[ G. R. No. L-24022. March 30, 1965 ] 121 Phil. 358
[ G. R. No. L-24022. March 30, 1965 ]
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1.965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners’ filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer, do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners’ contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: “All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this repealing clause? Jt is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. vs. Simpson, 8 F (2d( 439; Weber vs. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State vs. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconciliable inconsistency and repugnancy exist i» the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different—one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3) when the shortage on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with 3. Nowhere in said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 2 only authorizes importation during normal tinier, when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
On view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No- 11511 which was presented in answer a the request of the Chief Executive that he be given and by power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:
“SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 there is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: ‘Provided further’, it says, ’that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax.’ So therefore, the position of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.” (Senate Debate, June 10, 1964)
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import an" meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconciliably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United States vs. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond vs. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462). The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano vs. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled “An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply” cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that mentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase “except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad.” The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus oficio at least on the matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty-. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
“SENATOR LIWAG: * * * Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in case of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No. 2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c) Section 2 page 2, that when we say ‘under the provisions of existing law, we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
“* * * * * * *”
Senator Padilla: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads:
‘Importation of rice and/or corn .should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing laws.”
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill be substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law—that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207—that is the reason your Committee eliminated that .stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3152 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear * * *.
SENATOR PADILLA: ‘Provided, further.’ it says. ‘That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment ’ the corresponding taxes.’ So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR Al.MENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law arc in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. 1 take the view that the two laws can be reconciled * * *.
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisos together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together 1 would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would he inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national emergency."
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3(e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in question.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.