[ G.R. No. L-18241. December 27, 1963 ] 119 Phil. 141
[ G.R. No. L-18241. December 27, 1963 ]
SANTIAGO VICENTE, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PAREDES, J.:
Petitioner Santiago Vicente had been in the employ of respondent as plant mechanic since July, 1952, with a monthly salary of P150.00. On March 30, 1957, while he was in the performance of his duties, going up a ladder to clean a boiler gauge, he fell, his chest and the back of his head hitting a cement wall. He became unconcious immediately after the fall, but regained the same, after an hour or so, and continued to work. At the end of two weeks after the said fall, or on April 29, 1957, he informed the respondent, thru Manager Gonzalo Puyat, that he was not feeling well. He exhibited some loss of memory; he could not work normally because he could not remember what he was going to do with the work. Mr. Puyat recommended him to Dr. Limson of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), for treatment. From April 29, 1957, he was confined at the PGH, until August 1, 1957. Petitioner’s illness was diagnosed as cerebral vascular disease, atherosclerotic with infraction and focal cerebralotrophy Exh. B, Annex C of petition. From May 9 to May 13, 1958, petitioner was again hospitalized, as his illness grew progressively worse and was then diagnosed as “cerebral atrophy with encephalopathy probably secondary to cerebral arterios clerosis”. He was still having purposeless movements on the right lower extremity, amnesic of past events and could recall only the immediate past.
During the period of confinement, petitioner filed a claim for compensation (Form No. 1), under Act No. 3428, as amended (R03-WC Case No, 298), with the Regional Office No. 3, of the Department of Labor, for the injury and consequent disability, resulting from the accident met on March 30, 1957. On October 31, 1957, respondent company filed its Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness (Form No. 3), claiming that it did not have knowledge of the injury or the accident.
The hearing Officer rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which recite—
“When Mr. Santiago Vicente suffered the fall in March 30, 1957 while working’ in the respondent’s shop he already had the ‘cerebral arteriosclerosis’. And since, according to Dr. Apostol, this disease was due to the hardening of the brain arteries which is the manifestation of the aging process, it could not therefore be held traceable to the fall. Claimant merely imagined that his present loss of memory and involuntary movements of extremities was directly caused by his fall in March 30, 1957, when all the time the cause of such sickness existed even before the accident. Even Dr. Ceasar Catindig presented by claimant as his witness who was consulted by Mr. Vicente in November, 1958, agreed with Dr. Apostol that claimant’s arteriosclerosis was a part of the aging process.
Premises considered we find that the illness on which the claim is based and resulting disability was not directly traceable to the fall which hit the claimant’s head in March 30, 1957 while in the course of his employment. The cerebral arteriosclerosis was part of the aging process and existed as early as January, 1957—long before the accident. The loss of brain substance and hardening of the brain arteries had no casual relation whatsoever with the accident that befell the claimant.
“Wherefore, we regret to have to decree the dismissal of the instant claim for Insufficiency of evidence to support the issuance of an award. Without costs.”
On August 5, 1960, the Commissioner of the WCC affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, stating among others, the following—
“In this case, the claimant was able not only to continue his work after his accidental fall without any ill effects whatsoever, but also for so many days thereafter. He allegedly exhibited loss of memory only after the lapse of more than two weeks after the accident. Consequently, we are impelled to conclude that the manifestations of the illness of the claimant which disabled him for labor was the result of the natural progress of his cerebral arteriosclerosis and not due to any aggravation caused by his accidental fall.”
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above decision and prayed that claimant be allowed to:
1. Present additional evidence to show that his disease or ailment was aggravated by the accident;
2. That a joint examination he conducted on the claimant by an expert, designated by the parties; and
3. The motion for reconsideration be set for argument for a more vivid ventilation of the issues.
On February 21, 1960, the WCC, en bane, denied the motion for reconsideration, neither did it allow petitioner to present additional evidence or to hold a joint examination of claimant.
The case is now before this Court on a Petition to Review on Certiorari, claimant raising four (4) issues, which may be summed up into the single proposition of whether or not the Alleged pre-existing illness of petitioner of cerebral vascular disease, atheroclerotie with infraction and focal cerebrolotrophy (hardening of the cerebral arteries), was aggravated by the accident in question.
The Commission, in refusing to award compensation to petitioner relied mainly on the findings of the PGH that the principal complaint of petitioner when admitted at the Hospital on April 29, 1957, was “Uncontrollable movements of the right lower extremity” which allegedly started four (4) months before his admission, or in January 1957. The Commission concluded that disability which manifested itself and prevented petitioner from performing his work, was independent from the accident; rather it was the natural progress of his illness of cerebral arteriosclerosis. Upon the other hand, petitioner contends that his illness and subsequent disability were the direct result of the accident and/or aggravated by it and that the conclusions of the Commission are not supported by the evidence on record.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, among others, provide—
“Sec. 2, Grounds for Compensation. —When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation * * *.”
The findings of the Commission seem conclusive to the effect that on March 30, 1957, the petitioner while in the act of going up the ladder to clean a boiler gauge of respondent’s machine, fell therefrom, causing his chest and back of his head to strike the cement wall. Respondent and the Commission asserted that there was no injury, basing such conclusion on the fact that immediately after the fall (an hour or so after), the petitioner continued to work and it was only until after two weeks that he complained to the management. The conclusion seem to be off tangent to the testimonial evidence presented during the hearing, and to the very nature of things. When claimant-petitioner was confined at the PGH for the second time (May 9, 1958 to May 13, 1958), the illness was found to be “cerebral atrophy with encephalopathy probably secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis.” Dr. Apostol, explaining the cause or causes of the illness, testified—
“Q— style=’ and soon after his severe fall, he was already suffering from an illness which crippled him for work. Even a severe strain may have serious results. There was the smoke, there must have been a fire; the effect itself, showed the cause; the occurrence told its own tale.
The petitioner’s claim should be upheld, not only because the presumption of compensability was not destroyed by respondent company’s evidence, but also because the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident in the pursuit of his employment and must be liberally construed, to attain the purpose for which it has been enacted (Eneria vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., of Manila, 38 Off. Gaz., Sept. 15, 1951).
Having reached the above conclusion, it is not deemed necessary to pass upon other issues raised in the appeal.
In view hereof, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation for alleged insufficiency of evidence, is hereby reserved, and another entered, ordering respondent Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc., to pay petitioner such compensation as the law provides after a computation thereof shall have been made by the respondent Commission. With costs against respondent company.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J,B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.