administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which, he ought to know, would embarass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.” (Aytona v. Castillo, et al., G. R. No. L-19313, January 20, 1962)
It is hoped that now and hereafter such excess in the exercise of power should be obviated to avoid confusion, uncertainty, embarrassment and chaos which may cause disruption in the normal function of government to the prejudice of public interest. It is time that such excess be stopped in the interest of the public weal.
Wherefore, petition is denied. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Regala, JJ., concur. Makalintal, J., dissents for the same reasons previously expressed by him in the resolution of Feb. 16, 1966.