[ G.R. No. L-15287. September 30, 1963 ] 118 Phil. 909
[ G.R. No. L-15287. September 30, 1963 ]
VIENCIO JORNALES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CENTRAL AZUCARERA BE BAIS AND COMPANIA CELULOSA DE FILIPINAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental dated October 29, 1958, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint was filed September 17, 1958, alleging that plaintiffs were permanent, year-round employees of defendants by virtue of agreements entered into between them and that, in violation of said agreements defendants dismissed the plaintiffs from their employment. It was prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued for immediate reinstatement; and after trial that the dismissals be declared illegal and plaintiffs awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees.
‘In their answer defendants alleged that they had no agreement with plaintiffs with respect to the duration of employment and justified the dismissals on the ground that defendants had entered with the United Central and Cellulose Labor Association (UCCLA- PLUM), the exclusive bargaining representative designated by the C.I.R., into a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed-shop clause, with which defendants, at the instance of the UCCLA, asked plaintiffs to comply, but that plaintiffs failed to do so, whereupon defendants considered them separated from employment as of September 15, 1958.
In the order appealed from the court declared itself without jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ claim for reinstatement was closely interwoven with a question of unfair Labor practice.
Plaintiffs now maintain that the lower court erred (1) in holding that it had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) in taking into consideration defendants’ answer in determining jurisdiction; and (3) in dismissing the case without defendants’ having filed a motion to dismiss.
Appellants designate their action as one for “specific performance with damages and preliminary mandatory injunction.” This description, however, is not necessarily conclusive as to the nature of the action. In the complaint, after alleging the conditions of their employment, appellants state the manner of their dismissal, thus:
“That, predicating their action on the notices to the plaintiffs, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A to A-8, which notices are not based on any of the causes specifically provided by law for dismissal of employees and violate their contractual obligations with the plaintiffs, the defendants have dismissed the herein plaintiffs from employment with them as shown in the letters, copies of which are hereto attached as annexes B to B-8 and made integral parts hereof.” (par. 4, complaint)
The above-mentioned annexes to the complaint are deemed part thereof and should be considered together with the formal allegations therein[1] in order to arrive at correct conclusion as to the nature of the action. Annexes A to A-8 are individual letters dated August 11, 1958, sent by appellee Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas to appellants, informing them that on April 12, 1958 said company and the UCCLA entered into a collective bargaining agreement, one of the terms of which was that those employees who were not yet members of the union should be required to become members 15 days from the signing of the agreement, and should continue to be so as a condition of their continued employment; that the UCCLA had formally demanded from the company that appellants, who were not members of said union, comply with said provision within 30 days from notice; and that if appellants failed to register within said period, without the UCCLA having withdrawn its demands with respect to them, the company would be constrained to consider them separated from the service. Annexes B to B-8 are individual letters to appellants, informing them that since they failed to affiliate themselves with the UCCLA, and the latter had demanded prompt implementation of the closed-shop agreement, they were considered dismissed as of that date.
In effect, therefore, the complaint avers that appellants were employees of appellees, and that upon their failure to become members of the UCCLA as required by appellees, the latter dismissed them. This is a clear statement of an unfair labor practice committed by the employers,[2] cognizance of which, there being in the petition a prayer for reinstatement, as in this case, is given to the Court of Industrial Relations.[3]
Appellants insist that what they seek is not the prosecution of an unfair labor practice but the specific performance of their contracts of employment which had been violated by the unwarranted dismissals. Be that as it may, the alleged manner in which the employment contracts were breached, as described by appellants themselves, placed the case outside the jurisdiction of the lower court.
A contract of employment may be violated by the employer by unjustifiably dismissing the employee, in which case the general law of contracts applies, and the action to compel the employer to reinstate the employee is cognizable by the court of first instance. However, if the dismissal is discriminatory—though also a breach of a private contract ordinarily remediable by rescission or reinstatement by way of specific performance—it constitutes a violation of a public right which the law specifically protects, and for the redress of which a specific procedure in a designated court, i.e., the Industrial Court must be followed.[4]
Upon finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case, the lower court correctly dismissed it, even though appellees had not moved for dismissal.[5]
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.