[ G. R. No. 25554. October 04, 1966 ] 124 Phil. 890; 64 OG 7821 (July, 1968)
[ G. R. No. 25554. October 04, 1966 ]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ISMAEL MATHAY AND JOSE VELASCO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association , a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph A, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly provides that “the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”. Section 7 of the same Act provides “that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of Representatives:
“SPEAKER
“1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966——-P29,129.00
“MEMBERS
“2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at, P7,200 from July 1 to December 29,1965 and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30,1966 ————–P2,032,866.00”
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:
The President of the Senate——–P16,000.00
Twenty-three Senators at P7,200——165,600.00
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R. A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act No. 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
“SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.” (Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969 ; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965 .
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex “A”), along the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved (Annex “B”); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice (Annex “C”, Petition). Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the former Justice Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present action. The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions, in so far as present members of the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Asso. vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
“The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds, is the minority doctrine.”
“On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents1 passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives’ increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place “a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt” (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to “all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives), thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and of the House”, underscores that in the application of Article VI, section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court’s opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the Legislature should be unicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the committee read as follows:
“The Senators and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual compensation of four thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided. That no increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature that approved such increase.” (Emphasis supplied)
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which read:
“Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.” (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
“No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.”
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present form:
“No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all the members of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the increase, they would have just used the expression “term of all the members of the Congress” instead of specifying “all the members of the Senate and of the House”. This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words “of the” before “House” in the provision being considered, and in the use of the phrase “of the Senate and of the House” when it could have employed the shorter expression “of the Senate and the House”. It was grammatically correct to refer to “the members of the Senate and (the members) of the House”, because the members of the Senate are not members of the House. To speak of “members of the Senate and the House” would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the “terms” (in the plural)” of the members of 3 the Senate and of the House”, instead of using “term” in the singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular form “term” precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, “until the expiration of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase”.
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity of the increased compensation would subject the present members of the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original limitation or the present one, as amended, a maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four(4) is necessary before an increase of legislators’ compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two assemblymen’s terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the increase could become operative, because the original Constitution required that the new emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an assemblyman’s term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again, an identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given election four of the approving Senators’ full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30, 1969 , since the said Senators’ term would expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end in December 30 of 1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher compensation would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later, because the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the amended constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of the present House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of increases of compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate their reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 , when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it in June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriations for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969 . In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.
Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring opinion of Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ..