[ G.R. No. L-13790. October 31, 1963 ] 118 Phil. 1142
[ G.R. No. L-13790. October 31, 1963 ]
KUA SUY ALIAS KWAN SAY DEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLEES VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Case No. 33407. Appellees Kua Suy and her three minor sons, all of Chinese nationality, had sued the appellant Commissioner of Immigration to have him enjoined from expelling appellees as overstaying visitors, and confiscating their P34,000 cash bond. The case was submitted upon the following stipulated facts:
“1. That petitioners, who are respectively the wife and minor children of Liu Giok In, a Chinese and permanent resident merchant in the Philippines, were admitted as temporary visitors in the country on June 17, 1955 with an authorized stay of 3 months only.
“2. That on August 4, 1955, that is before the expiration of their original authorized period of temporary stay in this country petitioners, through their counsel, requested the Secretary of Foreign Affairs fcr permission to remain in this country for a period not exceeding the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of Liu Giok In, husband/father, of the petitioners which request was granted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and notice thereof was sent to the respondent by way of 1st indorsement dated August 15, 1955, subject to the following conditions:
‘(a) That subject aliens will have their reentry permits to Hongkong kept valid during their temporary stay in this country or until the determination of the naturalization proceedings of aforesaid husband father.
‘(b) That non-immigrant statute and cash bond as prescribed by the resolution of the cabinet on March 19, 1954 are mentioned.
‘(c) That the said minor sons of Liu Giok In are actually enrolled in any of the public or government recognized government public school during the entire period of their temporary stay in this country.
‘(d) That the proceedings for the naturalization of the alien husband/father shall be pursued in good faith and without unnecessary delay and should it fail to prosper their permits shall be deemed cancelled and they shall immediately voluntarily leave the country.’
" ‘3. That the petitioners have complied with the conditions imposed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs relative to the extension of their temporary stay in this country.
" ‘4. That on June 24, 1957, the respondent called attention of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the fact that the petitioners who are staying in this country by virtue of the extension of their stay as mentioned above, have been staying in this country beyond the period that which is allowed by the Immigration Law and asked whether petitioners should be allowed to stay further.
" ‘5. That on August 2, 1957 the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs informed the respondent that the said department is unable to authorize the further extension of petitioners herein and suggested to respondent that petitioners be required to leave the Philippines immediately.
" ‘6. That in line with the aforesaid directive from the Department of Foreign Affairs, respondent requested the petitioners to leave the Philippines voluntarily within 3 days from receipt, otherwise drastic action for their forcible removal may be taken by his Office and the cash bond posted in their behalf declared forfeited.
" ‘7. That as a result of the abovementioned letter of the respondent, petitioners filed the present petition. This Honorable Court granted a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the petition of the surety bond in the amount of P5,000.00 restraining the respondent from causing the forcible removal of petitioners from the country and confiscating the cash bond of P34,000.00 deposited by Liu Giok In until further orders from the Court.
" ‘8. That on August 17, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Case No. 40, rendered a decision granting Liu Giok In’s petition for naturalization, which decision became final without an appeal taken therefrom by the government.’”
On 28 March 1958, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment granting a writ of injunction as prayed for on the ground that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, in its Civil Case No. 40, granting naturalization to Liu Giok In, Kua Suy’s husband (and father of the other petitioners-appellees), and dated 17 August 1957, having become final, the Immigration Commissioner’s order for appellees to leave the Islands within three days from notice had “become untenable”, and any implementation of said order “is evidently in excess of his power and jurisdiction and inconsistent with the provisions” of the naturalization law.
From this decision the Commissioner has duly appealed.
The decision must be reversed.
In the first place, the finality of the 1957 decision declaring the husband of Kua Suy to be qualified for naturalization does not automatically make him a Filipino citizen, since the law prescribes a further probationary period of two years before he can take an oath of allegiance. Until then, and only upon proof that he complied with the statutory requirements, the applicant does not become naturalized as a citizen; much less would citizenship be extended to his wife and children, appellee herein. Therefore, the latter remained aliens at the time the appealed decision was rendered, and since there is no question that they had exhausted, the maximum period alloted them as temporary: visitors, it was the appellant Commissioner’s right, nay, his duty, to expel appellees.
Appellees invoke the benefits of an alleged Cabinet resolution of 29 February 1956 that authorized the extension of the period of stay of aliens Tan Ban and Go Siok Yan. But paragraph 5 of the stipulation of facts clearly shows that in the case of present appellees, the extension granted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was definitely terminated on 2 August 1957, and the Immigration Commissioner was then set free to proceed with the appellees’ expulsion. Only the injunction issued by the trial court stopped the Commissioner from doing so.
It is also argued that the Secretary of Justice (who is the administrative superior of the Commissioner of Immigration), by Opinion (No. 287, dated 3 December 1958, extended appellees’ stay until the expiration of the husband’s two-year probationary period. It appears, however, that the same Secretary revoked the opinion referred to, on 5 February 1959, because his prior opinion was obtained without full disclosure of facts and circumstances.
That the husband Liu Giok In should have finally taken his oath of allegiance in 1959, when this appeal was already pending, does not improve the case for appellees. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she “might herself be lawfully naturalized”, so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ka vs. Galang, 101 Phil., 459; 54 Off. Gaz., 356; and in Cua vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 101 Phil., 521; 53 Off. Gaz., 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy. As to the minor children, it is to be observed that the same section (paragraph 3) of the naturalization law extends citizenship to & foreign-born minor child “if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent”, and, of course, “dwelling” must necessarily be construed to mean “lawful residence”. Since prior to the time the father of these appellees took his oath of allegiance (on 24 August 1959), the lawful period of stay of these children had already expired in 1957, and they had been already required to leave the Islands, plainly they were no longer lawfully residing therein and have no right to be considered as also naturalized. The naturalization Act was certainly not intended to be an excuse for violations of our immigration laws.
This case, and many others of the same nature that this Court has had to decide, are strong evidence of a tendency on the part of certain aliens to enter on temporary visitors’ permits and thereafter rely on the improvident issuance of injunctions in immigration cases by the Courts of First Instance; for even if the error is subsequently corrected on appeal, such aliens are meanwhile able to unduly prolong their illegal stay, in violation of our country’s immigration laws and policies. We can not, therefore, overemphasize the need of extreme caution in issuing such injunctions. Aliens who voluntarily enter under temporary permits must be strictly required to abide by the periods fixed therein, because laxity in this matter would merely encourage entry under false pretenses.
The appellees’ plain remedy is to first leave the country as they promised, and thereafter secure permission to reenter permanently.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby revoked and set aside. Costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur. Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.